

The Relevance of *Samhandling* in Military Doctrines

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Abstract: Military leaders are faced with high expectations when it comes to handling unforeseen situations in joint military operations. This chapter aims to present a nuanced professional and pedagogical discussion of how an increased awareness of the concept of *samhandling* in the use of military doctrines may contribute to the professionalization of military higher education. Different doctrines reflect different theoretical decisions. They are given relevance in education as a way to illustrate formal examples of what is preferred and what is rejected. As doctrines are built on experiences from real-life scenarios, as well as on predictions and strategies for possible change, they may serve as a way of balancing the branch-specific “hidden curriculum”, i.e. an established culture with a set of current values, behavior and thinking that have been developed over time in the organization. The findings in the current case study indicate that military doctrines are regarded as important in leadership training at the Norwegian Military Academy, especially when it comes to understanding and guiding *samhandling* in unforeseen and risk-oriented situations. However, at the same time, the terms used to describe *samhandling* in military doctrines found relevant in education at the Norwegian Military Academy are numerous, vague and somewhat overlapping. It seems crucial to raise awareness of the underlying processes and the relational ambition level that forms the basis of the chosen term. It is advantageous to reach a collective understanding of the kind of skills that need to be developed and trained. Another benefit of such analysis is to provide a basis for clarified learning goals and practical scenario development through exercises and other teaching plans in leadership education, as well as the evaluation of this, both in terms of learning outcomes and education as a whole.

Keywords: *Samhandling*, curriculum, doctrines, interaction, collaboration, organizational learning, military training, unforeseen.

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Introduction

Military organizations today must deal with very high levels of uncertainty, as a result of the international political environment, the possibility of direct intervention by formal authorities, and the very nature of combat (Posen, 2016). New and changing forms of terrorism and cyber-attacks, the latter in combination with other efforts, are also parts of the threats both for the Armed forces and for civilian organizations. Leaders, and particular military leaders and leaders responsible for preparedness are now faced with high expectations when handling unforeseen situations in combined operations, also related to cyber operations and terrorism. *Samhandling* (interaction) is believed to have an increased relevance to meet the challenges. In addition, the level of uncertainty is increased because of the mixed motives of organizational participants, and the fact that military organizations do not get much realistic practice (Posen, 2016; Carlsten, Hybertsen & Heggem, 2015; Carlsten, Skaug & Haugdal, 2016). Military leaders are now faced with high expectations when it comes to handling unforeseen situations. One way of preparing new leaders for interaction under uncertain circumstances has been, for a long time, to introduce different doctrines into leadership curricula.

Different doctrines reflect different theoretical decisions. They are given relevance in education as a way to illustrate formal examples of what is preferred and what is rejected. As doctrines are built on experiences from real-life scenarios, as well as on predictions and strategies for possible change, they may serve as a way of balancing the branch-specific “hidden curriculum”, i.e. an established culture with a set of current values, behavior and thinking that have been developed over time in the organization (e.g. Jackson, 1968; Giroux, 1988; Margolis, 2001), with tools to understand and develop competence to handle new ways of *samhandling* in upcoming, unforeseen situations. In order to find concrete examples of educational planning, using both general and operational doctrines as part of the formal curriculum, we have selected the risk-oriented officer leadership education at the Norwegian Military Academy as a specific case in our study.

In this chapter, we aim to present a nuanced professional and pedagogical (educational) discussion of how an increased awareness of the concept of interaction in the use of military doctrines may contribute to

the professionalization of military higher education. The discussion of the relevance of such a concept may be of specific importance at a time when military higher education is increasingly cooperating with the civilian education sector (Carlsten et al., 2016). Therefore, we argue that this chapter is of relevance for both military and civilian higher educational institutions.

More specifically, we ask how *samhandling* (“interaction”) is framed within risk-oriented educational planning using military doctrines. What concepts are used to describe different types of *samhandling* in the relevant doctrines, and how do those responsible for military educational planning judge the relevance of *samhandling* in the central doctrines?

The chapter aims at answering the following questions:

1. What terms are used to identify different constructs and concepts of *samhandling* in doctrines relevant to officer leadership education planning at the Norwegian Military Academy?
2. How do instructors in charge of officer leadership education planning at the Norwegian Military Academy explain how normative understandings of *samhandling* within different doctrines serve to prepare future officers for *samhandling* in unforeseen and risk-oriented situations?
3. How does the leadership of the Norwegian Military Academy explain how doctrines may serve as relevant tools in educational-strategic planning?

Doctrines, the unforeseen and *samhandling*

What is a doctrine and what is its function in terms of getting closer to a nuanced understanding of *samhandling* in risk-oriented educational planning? In our study, we use central discussions in military and educational theory to support us in finding answers to these questions (Andersen, 2016; Zapfe, 2016; Honig, 2016; Kronvall & Petersson, 2016; Posen, 2016; Slensvik & Ydstebø, 2016; Høiback, 2016; 2013; 2012; 2011; Bekkestad, 2012; Jackson, 2013; Torgersen, 2008; Torgersen & Steiro, 2009; Rasmussen, 2006; Kier, 1997; Gordon, 1997; Posen, 1984). Common

to discussions about the role of a doctrine in military theory, is understanding its purpose in providing common operational and administrative procedures, as well as its function as a basis for communication, coordination, cooperation and *samhandling* between military branches and member countries. As Høiback (2016) points out, doctrines serve as tools for operations, education, and change. These three functions have driven defense transformation in Norway, along with threat perception and defense spending (Kronvall & Petersson, 2016).

A doctrine is built on a speculation about what is needed in the future – in an unforeseen scenario. It is also characterized by a certain inertia, and may be understood as a documented tradition more than a guideline for unforeseen situations. How well does a doctrine with such an unclarified foundation address *samhandling* in modern military operations, in providing a realistic foundation for ongoing changes? As pointed out in Chapter 1 in this book, the unforeseen and *samhandling* are linked to the Bow-Tie Model, which shows the phases before, during and after an unforeseen event. *Samhandling* can be beneficial in relation to occurrences and accidents, as illustrated in the Bow-Tie Model. As underlined by Torgersen and Steiro in Chapter 2, there is no standard formula for organizations for developing *samhandling*. Each organization should conceptualize the term individually. Our claim in this chapter is that the study and application of relevant definitions of *samhandling*, as found in central military doctrines, is a recommended starting point in educational planning. We assume that *samhandling* as a term embraces a high relational ambition level, more than just coordination and communication (see Chapter 2).

A common understanding of the relevance of terms used to identify constructs and concepts of *samhandling* in doctrines is central to current risk-oriented education. In our case, the Norwegian term *samhandling* is defined according to Chapter 2 in this book: “*Samhandling is an open and mutual communication and development between participants, who develop skills and complement each other in terms of expertise, either directly, face-to-face, or mediated by technology or manually. It involves working towards common goals. The relationship between participants at any given time relies on trust, involvement, rationality and industry*”

knowledge” (see also Torgersen & Steiro, 2009:130). As further pointed out by Torgersen and Steiro in Chapter 2, for *samhandling* to occur, each participant must contribute with their unique situational understanding. Sørensen (2017) found, in his study of Norwegian civilian maritime crisis collaboration exercises, “... a need for greater emphasis on collaboration learning and usefulness (...)” Furthermore, he recommends “...adopting a national collaboration exercise framework that stresses collaboration development rather than continuation of current practices...” (p. 101).

The unforeseen is by no means a closed concept, but is rather a relatively-open expression (Kvernbekk, Torgersen, & Moe, 2015). “*In the military context, the essence is, in the best possible way, to forestall the unforeseen through intelligence gathering, planning, structured training and learning. Samhandling is needed to make this happen.*” (Bergh & Boe, Chapter 17:310). Bergh and Boe (Chapter 17) further write that military commanders are of great importance for both the leadership of planning processes in military doctrines and military leadership literature. A broader and deeper understanding of the concept of *samhandling*, seen in correspondence with relevant doctrines and both formal and hidden curriculum analyses, could provide the basis for more robust and relevant competency development. We know from earlier studies of the relevance of Norwegian officer leadership education that concepts and structures related to the unforeseen and *samhandling* are diverse and not made sufficiently explicit in curricula and educational strategies (Carlsten et al., 2015; 2016).

Samhandling is a precondition for mastering complex crisis situations with a high risk of loss of life and materials, where action carried out in an integrated process consists of many parties and advanced equipment and technology. Such pedagogical (educational) thinking has, among other things, a basis in encyclopedic reasoning (diversity in competence) (Torgersen, Steiro & Saeverot, 2015; Torgersen, 2008). Antithetically, ambiguities and a lack of conformity in the use of the concept of *samhandling* between doctrines and curricula could provide weaker and more random skill-development in handling unforeseen situations. At the same time, it is paramount that education of each individual officer enables a tailoring of the concept *samhandling*, with corresponding competence in specific core tasks. Such a correspondence between management documents,

concepts and educational content obviously applies to all types of professional education, where many parties are involved in the execution of competence-demanding tasks, and where the conditions are unforeseen and risky.

***Samhandling* in doctrines relevant to educational planning**

Does it matter what words and terms are used in the curricula? Yes; as indicated above, it is important to choose the right words and expressions as the basis for curricula in higher education, especially where education is practical and focuses on the development of creativity and innovation (Jackson et al., 2006). This kind of training often requires sophisticated teaching plans and exercises. It takes time to develop such arrangements. It entails that instructors have a sophisticated planning tool based on current competency expressions and terms, that serves as a substructure for training. In such situations, it is necessary to have a reflected view on key terms used to identify concepts such as *samhandling*, and to what extent they involve the same construct or whether there are nuances. Identifying and applying nuanced meanings will have consequences for the actual teaching plans and the storyboards for exercises and scenarios. If not made explicit, skills that are desired or needed may not necessarily be developed in a qualified and secure way, unique to each situation.

Military doctrines are commonly used as a basis for several topics in military education, as well as for developing learning objectives and content in the higher education institution's curricula. This applies in particular to higher military education for educating officers at staff level. Discussions of terms covering the relationship between military branches are decisive in developing expertise in both branch-specific and cross-branch understandings of interaction and cooperation in domestic and international operations. Different concepts relating to *samhandling*, and varying interpretations of how these same different concepts relate to branch-specific interaction, will influence what kind of competence is desired to be developed among the students. This will be of relevance for the teachers' choice of curriculum content and

competency goals, as well as for how teaching and training plans are facilitated and evaluated, and should be formulated and written down in the school curricula. It is seen as important to use concepts that represent the actual and strategic competence desired to be developed (O'Neill, 2015; Leash, 2015).

Doctrines have been the subject of much research during the past few years. We know from some of the research that doctrines may be a powerful and efficient tool of direction. As Andersen (2016) points out, they may therefore be understood within a paradigm, emphasizing doctrines as functional and rationalistic documents. He points out that this understanding may be more apparent in joint-operational doctrines than in branch-specific doctrines, the reason being that there may be added room for sensitivity to cultural tension in branch-specific documents (Andersen, 2016). There is, however, a lack of knowledge regarding if and how doctrines, as normative documents serving as a basis for domestic and international interaction, may be used for educational purposes as tools to ensure interaction in the planning of unforeseen and risk-oriented situations. In this chapter, therefore, we identify terms used to cover the constructs and concepts of interaction, collaboration, cooperation and joint force in Norwegian documents and NATO doctrines relevant to officer leadership education at the Norwegian Military Academy, and ask how relevant they may be as part of a curriculum aiming to build competence in handling unforeseen situations requiring *samhandling*.

Method and materials

Through a thematic document analysis as well as the analysis of an interview study, we have examined if terms used to identify constructs and concepts of interaction are used in similar ways, or if they seem to stand opposed to each other in educational planning. Studying this possible tension empirically, we designed a study where we examined how joint and branch-specific operation doctrines are used in officer leadership education at the Norwegian Military Academy (Krigsskolen).

The doctrines were identified through an informal survey among central officers in the Norwegian Armed Forces, as well as through the

interviews with instructors and leaders at the Academy. More specifically, the doctrines were thematically studied according to Research Question 1, in order to extract the terms that could encompass the construct and concept of *samhandling*, as defined in Chapter 2 of this book and on page 138 in this chapter.

In the interview study, we developed a semi-structured interview guide. The reason for this was to ensure comparability and congruence in the informants' answers when using terms in the curricula. The reason for keeping it somewhat open was to enable each participant to contribute their understanding of the application of the constructs and concepts of *samhandling* unique to their situation. We identified six informants, representing different roles and backgrounds at the Norwegian Military Academy, which could provide us with sufficient data. Informants 1–4 were instructors, while informants 5 and 6 represented the leadership at the Academy. The sample can be viewed as strategic. The purpose of the study was explained to all of the informants, as well as the research ethics of issues related to confidentiality and confirmed consent. The individual interviews were conducted at the Academy in the spring and fall of 2017, each interview lasting approximately one hour. After the last interview, the data was analyzed by all four authors of this chapter. The data material collected was considered sufficient and no further interviews were regarded necessary. The interviews were analyzed using a thematic methodological approach (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

Results

The following section presents the results of the thematic study.

Terms used in relevant doctrines

What terms are used to identify different constructs and concepts of *samhandling* in doctrines relevant to officer leadership education planning at the Norwegian Military Academy (Research Question 1)? The Norwegian Armed Forces uses the following definition of a basic doctrine: “Basic doctrines are used for the development and application of military forces

in support of national objectives. They are guiding but require judgment in use.”^{1,2} As seen, the definition of a doctrine relevant to identifying terms covering constructs and concepts of *samhandling* in the Norwegian case, exemplify the claim by Torgersen and Steiro in Chapter 2, that there is no standard formula for organizations for developing *samhandling* when analyzing and applying the doctrines in educational planning and in concrete action. As each organization conceptualizes *samhandling* individually, to link unforeseen and risk-oriented interaction (the Bow-Tie Model in Chapter 1) requires identification of the terms, covering possibly comparable and contrasting understandings. Terms relevant for answering Research Question 1 in this study were identified in the doctrines represented in Table 8.1 below.

According to Table 8.1, the Norwegian Military Academy uses a wide range of national and international doctrines in the education of officers. In the documents, we find different terms for cooperative efforts, such as *samhandling* (interaction), collaboration (cooperation under leadership aiming for a common goal), cooperation, and combined arms³. The book on *the German Art of War: Truppenführung* (Condell & Zabecki, 2001) is also stated by many as a widely used source as a basis for discussion and reflection, but the book is not used as an instruction or guide for directly developing officers at the Norwegian Military Academy.

In our thematic analysis, we examined the two latest Norwegian doctrines, FFOD (2007) and FFOD (2014), in more detail, as these are the two doctrines all informants have indicated are most often used in education at the Norwegian Military Academy. In FFOD (2007) and FFOD (2014), the terms covering the constructs and concepts of interaction and cooperation are used more or less synonymously. However, the terms appear more often than not when describing military-civilian collaboration. Joint force is, on the other hand, used to describe collaboration within the Armed Forces, indicating that different branches collaborate on joint projects. This is especially present in FFOD (2014) in our analysis.

1 <https://www.oslomilsamfund.no/forsvaret-forsvarets-doktriner/>

2 The joint doctrines are also covered by other definitions, such as Joint Publications and Capstone.

3 Norwegian term: *Samvirke*.

Table 8.1 Results from survey and interviews: Doctrines relevant for/used in the education at the Norwegian Military Academy, 2017.

	Name of doctrine	Description
Norwegian doctrines	FFOD (2000)	The first joint doctrine.
	Forsvarets Pedagogiske Grunnsyn [The Basic Pedagogical View of the Norwegian Armed Forces] (2006)	The doctrine for a common educational foundation.
	FFOD (2007)	The second joint doctrine, indicating the role of the officer. Describes cooperation but not <i>samhandling</i> . Provides a military-theoretical basis.
	FFOD (2014)	Interaction is present as a concept (<i>samhandling</i> is mentioned 15 times in a document of 208 pages, main text). Provides a basis for understanding peacekeeping forces and Capstone.
Basic publications for the Norwegian Army	UD 1	Educational directive.
	Doctrine for land operations 2004	High probability that this will be replaced following the review of the Army, Fall 2017.
Doctrines from other countries	Germany's <i>Truppenführung</i> 1933-34	The oldest doctrine in use at the Norwegian Military Academy.
	Doctrine of the Netherlands	
	UK Army Operations 2010, (Chs. 2, 3 & 8)	Considered well written by some informants.
NATO-doctrines/ UN	Capstone doctrine UNIBAN 1+2 Stanag APP 6 Stanag AJP 3.2 + ATP-3.2.4 - Land operations Counter ID AJP-3.15	NATO doctrines are used as supporting literature, but NATO terminology is considered important for educational purposes. AJP's are less used.
Field Manuals	FM324 - Counter-insurgency	General doctrine, but largely based on experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq.
	FM 3-24 US Army/Navy Counter-insurgency	General doctrine, based on experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq, 2005. Central in Norwegian higher military education.
	FM100-5 Air/Land Battle	First maneuver warfare.
	FM 100-23 UN Peace Keeping	
	FM part 10 (British doctrine)	

In FFOD (2007), the term *samhandling* (interaction) appears only occasionally. The FFOD (2007) doctrine is considered by our informants to serve educational purposes better than FFOD 2014, because the former provides a more solid military-theoretical basis than the latter. However, even the FFOD (2007) doctrine provides little guidance on *samhandling* as a way of learning. This means that it does not explicitly address the idea that for interaction to occur, each participant should contribute with their unique situational understanding, and that this is an ongoing learning process in terms of relating interaction to unforeseen situations and risk-oriented educational planning. As claimed earlier in this chapter, for participants to engage in qualified and safeguarded interaction in risk-oriented situations, participants' understanding of terms used to identify comparable and differing constructs and concepts of *samhandling* in doctrines is crucial. The absence of relating the terms identifying *samhandling* to unforeseen situations in both FFOD (2007) and FFOD (2014) may indicate that the Norwegian doctrines do not have a clarified view as to the premises of *samhandling*. Rather, the way the terms are used may be understood as a vague attempt to frame the relationship between different agents on the "same team", rather than providing well-defined terms that would enable the same agents to discuss what *samhandling* means in each unique situation. As such, the thematic analysis indicates that the terms used to identify constructs and concepts covering *samhandling* in the doctrines used in education planning at the Norwegian Military Academy do not focus on the Bow-Tie phases to any great extent (see, for instance, Chapter 1). The terms used for different kinds of collaboration are not sufficiently open to change, neither practically nor theoretically, regardless of whether the topic or situation is related to an assessment of risk in military operations or threat analyses, or whether interactional competence should be used in risk assessment, in operations or in the recovery phase. The doctrines signal the function of the terms, indicating *samhandling* as one and the same thing, even though different terms are used. Hence, the term *samhandling*, as used in both of the Norwegian doctrines relevant in educational planning at the Norwegian Military Academy, does not function as a specific guide in competency development for new Army officers. Terms for different

kinds of collaboration are, however, frequently used. As these doctrines serve as a basis for military officer leadership education, the terms may be both somewhat misleading when not subject to a concrete analysis, and they may serve as an ambiguous concept in military training. One consequence of this may be, as pointed out by Andersen (2016), that each branch of the Armed Forces adapts its own translation of the concept of *samhandling* into its own context, as the branch-specific interpretations are more context-sensitive than a rationalistic, joint-doctrine understanding that is less clearly defined. This possible consequence is contradictory to the joint doctrine's aim of aligning the military branches in operations.

The term *samhandling* (interaction) is used six times in the Norwegian doctrine, "Forsvarets Pedagogiske Grunnsyn" (FPG, 2006) ["The Basic Pedagogical View of the Norwegian Armed Forces"], and is spread over several chapters. It is therefore reasonable to claim that the term serves as an important basis for education in the Norwegian Armed Forces. *Samhandling* is considered essential to the main message of FPG. The FPG underlines a shift in the educational focus in the Norwegian military, from traditional knowledge dissemination to an ongoing and common development of knowledge unique to different situations. The FPG is based on socio-cultural learning theory exemplified in such topics as communities in practice, experiential learning and Apprenticeship Learning (see Chapter 6 for a further elaboration of Apprenticeship Learning in a military context). The FPG also focuses on role consciousness, leadership identification and leadership development. Finally, the FPG focuses heavily on a professional development of the military profession (regarding military skills, situational awareness, ethical considerations, attitudes and leadership). Our findings indicate an absence of clarified terms used to cover *samhandling*, as well as an imprecise link between interaction and learning, and this may indicate that the FPG has not had sufficient influence as a communicative link between doctrines, curricula and teaching practice. Another question posed by our informants is whether the use of collaboration/cooperation in NATO documents might be interpreted in the direction of interaction rather than collaboration? If that is the case, the challenge may not be in translation or transfer

from NATO documents to Norwegian documents, but rather that the Norwegian doctrine authors have not focused on the main message of the socio-cultural understanding of *samhandling* in the FPG adequately. This may have resulted in unknown consequences in the education of Norwegian Army officers over the past 10 years.

Defining and understanding the distinction between *samvirke* (collaboration) and *samhandling* (interaction)

How do instructors in charge of officer leadership education planning at the Norwegian Military Academy explain how normative understandings of interaction in different doctrines serve to prepare future officers for interaction in unforeseen and risk-oriented situations (Research Question 2)? In our interview study, we find that the terms are understood differently and that they appear to serve different purposes in educational planning at the Academy. Reports from two informants in our interview study indicate that they have different views on how the terms “collaboration” and “interaction” may overlap in daily practice. Informant 1 elaborates on this issue. He explains that *samhandling* is achieved when collaborating in a department to achieve defined effects. It entails practical problem solving where time is essential. Time, and especially achieving something at a greater pace than the enemy, is the most important thing in warfare. ‘Self-synchronization’, as described in the Defense Chief’s view [FSJ-Lead, 2012], means that the less time you use on collaboration management and the more you rely on intuitive action, the more time is saved. There are different effects that contribute to this, but it requires a lot of training together to understand such collaboration in practice; to create a common understanding of the problem and to know how colleagues will possibly react. Informant 1 uses the two terms rather synonymously in this observation.

Informant 2, however, is clear about the different meanings that the two terms may imply. Tactical collaboration is about combining effects. *Samhandling* is, in his view, a more difficult term to get a hold on. It may differ between military units, between the military and civilian sectors,

and between representatives from the tactical and political levels, both nationally and internationally. Collaboration is, from this perspective, more about cooperation before, during and after an operation, and it deals with all the resources that are available. *Samhandling* (interaction), on the other hand, is deemed to be a broader term than collaboration and is thus more difficult to delineate.

It is not our purpose to criticize the two informants, nor to imply that one interpretation of our interview question is more correct than the other. Rather, it is in our interest to illustrate that terms can be understood differently within an organization when not specified in the relevant doctrines they use as a foundation in their educational planning. In the Norwegian language, the words *samvirke* (collaboration) and *samhandle* (interaction) have a very close linguistic similarity. While Informant 1 explains that cooperation is about acting together to reach a common goal and create a unified organism, Informant 2 perceives *samhandling* to be at a higher level than collaboration, and that interaction serves a higher ambition than collaboration. In the interview, Informant 2 also links *samhandling* to officer socialization, thus making the socio-cultural learning aspect more apparent than in the reply given by Informant 1. There may be different reasons for this, but one interpretation is linked to their different backgrounds and roles in the educational planning processes at the Academy, where Informant 1 is in charge of practical tactical topics and Informant 2 is in charge of topics related to strategy development.

Wadel (see Chapter 13) points to the importance of relational skills enabling interaction. He also refers to Anthony Giddens, who describes social interaction as: “...*the process by which we act and react to those around us*” (Giddens, 1997:85). Informants 1 and 3 do not necessarily agree that *samhandling* (interaction) is at a higher level than *samvirke* (collaboration), claiming that the relational aspects are equally strong when using both terms. Informants 2 and 4 point to a need for more clarification regarding the terms in FFOD (2014).

Informant 4 claims that FFOD (2014) introduces differing and somewhat contrasting terms to identify constructs and concepts of *samhandling*. This is a challenge, in his view, because it creates a mental barrier for

students in understanding *samhandling* in practice. Using all three Norwegian doctrines for joint operations in education at the Norwegian Military Academy, however, underlines the importance of better defining the terms used in identifying constructs and concepts of *samhandling* in the doctrines, as they are seen to be vague and somewhat overlapping (Table 8.2).

Table 8.2 Results from interviews: How Norwegian officers in charge of leadership education at the Norwegian Military Academy define the terms *samvirke* (collaboration) and *samhandling* (interaction).

Informant	Term	Explanation
#1	Collaboration	The study of joint efforts. Theoretically about placing the enemy on the horns of a dilemma. Relevant for tactical training more than conceptual understanding.
	Interaction	Internal processes coordinated to achieve the process itself. Requires increased conceptual understanding, preferably at a higher level in the military hierarchy.
#2	Collaboration	Tactical cooperation, combined effects to create a dilemma for the enemy. About military resources within an operation.
	Interaction	Challenging concept to define, requires joint analysis. Relationship between military and civilian resources, and tactical and political levels, nationally and internationally. Rather than tactical efforts, it is about cooperation before, under and after an operation, applying all resources available.
#3	Collaboration	Concept that encompasses leadership, ability to be led, organization, tactics, and synergy across branches to solve missions. A practical concept used in daily communication. Unity of command.
	Interaction	Does not use this specifically. It is a synonym for collaboration.
#4	Collaboration	Tactical. Coordinating effects. Support mechanism to interaction that may be branch-specific.
	Interaction	Cooperating to achieve a common goal. A level above collaboration with a higher ambition. Coordinating actions. Joint leadership across branches.
#5	Collaboration	Used within a branch or across branches, a practical effort to use maximal strength.
	Interaction	Relational, e.g. interaction in networks. Easily misunderstood as related to technology/Mission Type Orders. Cooperation through parallel planning on multiple levels to save time.
#6	Collaboration	Leadership and tactics related to doctrines solving military problems.
	Interaction	Leadership form in daily interactions. The current leadership model in military education requires interaction. A new FFOD should reflect this.

During the interviews, we found that two of the informants interpreted the nuance between collaboration and interaction as useful, while the other two instructors found that the terms covered the same issue. Therefore, we also asked the informants representing the leadership at the Academy about a clarification of how relevant the terms covering collaboration and interaction in FFOD (2007) and FFOD (2014) were in educational planning, seen from their perspective. Informant 5 found the term *samhandling* to be crucial in preparing new officers for handling crises in unforeseen situations. He expressed a need for clarification of the two terms in upcoming doctrines for joint operations. Informant 6 agreed that it is important to define and contextualize how the difference between *samvirke* (collaboration) and *samhandling* (interaction) may be understood in unique situations. Informant 6 underlined that the present educational model at the Norwegian Military Academy demands a common and clear understanding of *samhandling*, such as defined in Chapter 1 and in the introduction to this chapter. In the view of Informant 6, the current doctrines are not sufficiently clear about the terms and how they may be linked to ongoing learning. He assumed that an upcoming FFOD would have to maintain a focus on joint operations and, in particular, how new technology, the new security policy situation and new threats require a clarified view on how *samhandling* is shaped by these factors, and how a focus on interaction rather than collaboration will contribute to a stronger operational force.

We see from Table 8.2 that the four instructors and the two informants representing leadership positions at the Academy define the two terms differently. Some of the instructors viewed collaboration and interaction as interchangeable terms. The higher up in the hierarchy, the more likely it is that the person will interpret the term *samhandling* (interaction) in a similar manner to the definition used in this chapter, i.e. more strategically emphasizing relational aspects, and more strongly related to a discussion about how the terms need to be better explained and updated accordingly in upcoming doctrine developments.

Another important finding in the interview study is that the informants point out what they perceive as crucial differences between Norwegian and US doctrines used in education to prepare officers for the

unforeseen. The Norwegian doctrines are described as serving as a knowledge base for military theory, linked to military theorists such as Clausewitz and to socio-cultural learning theory. The Norwegian doctrines are, however, perceived as challenging and difficult to interpret for students because of their complexity. The US doctrines used in the same education are regarded as more of a template for “normal” training. They are easier to use in education, and are regarded as more adaptable to action. They are, therefore, perceived as less time consuming to use in education. All four instructors do, however, use doctrines to introduce central military theoreticians to students. Two examples mentioned are Hew Strachan’s (2008) *Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography* and Michael Howard’s (1962) *The Use and Abuse of Military History*. Both are regarded as central in teaching new officers an understanding of the history and development of military doctrines, as well as in teaching military ideology and how military leadership might think about current military operations. When it comes to preparing students for unforeseen and risk-oriented situations, military doctrines are seen as a highly relevant teaching tool by all, although they disagree on the quality of the doctrines in this regard.

In the individual interviews, all informants illustrated how they perceive doctrines as a pedagogical (educational or teaching) tool. They underlined the status of the doctrine as a speculation about what is needed in the future – in an unforeseen scenario, as well as pointing out how they are characterized by inertia. The dynamic between understanding a doctrine as a documented tradition as well as a guide for unforeseen situations was described as challenging, but necessary. The aim of using both general joint doctrines and branch-specific operational doctrines is reported to enhance the students’ understanding of the ambivalence in the theoretical, cultural and authoritarian aspects of military theory (Høiback, 2012). One informant described a doctrine as a tool to provide form and color to unknown future directions of the Army.

The NATO doctrines were not perceived as being as relevant in education as the Norwegian and US doctrines. Although underlining that Norwegian doctrines are built on NATO doctrines, and that it is important to equip students with the current terminology found in, for example,

STANAG APP 6 and AJP 3.2 + ATP 3.2.4, one of the informants pointed out that the US is, after all, strongest in international operations. This served as an argument for preferring US doctrines to NATO doctrines in an educational setting. Another argument was to use UN doctrines, such as Capstone doctrine UNIBAN 1+2, in education, as they are relevant to peace-keeping operations, an aspect not found in the NATO doctrines for joint military operations. However, when referring to particular aspects of the curriculum, such as preparing for international operations in places such as Afghanistan, informants perceived doctrines to be too generic to serve a meaningful purpose in education.

Overall, doctrines were deemed important in education planning, ensuring that new officers are prepared for unforeseen scenarios. Doctrines were understood as a reference point for developing common concepts and a common understanding of a *why* and *how* in military efforts, but not necessarily as a measuring tool for future operational success. Doctrines were seen as one of several parts of a formal curriculum. The current curriculum includes all three of the Norwegian joint operation doctrines, i.e. FFOOD (2000; 2007; 2014). They serve to explain doctrinal development in Norway, and more importantly, concept development related to *samhandling*.

The relevance of military doctrines in educational planning

How does the leadership of the Norwegian Military Academy explain how doctrines may serve as relevant tools in educational strategic planning (Research Question 3)? Both informants representing the leadership in our study viewed military doctrines as especially relevant in preparing future officers for upcoming deployment. In the same line of argumentation, they also found doctrines as relevant in equipping students with an understanding of how future orders are linked to strategies based on national and international doctrines. Informant 3 pointed out that doctrines could be seen as more relevant for the first group going on a new mission. The doctrines were perceived as less important for successive groups, merely “taking over” an ongoing mission, the argument being that they inherit experience from the earlier deployed groups.

Although the doctrines are perceived by all six of our informants as a useful working tool in educational planning, relevant for teaching students how to handle the ambiguity of central concepts in understanding and developing common efforts, the informants representing the leadership also called for a better conceptualization of *samhandling* (interaction) in the Norwegian doctrines and a need to change this in an upcoming joint doctrine. According to the same informants, this conceptualization should be theory-based, such as in FFOD (2007).

The study also indicates a need for better tools, to understand which similarities and differences in terms are more relevant in analyzing the relevant outcome of education. This is crucial when we understand how doctrines are used as instruments for guiding the education of future officers, facing unforeseen scenarios in upcoming deployment and domestic affairs; see, for instance, the Bow-tie Model in Chapter 1.

When understanding *samhandling* (interaction) in the sense that we argue for in this chapter, that each organization (and group) should conceptualize the term individually, in order to understand their own and each other's analysis of an operation in a proficient manner, the lack of a clarified definition of interaction in the current doctrines used in educational planning at the Norwegian Military Academy seems to provide limited guidelines in this case. The informants were, however, divided in their judgment on this issue. The informants who stressed that interaction was a concept encompassing more than the concept of collaboration were also the ones suggesting that renewed interpretations of doctrines, rather than inheriting others' experience, were crucial in educating officers for the unforeseen. In fact, two of the informants (one from the instructor group and one from the leadership group), stressed the need to expose military students to doctrine analyses as early as possible, as they found the analysis of differing terms used to cover similar constructs and concepts to be part of critical training for an officer and for the professional development of the organization as a whole. On the other hand, the informants from the instructor group who viewed experience to be of just as much importance as complex doctrinal analysis in education, argued that military operations have a practical focus. They agreed that doctrines were necessary, but preferably at a higher (and more ideological or political) level in the military hierarchy.

The discussion of theory-based versus experience-based views on the use of doctrines in strategic educational planning was, in fact, the issue that divided the informants' perspectives of the relevance of doctrines in educational matters the most. We have also found the same tension in other studies of the educational relevance of leadership education in the Norwegian Armed Forces (Carlsten et al., 2015; Carlsten et al., 2016).

The hidden military curriculum and *samhandling*

Not everything learned in education is explicitly formulated in a formal curriculum. Each educational program usually follows an established culture, with a set of current values, behavior and thinking that have been developed over time in the organization. This is usually called the “Hidden Curriculum” (including Jackson, 1968; Giroux, 1988; Margolis, 2001). In military leadership education, we recognize this as codes and industry culture related to military branches, among other things. Doctrines are thus read in the light of the Academy's own “Hidden Curriculum”, and the formal curriculum can be more or less colored by this. In addition, the “Hidden Curriculum” works partially independent of the formal curriculum when it comes to impacting students' learning. For this reason, it is necessary for instructors, leadership and students to be aware of nuances in key terms in doctrines identifying central constructs and concepts, like *samhandling* (interaction), that are likely to contribute to new officers' competence development in handling complex and risky situations.

The consequences of such differing perceptions as we have identified, at only one military academy in one country, will be even more influential in military action, at a point where officers from different branches and countries, who have completed their education at various defense academies and staff colleges, will meet. If different officers in a joint operation have quite differing understandings of the term “interaction” in the doctrines relevant to their missions, the effectiveness of the joint force could be severely affected.

To ensure that the “Hidden Curriculum” does not control competence outcomes too strongly, doctrines and the formal curriculum should define

and elaborate on these terms thoroughly, and there should be the greatest possible match between them. In our study, we have seen that the central concept of interaction is unclarified, both in the different doctrines and in their interpretation by different informants within the same higher education institution. This may pose challenges, both in educational training and practical *samhandling* (interaction). Even though a doctrine should be open enough to allow for situational judgment, the terms used to cover important constructs and concepts should guide such analysis rather than distract it, as we have seen indications of in this study.

Conclusion

The findings in the current case study indicate that military doctrines are regarded as important in leadership training at the Norwegian Military Academy, especially when it comes to understanding and guiding interaction in unforeseen and risk-oriented situations. The findings indicate that doctrines should be strengthened, and play a more significance role for leadership education in the future. At the same time, the terms used to describe *samhandling* in military doctrines found relevant in education at the Norwegian Military Academy are numerous, vague and somewhat overlapping. Collaboration (*samvirke*) and interaction (*samhandling*) are used interchangeably as terms, without the message being clear about what purpose the terms serve, and what the consequences for strategic planning may be.

More generally, our findings demonstrate that if the concept of *samhandling* (interaction) is brought to the forefront in teaching new officers to handle unforeseen situations through interaction, it is crucial that the terms of interaction and collaboration are better defined, on a continual basis, and made concrete at all levels in the military hierarchy, not only in the doctrine itself. Informants stress that a doctrine should be safeguarded at the top level in the hierarchy, because the military doctrines possess certain qualities of looking ahead jointly, that individualized, experience-based approaches to strategic education planning cannot cover.

The term *samhandling* is not sufficiently related to unforeseen situations and ongoing learning in the doctrines found relevant in officer

leadership education in our case. It is neither sufficiently exemplified, nor clearly based on a theoretical foundation. Thus, we see a tendency in our study that the understanding of one of the main terms in modern military development is given different meanings by different agents in the same organization. Although we have suggested that the relevance of *samhandling* (interaction) needs to be open enough to be context-sensitive, in order to serve the purpose of handling unforeseen and risk-oriented situations, our findings indicate that it might just miss the same context-specific features guiding the training for joint operations. The vagueness may be replaced by opinion and experience-based views in the “Hidden Curriculum,” rather than serve as a basis for developing the military profession as a whole, both within and across military branches, nationally and internationally. Our ambition for this chapter has been to lay a foundation for a more nuanced academic and pedagogical (educational) discussion that in turn can contribute to further awareness of the relevance of the concept of *samhandling* in curriculum analyses. In the future, more *samhandling* will be expected with the civil education sector (cf. Carlsten et al., 2016). We therefore believe that this chapter may be relevant for both the military and civil education sectors in order to create awareness and debate.

From a general perspective, these findings may also be of relevance for public strategic emergency-preparedness management, other high-risk emergency organizations, and in educational programs for different professions, in their strategic work aiming to develop *samhandling* competence and in order to handle risk under unforeseen conditions. At the same time, concepts such as *samhandling* and similar expressions may lead users to believe that it covers more than it actually does or covers something different, which may have undesirable consequences for the actual learning outcome. It is therefore important to raise awareness in the organization of the underlying processes and the relational ambition level that will be the basis for and the content of the chosen term (see also Chapter 2). An advantage is to reach a collective understanding of the kind of skills that will be developed and trained. Another gain of such an analysis is to provide a basis for clarified learning goals and concrete scenario development through exercises and other teaching plans

in leadership education, as well as the evaluation of this, both in terms of learning outcomes and the education as a whole. This may facilitate a balance between the hidden curriculum and formal guidelines and tools in order to build competence for *samhandling* and prepare leaders for handling risk and unforeseen conditions.

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