

Samhandling and Trust in Military Leadership Structures

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Abstract: The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the importance of trust in military *samhandling*. Trust serves as one of the main prerequisites for effective collaboration (Kouzes & Posner, 2003). The Norwegian Armed Forces' (NAF) core business is the planning and execution of military operations (Forsvarsstaben, 2014). One of the main tasks of the NAF is to plan for the unexpected and, ultimately, for war. The chapter further discuss trust in military leadership, and leadership and situational awareness. Leadership as a social interaction process that builds trust is discussed, and *samhandling* is seen in a military context. A basic "trust-based model" of *samhandling* is introduced and viewed in terms of internal and external framework factors. The chapter concludes that trust is still quite an open concept, and that trust is essential for the effective accomplishment of military missions. The basic trust model is an attempt to underline understanding of the importance of trust in a military planning and leadership context.

Keywords: *Samhandling*, interaction, trust, military leadership, preparedness, organizational learning, unforeseen.

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Introduction

We begin this chapter with a short introduction to the importance of trust in the military. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the importance of trust in military *samhandling* (interaction, cooperation). We then continue to discuss trust in military leadership, and leadership and situational awareness. After this, we continue to discuss leadership as a social interaction process that builds trust. We then introduce *samhandling*, discussing this in a military context. After that, we discuss what military leadership is and explain military leadership structures. We then introduce a basic trust-based model of *samhandling* and discuss the model and its elements in terms of internal and external frame factors. Finally, we conclude that trust is still quite an open concept, and that trust is essential for the effective accomplishment of military missions. Our model is an attempt to pinpoint the understanding of the importance of trust in a military planning and leadership context.

The importance of trust has long been recognized (see for instance Stouffer, Adams, Sartori & Thompson, 2008). Trust also serves as one of the main prerequisites for effective collaboration (Kouzes & Posner, 2003). The Norwegian Armed Forces' (NAF) core business is the planning and execution of military operations (Forsvarsstaben, 2014). One of the main tasks of the NAF is to plan for the unexpected, and ultimately for war. The nature of warfare itself is distinguished by uncertainty and randomness (Clausewitz, 1832/1976). Warfare consists of many complex factors. The unforeseen is by no means a closed concept, it is rather a relatively open expression (Kvernbekk, Torgersen, & Moe, 2015). In the military context, the essence lies in forestalling the unforeseen in the best possible way, through gathering intelligence, planning, structured training and learning. *Samhandling* is needed to make this happen.

The core of the concept of *samhandling* is closely related to leadership. In a military sense, we can say that it is about gaining experience and learning from each other during the process (Torgersen & Steiro, 2009). For the NAF, *samhandling* is about the ability to lead planning of military operations as effectively as possible. There is broad agreement that trust is an important factor of interaction between different participants within an organization (see for instance Delhey, Newton, & Welzel, 2011). Trust

can be considered as the willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of another group member (be it a leader, subordinate or colleague), based on a sense of security towards another group member (Sweeney, Lester, & Matthews, 2011).¹

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the importance of trust in military *samhandling*. Specifically, we discuss the importance of trust when planning, leading and executing military operations, which by their nature occur under complex conditions.

Trust and leadership

Trust in military leadership

In the research literature, there is an ongoing and not-unexpected discussion about how the concept of trust should be defined and understood (Sonnenberg, 2015). Trust is a tool that helps individuals to deal with uncertainty and in a better way expect different outcomes (Luhmann, 2000). Kramer and Tyler (1996) highlight the idea that trust helps us dare to work with others to solve common tasks. Piotr Sztompka (1999) defines trust as: “a bet about the future contingent actions of others.” (p. 25). This definition seems fitting for our purpose. It assimilates very well the unforeseen, and we find elements of *samhandling* implicit in the definition. So far, there is no complete definition of trust in a military sense (Brandebo, 2015). Trust is not new regarding *samhandling*. According to the renowned scientist Elinor Ostrom, trust and interaction are as old as humanity itself (Høyer, Kasa, & Tranøy, 2016). Trust and *samhandling* are therefore fundamental to our existence.

1 Trust is necessary and essential for a leader to be able to exercise influence in combat. Soldiers who trust their leaders allow them a greater degree of influence regarding the soldiers' readiness to follow directives and motivation to perform duties to complete missions (Sweeney, Lester, & Matthews, 2011). Trust is a psychological mechanism that gives the personnel a feeling of security, even in dangerous situations, and the necessary willingness to accomplish what it takes to solve the mission. The leader must earn the trust of his/her group members through actions and communication. If the soldiers trust their leader, they will provide him/her with clear and timely information. They will not hesitate to give their own personal opinions, which can be very useful. In addition, they get used to voicing possible problems and possible solutions to their leader (Sweeney, Lester & Matthews, 2011).

In recent years, the concept of trust has come under pressure. We see this for example in relation to the implementation of New Public Management (NPM), also in military governance. The basic idea of NPM is that the public sector can be made more efficient through the use of organizational structures from both the public and private business sectors (Busch, Johnson, & Vanebo, 2002). According to Bryson, Crosby and Bloomberg (2014), NPM arose out of a concern with government failures, a belief in the efficacy and efficiency of markets, a belief in economic rationality, and a push away from large, centralized government agencies towards devolution and privatization. NPM refers to a broad trend of institutional developments, implying that principles of governance inspired by private organizations should replace the hierarchical structures of old bureaucracies in the public sector (see e.g. Almklov & Antonsen, 2014; Christensen & Lægneid, 2001, 2007; Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, & Tinkler, 2006; Hood, 1991). NPM as a “control doctrine” has its roots in liberal politicians’ underlying mistrust of staff and decision-making in the public sector (Busch, Johnson, & Vanebo, 2002). NPM is not a topic as such in this chapter, but it is worth mentioning because NPM in military governance challenges our message that trust is crucial for leadership in the military.

Leadership and situational awareness

Martinsen (2005) states that leadership matters. We argue that this also applies in today’s network-based NAF, where one might think that the picture of any situation is very well distributed and understood, so that no particular intervention is needed from one side or the other. The concept of situational awareness (SA) is used to describe the condition in which a person, group or organization has both an overview and understanding of a situation. Endsley (1988) has defined SA as “the perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future” (Endsley, 1988:97). This is fundamentally problematic, because no humans perceive things alike. A realistic SA, therefore requires leaders who work with the community and activate all the resources of a team (Forsvarsstaben, 2012). We shall see later that SA is

closely related to the concept of sensemaking in military leadership and planning processes.

The key trends during the last 100 years of research on leaders and the importance of leadership show that leaders' personality traits, intelligence and leadership behavior can have a good to very good effect on efficiency and profitability. Charismatic and transformation-oriented leadership also has a good effect. The quality of the relationship between leaders and co-workers also has an impact on efficiency and profitability (Martinsen, 2005). Good and effective leadership is mainly about creating good results through others. The results created together in the NAF contribute to an increased operational capability. It is therefore sensible that the political leadership of the NAF has selected leadership, competence and a culture of continuous improvement as the most important areas for further development (Forsvarsstaben, 2014).

Leadership as a social interaction process, building trust

Yukl (2012) defines leadership as a social interaction process. Leadership is about relationships and jointly developing a good environment in the group. Good relationships affect work performance and achievement in a positive way. Decentralization gives the leader a particular responsibility to develop leadership into a collective process. To describe leadership as a collective process is a necessary consequence of the leadership philosophy behind mission command. "Mission command" (Ben-Shalom & Shamir, 2011) is referred to as *oppdragsbasert ledelse* (OBL) in Norwegian (Forsvarsstaben, 2007; 2014).

The leader will always have an overall responsibility to make sure the team functions and develops and that results are being achieved. Taking part in this responsibility contributes to trust and to an overall understanding, which in turn helps the hierarchy to function when needed. (Forsvarsstaben, 2012). In addition, military leadership requires – if it is to be good and efficient, that the leader exhibits balanced leadership behavior. This leadership behavior can be categorized by three primary target areas: 1. mission focus, efficiency and performance; 2. teamwork,

activation of human resources; and 3. development, innovation and adaptability (ibid.). In Norway, military leadership is about balancing these areas in a natural and credible manner. Embedded within this, trust is a subliminal force that enables social interaction between people.

Military leadership is about the leader's characteristics and behavior, and the interaction between leaders and subordinates. Besides this, several external factors, that is, system variables such as organizational structure, situation, context, and coincidences, may affect leadership (Forsvarsstaben, 2012.) This means that leaders, in cooperation with subordinates, in a targeted manner structures, organize, influence and legitimize the business. Therefore, we may suspect that trust in *samhandling* has a significant function, in that it contributes significantly to the effective accomplishment of military missions.

***Samhandling* in a military context**

The concept of *samhandling* is, as we have seen, a relatively open expression. The concept is used in many contexts by agencies, companies, researchers and textbook authors (Torgersen & Steiro, 2009). The term is also closely related to leadership and trust. We will look at some of them and then put the concept into a military context. At the same time, the concept of *samhandling* is utilized at both organizational, group and individual level in connection with strategic management, competency management, education and training, where the technology structures are also included. Torgersen postulates that the concept of *samhandling* has an effect on all sectors and levels (personal communication, September 29, 2016). Over time, the word has also gained importance as an action, or interaction, in the interface between people, organizations, groups, departments, etc. This makes it particularly interesting in relation to the NAF, where the planning and execution of operations are strongly influenced by *samhandling* ability both within units, between units and between organizational elements and -levels.

The concept of *samhandling* is applied in the Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine (FFOD) from 2014 (Forsvarsstaben, 2014). In FFOD, *samhandling* deals with both processes between people, between

the structural elements and levels of the organization, including the conversion of political ambitions into military operations. Among other things, this document states that “The *samhandling* between levels is dynamic and goes both ways, as well as *samhandling* with sibling entities, such as civilian agencies or allied headquarters and forces.” (author’s translation). The term is also used in conjunction with inter-operability, i.e., the ability to operate together. The latter is significant in relation to effective accomplishment of missions and is related to trust, in that trust contributes to better and/or more efficient *samhandling*.

In military literature outside of Norway, we find a similar, if not identical meaning for the term. In English, often-used terms are cooperation, collaboration, coordination or most commonly, interaction. “*Leaders could influence the efforts of subordinates by clarifying their roles and developing their abilities, organizing the structure of work, encouraging cooperation and teamwork,*” (Horn & Walker, 2008:494), is one such example in a military context. Another is; “*Leaders must be able to lead, but they must also be ready to liaise, persuade and cooperate, whoever the protagonist or strange the environment.*” (Jans, Mugford, Cullens, & Frazer-Jans, 2013: preface). And, “*The performance of an organization depends in part on the level of cooperation and coordination among interdependent leaders.*” (Yukl, 2015:466). This shows that the English equivalents of the term *samhandling* have embedded both key elements of group and team theory, as well as elements of general leadership theory. We can also clearly see implicit elements of interaction and trust.

The absolutely-essential element in military planning processes – that is, their outcome, is effective accomplishment of missions. The object, or the desired final end-state of the operation, always has the main focus. To achieve this, the process is dependent upon several factors. Trust is possibly the most important because it is essential for effective decentralization, dealing with unplanned events, making the most of skills and expertise, and targeted initiatives and drives (Forsvarsstaben, 2012). Effective planning and control of military operations requires, among other things, good leadership (Forsvarsstaben, 2014) and the establishment of SA (ibid.). Since trust is presumably essential for efficiency, the leader’s role and his or her ability to convey the intent and desired

end-state becomes important to both trust and SA. Establishing SA, often a common one, is a challenging task. The leader produces and delivers (*read*: communicates), on the spot, a translation of his/her perception that is consumed by “users”. In our case, primarily staff and/or subordinate commanders. Shared mental models are important when it comes to establishing a common SA (Endsley, 1995). However, different conditions can complicate communication, including the ability and willingness to transform the leader’s intention into practical action (Forsvarsstaben, 2014). This therefore requires trust and *samhandling*.

We argue that the quality of *samhandling* is dependent on both the commander’s ability to exercise discretion and framework factors in the communication situation. One factor may be the leader’s relationship with those that he or she interacts with. Saltnes Urdal (2015) argues that when services are provided in collaboration with the users’ requirements and participation in the situation, the users (for instance, the staff) will help to create the service and act as co-producers. *Samhandling* in the communication process is, as such, a mediator in relation to avoiding misunderstandings.

Military leadership

Leadership in the NAF does not occur in a vacuum; it happens together with other people (Forsvarsstaben, 2012). Leadership is a relational concept that presupposes a mutual collaboration between leaders and employees. Therefore, leaders in many ways are also team players (Glasø, 2008). All military planning and leadership processes involve *samhandling* between two or more people. *Samhandling* takes place not only between individuals, but also with leaders who take overall responsibility and cooperate across organizational boundaries (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2014). Knowledge and trust in each other is important. Trust is described as the main cornerstone of the NAF leadership philosophy: Mission command, or *oppdragsbasert ledelse* (OBL) in Norwegian (Forsvarsstaben, 2012). OBL highlights leadership through common attitudes and a common approach, rather than management through strict rules and over-control.

Trust is essential for this process to take place effectively. This applies at all levels. Effective processes require, among other things, cooperation across the whole range, i.e. between individuals, between groups and organizational elements, and between organizations and organizational elements. The latter is usually called “organizational *samhandling*” and trust is highlighted as a key prerequisite for its success (see Gottschalk & Solli-Saether, 2008). The leader of the current level can be considered as a “team leader”. The leader is responsible for identifying and defining the assignments, deciding what should and should not be done in a team process (Hjertø, 2009).

According to Parrington and Findlay (2013), one of the leader’s most important tasks is to build and maintain trust. The importance of the military commander in leading planning processes has been written about extensively in military doctrines and military leadership literature. It is clear that the leader alone cannot achieve this. *Samhandling* is required. The term *samhandling* has, until very recently, been used relatively infrequently in a military sense in Norway. In the Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine (FFOD) from 2014 (Forsvarsstaben, 2014), the concept is utilized to a certain extent. This doctrine is a normative document that discloses principles in connection with the planning and implementation of joint operations, in addition to other things. FFOD is also a learning tool that is intended for the NAF schools and educational system (ibid). In the doctrine, the importance of *samhandling* between different subsystems, between people, and between departments and systems is emphasized.

These doctrinal, or normative documents very often describe ideals. When it comes to practice, our experience is that the reality is much more complex. In fact, the doctrinal reality often becomes too hard to practice, and may in many cases be abandoned.

Military leadership structures

To better understand *samhandling*, trust and efficiency, it is important to look closely at how military forces (*read*: units) are organized, and which leadership structures we find. The organization and the formal structures

form a framework for how *samhandling* and trust can be created and acted upon. The NAF is a highly hierarchical organization, and the organizational form is the result of centuries of development. The organization (structure) itself is, however, not enough to create interaction or trust.

The organizational structure should be an instrument for solving problems, creating transparency, predictability, and effective communication within the organization (Torgersen & Steiro, 2009). The current organization of military units is a *result* of the tasks that must be solved most effectively. Military forces are hierarchically organized in groups and units of varying sizes. There is a formal leader in each group/unit and at every level. This means that there are many leaders. We like to think that leaders are often people who would like to get something done, meaning that they have an inner drive. This can function as both a support and as a hindrance for *samhandling* and output, the effective accomplishment of missions. The leader has formal authority or power through his or her position and rank. That does not mean that the leader's power is always legitimate. Power is founded on various "power bases": respectively, reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, reference power and expert power (Vecchio, 2009). The leader is, nevertheless, a central figure.

The organizational form of military organizations is a line and staff organization, which can be traced back to the organization of the Prussian army at the end of the 18th century (Nytrø, 2006). As mentioned before, the organizational form is chosen based on the desire to have the most effective accomplishment of the assigned missions. The organizational form still has its challenges. The line organization executes the mission, and the staff are intended to provide a supportive function, in principle. Unfortunately, it is never as easy as this. This is presumably valid for many organizations. There are several assumptions that must be present for *samhandling* to function effectively. Trust is one of them, perhaps the most important. The leader must trust that the staff possesses the competence he or she alone does not have. The staff must have faith in their leader to trust the knowledge of the specialists and what they do, and that he or she gives them the necessary leeway, direction and support.

Effective *samhandling* can only take place if the line organization and the staff trust each other. Unfortunately, that is not always the case. This

may ultimately result in unnecessary casualties. On the other hand, too much trust can also lead to challenges. A survey conducted by the Office of the Auditor General in Norway (Riksrevisjonen, 2011) has shown that the existing culture of the NAF is based on trust. This culture of trust has, in some cases, led to inadequate internal control procedures because of the mutual trust between the staff members. Certain procurements were carried out contrary to the current regulations (Boe & Kvalvik, 2015).

To mediate this, military forces have introduced a command and control (C2) system consisting of personnel, materials, methods and procedures (Forsvarsstaben, 2014). C2 is central to integrate, synchronize and control military operations across units, both horizontally and vertically (Andersen & Ødegaard, 2016). Hence, it can be viewed as a typical control system. We might ask ourselves whether C2 contributes to more and/or better trust. We assume that the system should at least be able to facilitate increased and/or better *samhandling*. Military leadership structures are not in themselves enough to either promote or maintain *samhandling* or trust. The processes in planning operations must be led, and leadership, as we have seen, has a clear interactionist perspective (Wadel, 2012). Wadel also highlights the relational perspective of leadership.

We have seen that trust is at the core of any relationship. We can therefore argue, with good reason, that trust is also the core of leadership, since leadership is just about relationships. According to constructivist theory, language creates meaning (Bruner, 1990; Skagen, 2013). Opinion formation also takes place in the leadership process. We can refer to this as a *collective relational reality orientation*. Consequently, our questions are: How often do we talk about trust in our own practice? Or, in other words, how often do we use the word “trust”? Can it be that the more often we talk about trust, the greater the importance of the concept? Do we see here the seeds of a new and improved practice in the planning of military operations?

Therefore, trust can only be considered if one understands how such collective relational realities function. C. Grenness (personal communication, September 27, 2007) points out that for the leadership process to be more efficient, we must learn to communicate about the relational reality (e.g. implicit norms, culture), and begin with simple, dynamic conversations. What do we think and feel about trust in our own organization? This

has implications for dealing with the unexpected. By talking about trust and thereby creating a collective relational reality, it will open up for a collective formation of opinion. This can enable us to relate more effectively to the basic issues and problems, so that they can be addressed and resolved.

A basic trust-based model of *samhandling*

Trust is thus the core of all relations, also in a military context. We find it therefore natural to put trust into a basic model, using a *relational model for learning methods* (Figure 17.1) as a starting point. There are many factors that affect trust, specifically *samhandling* and relationships within and between the individual elements in the model (numbered 1–6). The model is primarily designed for joint military operations.

Trust in *samhandling* is essential for any effective mission accomplishment. This may seem obvious, but it is dependent on many elements. The model in Figure 17.1 is an attempt to simplify a very complex reality and should be understood as such. The model is a draft of such a context and may provide a starting point for analysis and reflection, as a basis for improved practices. It has its origin in a slightly processed version of the




Figure 17.1 A basic trust-based model of *samhandling*

relational didactic model (Pettersen, 2005). *Samhandling* – and probably the most important factor *trust* is obvious in this context. Perhaps the model can also help to see planning and leadership processes from a fresh perspective.

Pettersen (2005) points out that models for learning methods, in principle, have been developed from a teaching perspective where learning is central. For our purposes, such an approach is nevertheless applicable. In the attempt to clarify interaction and the relationship between the different elements, we must consider all efforts involved in analyzing, planning and carrying out military operations. Specifically, this means that when we reflect on, analyze and act in relation to one element, we must also consider the other elements, because choices and/or decisions related to one element will have consequences for the others.

In military terms, this means that the planning and execution of military operations is essential if one wants to forestall the unforeseen in the best way possible, as stated in the introduction. This occurs through intelligence, planning, structured training and learning during the process. *Samhandling* is therefore necessary to make this happen. It therefore seems appropriate to have a relational learning perspective on military planning and leadership processes.

Figure 17.1 is an attempt to simplify the complex processes that may occur in planning and executing military operations. Trust is at the core of the model and may be considered as the prerequisite for effective *samhandling*. The entire planning process for joint operations is not the intention of this part of the chapter. This is described in NATO's planning doctrine, AJP-5 (NATO, 2013).

Planning and leading military operations are influenced firstly by a set of external frame factors, such as the current policy, military strategic ambitions, laws, agreements, conventions and available forces. The external frame factors affect all the elements, especially the Commanding Officer's (CO, no. 1 in the above figure) opportunities to achieve the purpose or desired outcome of the operation.

There are also internal frame factors in the model. These are matters within the participants' control and maneuverability. They are conditions that the organization and the participants as a collective have designed

and determined (ibid.). This may involve specific plans and models for the planning and execution of an operation. The *operational design* can be said to be such an inner frame factor. This will be explained later.

The central theme of the model is mutual relations, including *samhandling* and trust as its core elements. Without *samhandling* and trust within and between the elements, the mission will not be accomplished effectively. The desired outcome then becomes difficult to achieve.

The planning and leadership process is also affected by these interdependent elements:

- (1) *The Commanding Officer (CO)* is responsible for the military force's overall operations, a responsibility which he or she cannot delegate to others. The CO will primarily act through his or her staff and the line organization (Forsvarsstaben, 2014). The CO influences the staff through their leadership style and understanding of the situation, i.e. mission, frame factors and the time factor (Nord & Andersen, 2016). The CO always has the primary responsibility for achieving the purpose or desired end-state of the operation². This is the reason the arrow is pointed towards the end-state in the model.

In addition, there is an area that lies between the leader and the desired end-state – *the operational design*. The operational design is a tool for internal communication and is a separate attachment to the operational plan. This deals with two things: The operational framework and the leader's intention (Ljøterud, 2016). Operational design is intended to give the leader the leeway he or she needs to transform the decisions into activities that can accomplish the mission most effectively. This requires a high degree of SA, *samhandling* and trust. We can certainly say that this is an inner framing factor.

- (2) *The superior level*. In modern Norwegian society, the military forces are politically governed. This means that military leaders do not

² We should not forget the CO's chief of staff (COS). He or she is often the key to the optimal accomplishment of the internal processes within the staff (Ljøterud, 2016).

have the same leeway that they would have in a military dictatorship, for instance. The superior level is, therefore, a particularly important element in planning and accomplishing military operations. The superior level can interact with the CO, which is most common, or directly with the staff and subordinate levels. The latter has become more widespread because of the implementation of new information technology, which makes it easier to monitor any situation.

- (3) *The staff* will always work on behalf of the leader and pave the way for those who fight the battles, that is, subordinate units and leaders. They have a mutual influence on each other. The staff also helps the CO to focus on the big picture and to think ahead.
- (4) *The subordinate commanders and units* are both the CO's and the staff's advisors, in addition to being those who carry out the mission. This element is therefore extremely important for an effective accomplishment of missions. Here one will often find a lot of expertise concerning the conduct of joint operations. They interact closely with the CO and the staff.
- (5) The *purpose* or desired *end-state* (of the operation) – is the overriding focus. The solution or intended achievement of the operation always takes first priority. That is why there is an arrow between the leader (CO) and this element. It might be argued that the purpose or desired end-state for any military operation is not a separate element. This means that it consists of individuals who interact directly with the other elements in the model. We would argue that this is not quite the case. The reason for this is that planning and leadership of military (joint or joint/combined) operations require integration and coordination. This is closely related to the *what* of didactics. That is what we are trying to do and intend to achieve. In the military sense, this relationship becomes clear in that we primarily need to find out *what* the military force is supposed to achieve before we launch the operation. This requires *samhandling*, which in turn requires a dynamic process where the formulation of purpose(s) is constantly subject to change. These dynamics will consequently have implications for the other elements in the model.

- (6) Last, but not least – *Civilian expertise*. All military operations affect civil society in various ways. The use of civilian expertise in planning military operations is, therefore, a central element that can help to provide detailed knowledge of the operation area, including topography, infrastructure and the civil population (Ljøterud, 2016). Integration of civilian expertise may therefore contribute to better *samhandling* and mutual trust between the civilian society and the military organization. This will, in turn, affect the desired outcome.

Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter was to discuss the importance of trust in military *samhandling*. The most common notion of trust seems to be of a psychological nature (Brandebo, 2015). This means that trust has a perceived vulnerability or risk. Individual perceptions of others' motives, intentions and actions are important. Trust in *samhandling* becomes particularly clear in a military context, in which vulnerability, risk, unpredictability and uncertainty affect the situation. Therefore, it is crucial that both military leaders and subordinates trust each other. That means, among other things, that they both need to act dutifully and not expose each other to unnecessary risk.

Trust is still a relatively open concept, perhaps especially so in the military sense. With a high degree of certainty, we can say that trust is the core of military relations and is crucial for effective *samhandling*. Trust is, therefore, of the utmost importance for the effective accomplishment of military missions and for maintaining a durable contract between the NAF and a democratic Norwegian society. Anything else is fictitious and can have potentially devastating consequences.

We can conclude that trust in and between military leaders is not only essential for the effective accomplishment of missions; trust is also crucial in terms of mental and physical well-being (Brandebo, 2015). To quote Brandebo further: "*Trust in leaders has been highlighted as a core variable and a prominent mechanism for subordinates' well-being, job satisfaction and motivation, amongst other things.*" (Brandebo, 2015:128–129). This quotation clearly emphasizes the importance of trust.

The model presented in this chapter will hopefully contribute to an enhanced understanding of the importance of trust in a military planning and leadership process. Planning and executing military operations is a complex process. Trust is at the core of the model and may be considered as a prerequisite for effective *samhandling*. Trust serves as the “glue”, helping to streamline and more effectively accomplish any given mission. By identifying both the external and internal frame factors, as well as the individual elements of the proposed model, it is possible to develop and implement specific strategies and educational programs in different areas of the NAF. In addition, we also think that our model may be useful for other types of organizations similar to the NAF, known as high-risk organizations (Picano & Roland, 2012). Trust is also a very important factor for *samhandling* for them. It is possible for these organizations to use the model, adapting it to their specific, organizational needs.

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