CHAPTER 9

From Researcher/Performer to Artistic Researcher: Looking Back at the Past in Search of New Possibilities

Jorge Salgado Correia
Associate Professor, University of Aveiro, INET-MD, Portugal

Abstract: Musicians involved in historically informed performance are pulled in different directions, driven by two different motivations, and when one of them is taken to the extreme, the other runs the risk of being, if not overtaken, at least overshadowed. One is the motivation to observe and analyse the past, i.e., to contribute to historical knowledge; the other is the motivation to conceive a pertinent artistic intervention, i.e., to contribute to an artistic domain. Reinforced and reassured by an analysis of the chapters in this book, I argue that this contribution to an artistic domain is an essential component of artistic research, supported by documentation that clarifies the pertinence of artistic interventions, promotes more empathetic connections and deeper intimate fruition, and results in mythopoetic reconfigurations. Only a discourse in the narrative mode can possibly play this roll, because it does not exclude embodied meanings and processes of subjective self-disclosure (re-enactments). This discursive mode will enable a reflection on the pertinence of the (inter)subjective concerns that motivated the creation, the pertinence of the creative processes, and/or the aesthetic, ethical, and ecological pertinence of the artistic intervention. Thus, going beyond an understanding of musical practice as simple “artefact-performance-reception” and embracing a sense of possibility, a specific territory opens for HIP performers. It consists of an embodied intersubjective amalgam of beliefs, convictions and mythopoetic configurations, where they, as artistic researchers, can intervene creating new realities and provoking changes and reconfigurations – rhetorically, pedagogically, and above all artistically.

Keywords: historically informed performance, artistic research, epistemological fracture, modes of knowledge, mythopoetic configurations

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Introduction

Historically informed performance (HIP) and artistic research have both developed at the crossroads where artistic interventions somehow articulate through research – research is here understood in the broadest sense as seeking something, i.e., seeking knowledge. Artistic researchers seek knowledge that is inextricably embedded or embodied in aesthetic interventions. They (should) seek material thinking, which Carter (2004) defines as a singular type of artistic knowledge that articulates declarative and procedural knowledge in the materiality of artistic production. Artistic researchers are artists who engage in research *to become better at what they do*:

> The object of artistic research is art. As artists, we engage in research to become better at what we are doing, for the development of knowledge and methods. We introduce new ideas in order to rethink art, become leaders, increase audience engagement, investigate new presentation formats, tackle political and societal issues, or to develop sustainable practices. We do it for the relevance of art in an ever more complex and diverse society. (Lilja, 2021, p. 28)

Is the object of HIP also art? To answer this question properly, one needs to be aware of two divergent paths that have coexisted in the HIP movement practically since its inception (Kartomi, 2014): the path of early music scholars – who have focused on publishing written outputs (articles, books and editions) to foster their academic careers; and the path of early music performers – who have focused on performing and recording to foster their artistic engagement.

The former tend to be committed to a score-based ontology, cultivating a logocentric epistemological orientation, and diverting their attention from relational and socio-emotional aspects of the here-and-now of the performance ritual. On this divergence between scholars and performers Charles Rosen has rightfully written that "musicology is for musicians what ornithology is for the birds" (Rosen, 1994, p. 72). Thus, for scholars, the object of HIP tends to focus not so much on art as an object of study, but much more on the production of historical-musicological knowledge ontologically based on the idea that musical structures determine the meaning of music. That these epistemological premises – closely linked to an ideology preaching the autonomy of abstract musical structures – have

dominated the research of HIP scholars for most of its history is reiterated by Doğantan-Dack:

> In the majority of twentieth-century musicological discourses the score has been read and interpreted as representing abstract musical structures. Audio-recorded data – by suggesting the severance of the causal ties between the performance context, the performer, and the recorded performance – can also prompt researchers to understand the sounds of a performance in similar terms, i.e., as abstract musical structures. (Doğantan-Dack, 2014, p. 9)

Performers intervene in the artistic world of early music, and therefore have artistic purposes. Their object is art, however, what they do is not artistic research per se. Although all relevant and innovative art could not have been developed without some kind of (re)search,[1] this "search" does not qualify as artistic research. What is missing is a process of deep reflection embedded in some kind of documentation designed to be shared, discussed, critically evaluated, and finally validated by peers to be archived in an academic repository. As it is proposed in this chapter, this process of profound reflection would have the function of clarifying the pertinence of artistic intervention as a production of knowledge, undertaking a critical and experimental reflection not only on the specific production methods and processes used, that is, on the "poietic" strategies, but also on the writing process of a discourse in narrative mode, which articulates symbolic and embodied meanings, that is, on the "poetic" strategies. These poietic-poetic modes of doing are constructed as a sensible-epistemic device disclosing a system of dispositions and interactions within an aesthetic, ethical and political ecology, and are indivisible from the subjectivity of those who produce them. Hopefully this will become clearer later in this chapter, however, to get to that point, it seems crucial to revisit the question that was implicit but left unanswered: Why are performer-scholars not artistic researchers by default? Although performer-scholars have to deliver both research and art, an epistemological divide seems to persist. In the following sections, I seek to identify and

1 In the opening lecture of the 2020 PhD programme in music at Aveiro University, Bruno Tackels referred to this interesting distinction between 'search' and 'research', the latter having the extra connotation of being thoughtful, reflective, methodological, in a word, academic.

discuss the reasons why this epistemological divide has been and remains resilient.

Submission and denial

Since performance entered the discourse on music from 1950 onwards (Assis, 2015), and consolidated itself as a domain of study throughout the 1970s (Carlson, 2010), one has witnessed a proliferation of approaches and perspectives, which, although admittedly different among themselves, seem to have one thing in common: the notion that performance is a complex term that includes a multidimensional phenomenon in which the body has a privileged status (Dalagna, Carvalho & Welch, 2021). This complexity, besides having opened the door for artists to express their views in a debate questioning the dichotomy of body and mind, justified the emergence of interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary approaches to the study of performance. In the particular case of music performance research, however, these approaches have been subordinated to the epistemological and methodological assumptions of so-called "theorists" of music or related fields. This subordination does not recognise "the discrepancy between scientific theory and phenomenal experience" (Doğantan-Dack, 2014, p. 18). Together with Mine Doğantan-Dack, I endorse:

> […] the spirit of the plea John Sloboda made in the context of research on music and emotions: that our efforts to simplify and deconstruct phenomena, which are the driving principles of scientific endeavour, "need to be constantly held up against the richness of everyday […] musical experience to ensure that it is the full experience we are attempting to explain, and not some conveniently simplified portion of it". (Doğantan-Dack, 2014, pp. 4–5)

Although musical performance (i.e., practical, hands-on music) has undergone a process of inclusion in universities very similar to that of the other performing arts, the same has not occurred when it comes to a confrontation with research. Unlike theatre or dance, performance studies in music emerged in the research world as a subdiscipline within a pre-existing field of knowledge, which already had a long and prolific academic tradition – the field of musicology.

The subdiscipline of performance studies in music emerged in the 1990s, when philosophers of music like David Elliot (1995) and Christopher Small (1998), and musicologists like Lydia Goehr (1992), Richard Taruskin (1995) and Nicholas Cook (1998) took a critical stance towards the dominant practices of music research as being exclusively centred on texts and scores, which some argued, contributed to the idealisation of musical works. It became imperative to look beyond the score, to observe and analyse performative practices. For instance, Small radically proposed that "music is performance" (Small 1998, p. 218). In the same vein, Cook questioned the prescriptive power of musical scores by considering them to be scripts rather than texts, thus highlighting the role of performance in determining musical meaning:

> The text-based orientation of traditional musicology and theory makes it difficult to think about music as performative art. Music can be understood as both process and product, but it is the relationship between the two that defines "performance" in the Western "art" tradition. (Cook, 2001, p. 1)

According to these recommendations and warnings, which were made about twenty years ago, research in performance has been changing its focus from scores to recordings, and from these to live performances, but always placing itself (with its verbal, propositional and paradigmatic discourse) as a mediator between the artistic interventions and our understanding. In order to see how this mediation acts and what its implications are, consider the following: Artists contextualise music in order to find a general orientation, define a semantic field or certain musical gestures as a starting point for creating their interpretation of each work; also they develop a personal amalgam of cultural references (more or less informed) and technical resources that have the function of simultaneously conditioning and stimulating their imagination in the search for clues to make sounds expressive, to imprint action on sounds (Correia, 2003). The systematisation of this knowledge, when it happens, is usually carried out in response to pedagogical or academic challenges (for example, when writing a paper or delivering a paper at a conference, or even when carrying out doctoral research). This means that it is a response to the need to argue verbally in favour of a given interpretation.

This effort to systematise or theoretically elaborate on an interpretation ends up diverting the attention, focus and investment of the "performers" from their specific function and initial goal – which is to give an account of the full experience of accepting the risk of responsibly defending their interpretations by performing before an audience, in person (Steiner, 1989), and contributing relevantly to the artistic domain in which they have chosen to intervene. Talking (or writing) about a performance is very different from experiencing it. They are two specific activities that are not only divergent, but can develop separately, or even exist, in extremis, almost independently:

> It is conceivable that a violinist, say, might offer an acceptable reading of a piece, one he was implicitly endorsing, without appearing to have, as judged by other indications – e.g. what he said about the music's emotional import, or the reasons he gave for certain performing decisions, or his response to performances of the piece by others – what we would be justified in calling even an intuitive grasp of the piece's structure or expression; it seems possible that there should be "*idiot joueurs*", so to speak, or performers who just happen to "get it right" by luck, at least some of the time. (Levinson,1993, p. 48)

Many aspects of artistic products can be articulated or even measured, but these approaches alone are too reductive to account for socio-emotional phenomena, aesthetic qualities, creative processes or the relevance of an intervention in the respective artistic domain. Such approaches thus utterly miss this point. It was at this juncture that music performance studies established itself as a subdiscipline of musicology. Under the purview and authority of musicology, music performance studies, in the environment of universities, were confined to following the same epistemological assumptions, and resorting to similar methodological procedures. Subscribing to a quasi-archaeological attitude (i.e., trying to understand the historical processes that underpinned practices and works), this new subdiscipline found no alternative to the study of archived objects – scores, recordings – or to the objectification of live performances, understanding them predominantly from observation, analysis and/or systematic description.

The notion of musical performance as a form of artistic expression, despite being acknowledged by musicians, seems to be something else

when it is thought of as an object of research. An example of this can be seen in the *Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance* (Ericsson et al., 2006), where art and music are covered by two different chapters. Although many explanations for this distinction might be offered, it is indicative of an academic discourse, in which expressions such as "music and performing arts", "the arts and music" or even "musicians and artists" clearly demarcate the two.

This inclusion and consolidation of music performance studies into the academic universe ended up being peaceful, applauded even by many practical musicians, but it also resulted in their withdrawal from the general process of autonomisation of performance studies that was taking place simultaneously, especially through the work of Richard Schechner, who, of all the professionals and academics emerging during the 1960s, played the most visible and consistent role in the formation of the paradigm of performance studies (Carlson, 2010). Based on Schechner's work, scholars interested in performance studies ended up defining what would be three crucial components: embodiment, presence and transgression. McKenzie (2005) argued for the pre-eminence of embodiment, because that draws attention not only to the performances of non-traditional theatre, but also to the quest for a rejection of the study of predominantly text-based drama. Instead of focusing on play scripts, it turned its attention to the training of actors' bodies, rehearsal processes, staging and site specificity (Mckenzie, 2005). Closely related to the emphasis on embodiment was the valorisation of presence (Fischer-Lichte, 2004). Gradually, both performers and so-called "performance theorists" began to devalue the representation of pre-existing texts, focusing on the spontaneity and vivacity of the performance and the co-presence of performers and audience (Mckenzie, 2005). In theatre, this entailed a shift in importance from the playwright to the director, and finally to the actor. Embodiment and presence, when combined with an emphasis on performance efficiency, motivated another point of interest: transgression, which was clearly informed by contemporary social upheavals, such as civil rights protests, anti-war demonstrations, or women's liberation marches (Mckenzie, 2005). The work initiated by Richard Schechner and developed by other authors, such as Victor Turner and Dwight Conquergood, eventually

stimulated the development of specific academic programmes. Several American universities, including New York University and Northwestern University, developed graduate programmes specifically designated as performance studies. Performance in the field of music thus bypassed the debate on performance studies in general, and although it already assumed a critical view in relation to traditional musicology, it still depended on its authority.

Parallel to this process of the consolidation of performance studies in music, and performance studies in other arts, a political and educational transformation occurred in Europe, known as the Bologna Process, that directly affected the understanding of performance in the debate on knowledge production in the arts, music included. Supported by the ideas that teaching should be research-based, and that education should be more competitive and market-oriented, the Bologna Process led many higher arts schools to adapt their curricula so as to integrate postgraduate training, including on the doctoral level.

The political decision to impose research on art schools within higher polytechnic education did not necessarily take place in consultation with the universities, which thus ended up seeing their monopoly on the definition of research questioned. The Bologna Process, quite unintentionally, may eventually contribute to the end of the hegemony of natural sciences in the field of research. What we are witnessing today, at least in the regions and countries where arts higher education institutions, willingly or unwillingly, participate in the Bologna Process, is the beginning of a fierce battle for the definition of research. It is not so much a question of recognising that art can produce knowledge, but of how this knowledge can be recognised and validated within the academy. Those best qualified to answer this question will obviously not be researchers from other areas, but rather artists committed to research, no matter how much disparity there may eventually exist among themselves. Mainly due to the Bologna Process, many practical artists and musicians were now able to invest their time in doctoral training, aiming not only for career advancement, but also artistic improvement (Correia & Dalagna, 2020; Crispin, 2015). Eager to capitalise on their artistic knowledge they began to explore practice-centred epistemological models, and thus the

conditions were created for the emergence of a new domain in knowledge production: artistic research (Assis, 2018).

Despite evolving discourse on artistic research, the obligation to base higher education, including the arts, on research was initially understood by many as an obligation for academies to engage in scientific research. Given the hegemony of the natural sciences, some will have genuinely misunderstood and others deliberately misunderstood, but the stubborn rhetorical identification of "research" with "scientific research" led to difficulties accepting any other form of research within the academy. Consequently, artistic research did not gain widespread recognition, and this scepticism provoked a counter reaction that motivated some authors to "prove" the legitimacy of arts research on the basis of the robustness of its methodological framework (Stevánce & Lacasse, 2018). While these views have contributed somewhat to the popularity of artistic research, it is often not the specific knowledge produced in this field that has been validated. It is crucial to have a clear understanding of whether it is the outcomes of artistic research that are being validated or the robustness of its methodological procedures. Linked to this insistence on the robustness of methodology (methodolatry) is the need to maintain the institutionalised disciplinary separation – for instance: "artistic research in music" or "artistic research in painting" – hindering the consolidation of a specific territory for artistic research (Stevánce & Lacasse, 2018). These ideological and reductionist assumptions contribute to excluding creative phenomena or "invention" from academic research (Carter, 2004). One of the most representative occurrences of this state of affairs is the widespread disorientation in relation to what the role of discourse should be in the supporting documentation within an artistic investigation.

> Artists often believe that they can only describe what they do if they leave out invention. Based on such a belief, auto-ethnographies have started to be advocated as a means of guaranteeing a conceptual and discursive knowledge associated with artistic practice. This strategy, although widely mentioned in artistic research manuals […], fails in its purpose because it keeps artistic production out of the validation process. Researchers defend their discursive arguments, but not the pertinence of the artistic output or even its articulation with those

> arguments. Auto-ethnographies deviate the focus from the artistic production itself, bringing to light details related to the life of the artists, their beliefs and their cultural values. It is a type of discourse and approach that elucidates and describes the cultural identity of those involved and, eventually, the context of the process, but it does not help us to engage more intimately with the artistic production nor does it clarify its relevance. (Correia & Dalagna, 2019, pp. 17–18)

These methodological and epistemic *démarches* end up obscuring and diverting researchers' attention from the meaning of the full experience. Too often artist researchers fall into the temptation to rationalise the formal elements of their practice instead of reflecting on their social effects, that is, on their re-configuring power: "Rather than account for the work as a structure for reinventing human relations, they explain the ideas behind the work" (Carter, 2004, p. 10). The difficulty for artistic researchers seems to lie mainly in keeping in mind that there are alternative discursive modes equally capable of gaining academic recognition with regard to their potential for contributing to knowledge production. While the differences between paradigmatic (generates abstract/conceptual meanings) and narrative (generates empathic/embodied meanings) verbal modes of communication are widely recognised, their consequences are not.

Communication and interaction

Problems arise when trying to give an account of the artistic and embodied domains using the declarative or paradigmatic discursive mode exclusively, that is, when trying to translate "symbols" into (verbal) "signs".[2] It is not, as John Butt has suggested, a question of choosing between the two opposing poles of social constructivism on the one hand, and analytic philosophy and music analysis on the other hand:

2 *Signs* are here understood as markers that have a very specific and precise meaning, preferably leaving out any ambiguity. *Symbols*, on the other hand, appeal to complex and deeper meaning structures that are rooted in the cognitive unconscious and are thus open to individual/subjective interpretation processes.

> If some tend to assume that musical works are objects that are basically non-human and thus stable in character (those on the side of analytical philosophy and music analysis), others have surely gone too far in the direction of social constructivism and assumed that pieces of music exist only by virtue of the attitudes of a particular society – that there is nothing essentially "there" beyond the cultural norms at hand. (Butt, 2015, p. 4)

Both approaches seem to be caught in the same trap. In both, researchers are operating through signs within verbal propositional language in declarative, discursive, paradigmatic modes, excluding the embodied and symbolic dimensions of meaning, which are crucial for an account of the full experience they are trying to explain. Even when they openly and theoretically admit the existence and importance embodied meanings play in aesthetic experiences, they continue to design their research projects based on a markedly ideological understanding that "music making is conceived in terms of the score-mediated relationship between the performing agent and the sounding music" (Doğantan-Dack, 2014, p. 9). That is, musical or artistic communication is understood as a process of passing on to everyone the same meaning structures or even the same contents, as if merely delivering a message. This is, after all, what is expected from good communication. But aesthetic experiences require *interaction* rather than *communication*, especially if the latter is understood in the very narrow sense of conveying a message from sender to receiver. Artists operate with symbols not because they want to appear vague and mysterious, but rather to empathically involve their recipients. I contend that it is a *sine qua non* condition for artists to involve their recipients to the point of making them actively re-enact the symbols through metaphorical projections from their stock of bodily affections, that is, from their bodily archive where the singularities of their subjectivities are articulated with complex intersubjective and symbolically charged processes.

> Creativity is possible, in part, because imagination gives us image schematic structures and metaphoric and metonymic patterns by which we can extend and elaborate those schemata. One image schema […] can structure many different physical movements and perceptual interactions, including ones never

> experienced before. And when it is metaphorically elaborated, it can structure many nonphysical, abstract domains. Metaphorical projection is one fundamental means by which we project structure, make new connections, and remould our experience. (Johnson, 1987, p. 169)

My point is that musical interpretation, musical meaning, musical expression or musical intention gain in creativity, originality and genuineness if one becomes aware of one's own inner theatre of symbols, which connect understanding and feeling at a deeper level than the conscious mind. Some excellent performers (or listeners) could assume that, when they are playing or rehearsing, no inner theatre of symbols or figures occurs. They just enjoy sound relations. They claim that their experience is purely musical and musical intention needs no symbols or images to be effective. But what Jacques Derrida wrote about philosophical concepts could just as legitimately apply here to musical gestures:

> The primitive meaning, the original figure, always sensitive and material ("all the words of human language were originally stamped with a material figure and all represented in their novelty some sensitive image […] fatal materialism of the vocabulary […]") is not exactly a metaphor. It is a kind of transparent figure, equivalent to a specific meaning. It becomes a metaphor when philosophical discourse puts it into circulation. The first meaning and the first displacement are then simultaneously forgotten. We no longer notice the metaphor and take it for the proper meaning. A double erasure. Philosophy would be this process of metaphorization that carries itself away. By constitution, philosophical culture will always have been crude. (Derrida 1973, p. 23)

Clearly to Derrida the expression of an abstract idea could be nothing else but an allegory: The philosophers, who believe to have left the world of appearances, are constrained to live forever within the allegory. He called this process white mythology: metaphysics erased the fabulous scene that gave rise to it, but this scene remained nevertheless, though invisible, active and insinuating, as if inscribed in white ink. Transposing the same idea, there would also be a white mythology hidden in every musical gesture for those interpreters who believe that they work exclusively with sounds.

In fact, the existence of such a white mythology in music is supported by solid arguments in its favour. The musicologist Goehr (1992) and the

anthropologist Lévi-Strauss (1979) point out that the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries represent a critical historical moment where discursive thought became more rationalised and music – because of its subservience to religious/mythological texts – ended up absorbing the two typical mythological thought functions: ritual and narrative. During this process music also gained its autonomy. It is worth recalling that music was still in Mozart's time just one of several elements (even if a very effective and important one), which comprised the complex structure of social and religious rituals. Only around 1800, as Goehr (1992) has argued, did the concept of a "musical work" emerge, exercising its regulative power over all music-related social practices. By that time, music had inherited from mythological thought the symbolic heaviness or the mythological function that empowered it to become an independent activity, and an independent ritual in itself. Also, in Lévi-Strauss's (1979) view, music was particularly affected by these changes, it became not only more rationalised, but it absorbed important functions, which were inherent to mythical thought, as well:

> It was also at that time that the great musical styles of the seventeenth and mainly the ones of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were born. It was as if the music changed completely its traditional form to be able to perform the function – both an intellectual and an emotional function – which the mythological thought had just abandoned at that epoch. (Lévi-Strauss, 1979, pp. 68–69)

These were crucial changes, which transformed music into what it is today. The whole transformation process was not a linear one, though. Small explains how musicians worked out these changes:

> In the seventeenth century […] musical gestures were abstracted from physical movement so that the listeners no longer moved their bodies [no dance movement responses] but sat and watched and listened, and […] the musical gestures represented not an emotional state itself nor a temperament but the type of physical gesture, both bodily and vocal, with which the emotional state or the temperament was associated. The musical gesture represented metaphorically the physical gesture that the audience recognised as belonging to that state. It thus had to be constructed at one removed, and the masters of that first brilliant

> explosion of the new art form worked through conscious striving, exchange of ideas, polemics and a good deal of trial and error, to perfect the representation. (Small, 1998, p. 148)

In addition, John Shepherd, from the research domain of music sociology, points out that a new role had been given to music during that epoch, compensating somehow for the reductive features of rational discourse:

> Post-Renaissance educated men became so aware of the potential for separating the meaning of a word from its referent, and so seduced by the intellectual power this represented in terms of manipulating and controlling the world, that they had difficulty seeing beyond the immediate implications of their own cleverness. In acting as an antidote to this tendency, the very fact of music as a social medium in sound reminds us, not so much of what has been lost, but of that of which we have ceased to be publicly enough aware. (Shepherd, 1991, p. 6)

Considering these contributions, it seems reasonable to explore a hypothesis that brings symbolic or mythical thought into a relationship with musical meaning. Meaning became a central issue in music interpretation: to interpret is to make meaning. Recognising the existence of this white mythology, that is, of this universe of symbols (personal and subjective but also inter-subjective because they are common to an entire community) helps us to understand the meaning of music better, to assume more freedom of interpretation, and to make learning music a significant step in cultural and aesthetic education. As previously stated, symbols and gestures must be re-enacted and re-enactment implies embodied meanings. However, this implication of corporeal individual action does not prevent most of these meanings from being shared by us all, that is, from being largely intersubjective as Milan Kundera has explained:

> If our planet has seen some eight billion people, it is difficult to suppose that every individual has had his or her own repertory of gestures. Arithmetically, it is simply impossible. Without the slightest doubt, there are far fewer gestures in the world than there are individuals. That finding leads us to a shocking conclusion: a gesture is more individual than an individual. We could put it in the form of an aphorism: many people, few gestures. […] A gesture cannot be regarded as the expression of an individual, as his creation (because no

> individual is capable of creating a fully original gesture, belonging to nobody else), nor can it even be regarded as that person's instrument; on the contrary, it is gestures that use us as their instruments, as their bearers and incarnations. (Kundera, 1991, p. 6)

"Gestures" are different from "concepts" because they do preserve the two distinctive dimensions of the narrative mode of thought – tacit and symbolic – because they have to be re-enacted to be perceived. This re-enactment is nurtured by the singularities of each individual, by each bodily-based stock of affections and knowledge, is triggered by empathy, and is a crucial part of the construction of meaning that reflects the recipients' involvement. It is in this profound sense that, when referring to aesthetic experiences, one should speak more accurately of "interaction" than of "communication". Symbols, articulated within a gestural narrative discourse, have the capacity to promote this empathetic involvement in meaning creation, leading eventually to deep mythopoetic reconfigurations. Without this empathetic re-enactment, without this interaction, without this involvement in meaning creation there is no reason to consider a particular experience an aesthetic experience. Deleuze's criticism to the work of abstract art stems from these same reasons, pointing out the fact that it is directed only at the brain, missing sensation, or direct action on the nervous system (Deleuze, 1981). Many other authors, such as the philosopher José Gil or the literary theorist and semiotician Roland Barthes, share the same view:

> Dance is in the full domain of meaning, making its gestures immediately felt, without passing through language [...] but a danced gesture does not only transmit an explicit meaning (even if "of transition"). It also conveys an unconscious meaning. (Gil, 2001, pp. 113–115)

> [...] listening [to a sonata] goes much further than the ear: it goes in the body, in the muscles, through the strokes of its rhythm, and as in the viscera, through the voluptuousness of its melody. It would seem that each time, the passage was written for only one person, for whom it is played. (Barthes, 1982, p. 260)

It seems, thus, that there is an alternative to the opposing approaches referred to above by John Butt – the social constructivism approach and

the analytic philosophy and music analysis approach – both of which seem, after all, to be more similar than different. Suspending their differences and endorsing what they have in common, we must first realise that in these two approaches art is understood as ontologically grounded in objects or performances, and not in the way in which they are perceived. I propose an approach that places aesthetic experiences on the level of perception, an approach incompatible with the two previously mentioned. Those approaches resort to an explanation mediated by paradigmatic verbal discourse and cannot avoid abstraction, i.e., the consequent reductionist operations that tend to eliminate unconscious bodily dimensions and all the individual and subjective involvement of the recipients in the construction of meaning.

The alternative mode of discourse that I propose operates through creating narratives, combining gestures and embodied meanings, which all blend to produce implicit knowledge in the narrative mode. An example of how this implicit knowledge works, how it is generated and shared, is our knowledge of ourselves and how we make ourselves known to others. Damasio (1999) explained how the sense of self emerges in the form of a narrative; it is a story that we tell ourselves. This lifelong story that we tell ourselves builds our "subjectivities", which means that we know ourselves through narrative mode. In the same way, through telling stories to our friends and experiencing things and situations together, we make ourselves known to them. We have no other way of making ourselves known to our friends or clarifying to them the meaning of what we do, what we feel or what we think. Our friends know us through the narrative mode. This could not be easily achieved in any other way, and certainly not through the paradigmatic mode. We relate to art in a similar way: We experience artistic interventions and we have access to narratives, which somehow contribute to the clarification of their meaning. There is an important difference to point out between friendship and what Rui Penha calls "artship"[3] (2019). In reality, it is a difference in the level of depth, because in friendship we get to know the life stories, singularities and

3 "Art is the name of a relationship – perhaps we should call it an *artship* – that we can establish with a given object: the artwork. This object is special because it was intentionally made for us to take it as a materialisation of an action of a fellow human being, giving us the opportunity to

idiosyncrasies of our friends, and in artship we get to know the specific contexts, values and singularities of specific communities with which we are more or less familiar. This means that we have shared socio-emotional experiences within these communities, which make us aware of and sensitive to their imaginaries, values, beliefs, convictions, in short, to their mythopoetic universes or configurations.

Artistic interventions, whether they are objects (sculptures, paintings) or performances (music, dance, theatre), are signifying systems combining and articulating gestures and symbols. Aesthetic appreciation is based on subjective personal meaning constructions and on empathy. The power of artistic communication thrives in this interaction between performers and public, which is arguably even more inescapable in performative arts because of their temporal unfolding. Meaning in performative arts seems to happen in what Deleuze & Guattari have termed a "meeting perception," where both performer and recipient react spontaneously to the expressive materials and to the ritualised atmosphere, influencing each other's experiences in a collective and creative meaning production process, which takes place in the moment: "The perception of a musical phrase draws less on a sort of reminiscence memory, rather on an extension or contraction of a sort of meeting perception" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980, p. 364).

This interaction between performers and public – triggered by an empathic relationship – produces multiple meaning constructions (all construct their own specific, subjective and individual meanings), but this should not be understood as being poor communication. On the contrary, Small argued that the gestural-symbolic communication processes, in spite of being open to multiple meanings on other levels, have an overt relation to our patterns of bodily experience:

> There can therefore be no such thing as completely objective knowledge, knowledge of the external world exactly as it is, since everything we can possibly know about it is mediated by the way in which we, the knowers, work on the information about it that we receive and convert it into usable knowledge. (Small, 1998, p. 55)

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form a theory of mind – i.e., to conjure in us a perspective – that helps to explain such action" (Penha, 2019, p. 10).

Thus, verbal descriptions and conceptual definitions of the external world, which are carried out in other forms of communication that I designate here as paradigmatic discourses, lack objectivity because of their production process. They are based on abstraction, which means that they diminish all the personal and subjective dimensions of meaning that are crucial to artistic (empathic) interaction.

This interaction has a direct influence on us, like no other mode of knowing seems to have: “Probably the nearest we human beings can come to ‘objective’ knowledge lies in meanings that are connected to those bodily experiences that are shared by us all” (Small, 1998, p. 55). Bateson (1972) explains that this language of gesture is mainly about “relationships”, essentially “how the perceiving creature relates to the outside entity that is being perceived, and vice-versa” (Small, 1998, p. 56). Bodily posture, movement, facial expression, and vocal intonation, writes Small, provide “a wide repertory of gestures and responses by means of which information about relationships is given and received” (Small, 1998, p. 57). Although this interaction is clearer in performative arts, a similar process takes place when experiencing artistic objects (sculptures, paintings). The richness, the peculiarity and, I would say, the authenticity of the artistic experience lies in the fact that the artistic intervention (the sender’s act) has to be re-enacted by the receptor, who can only understand it “on the basis of internal, self-generated cues” (Donald, 1991, p. 173). These re-enactments imply inevitably not only neural and, eventually, muscular activity, but also emotional responses, since “emotional states are tied to muscular states and to associated memories of similar contexts” (Cox, 2001, p. 204). Personal meanings are thus essential in the construction of our significant aesthetic experiences, which develop according to a logic of association dictated by our bodily structures of experience. In other words, gestural-symbolic meanings, in artistic communication (interaction), are revealed at the level of their embodiment. This deep involvement is crucial because it is where subjectivity meets intersubjectivity, where aesthetic responses include irreducible features that depend on the biographical background and individual characteristics of the recipients, but also on the cultural history of particular communities and societies (Higgins, 1997). Based on numerous anecdotal reports of listeners’

personal engagement with music, Higgins presented four implications of musical idiosyncrasy, which are reproduced here because they are equally relevant to my argument:

> First, some of those best educated to appreciate scores "objectively" have the most idiosyncratic perspectives. Practicing musicians would seem to be among the very individuals one would expect to be the most expert at "intellectually processing the score". In fact, however, these musicians are perhaps least likely to be simply attending to "tonally moving forms" when they hear a familiar work. Second, the idiosyncrasies involved in these cases are musically motivated and musically conditioned. […] These idiosyncrasies emerge from intimate familiarity with and attention to music by individuals who are well acquainted with the stylistic context of the music they are hearing. Third, what is salient to listeners varies with their individual musical (and generally artistic) backgrounds. Said emphasises the "ideal purity of the individual experience", although he conscientiously acknowledges "its public setting, even when music is most inward, most private" […] Finally, musicians and other knowledgeable listeners form something like personal relationships with particular works of music. […] Music is interpreted in terms of its relationship to locations, categories, associations, reflections, and evaluations relevant to the listeners. (Higgins, 1997, pp. 95–96)

It seems, thus, that artistic interventions operate on this threshold where subjectivity is intertwined with intersubjectivity: all recipients have a common ground – they have access to the same performance and they have similar cultural references and backgrounds – but all also have their specific, particular, individual and subjective stock of experiences and emotional impressions. This intersubjective common ground is a huge amalgam of fictions and beliefs, together with convictions and reasonings, some more thoughtful than others, some at the edge of the unconscious, and some deeply rooted and operating in the unconscious. This level implies a specific type of representation (different from verbal, propositional and conceptual language) that Lehrer (2012) called "exemplarisation". An "exemplar" represents a class of experiences of which it is itself a member. A conscious experience of a colour can serve as an exemplar that exhibits what the colour is like. This exemplar is like a psychophysiological mark that can define a conceptual mark,

in which this exemplar is also part of the content. The exemplar allows us to represent a class of objects that are part of the conceptual mark. Exemplarisation is not abstraction, i.e., one can only recognise blue colour if it fits their exemplar, and not from verbal explanations given by others. Exemplarisation is, thus, a process that "yields a representation of content in terms of an experienced particular that stands for other particulars. Exemplarization involves generalization of a particular" (Lehrer, 2012, p. 1). It is worth noting, however, that this generalisation is not reductive. In that intimate realm where subjectivity emerges from intersubjectivity lies a network of exemplars; it is precisely on this level that artistic interventions reach us. It is at this level that art reconfigures our old mythopoetic configurations, transforming experience by creating content. Knowledge produced by artistic interventions, thus, is not based on abstractions or intellectual propositions, but rather on a network of exemplars. Indeed, exemplars are the source and foundation though which concepts are formulated, and they allow us to expand awareness of ourselves, of the world and of ourselves in the world.

Thus, the knowledge produced by artistic interventions is a kind of knowledge that does not depend on contemplative, calculational, logical-analytical or interpretative methods. In a recent book edited by Huber et al. (2021), the term "knowing" is alternatively proposed for this kind of knowledge: "*Knowing in performing* refers to action in the performing arts as a specific form of the generation of knowledge" (Huber et al., 2021, p. 18). The same text further clarifies that

> [the suffix 'ing' in know*ing*] points to a genuinely physical, sensual and practical accomplishment and thus to the fluid, process-like status of knowing: 'Knowing is literally something which we do', says John Dewey (1916, p. 331). [...] it presupposes practical learning by doing in which knowing and mastery develop in parallel and completely overlap. [...] This knowing is actually multidimensional. It comprises primarily an embodied knowing, a sensuous-situational knowing as well as an experience-bound knowing of the work process. (Huber et al., 2021, pp. 18–19)

Despite this broad consensus in recognising that art produces knowledge, it perpetuates a conservative view of knowledge that tries to

translate the artistic and embodied domains into the declarative and discursive modes:

> Art runs the risk of being held hostage by those universities where artistic quality is subjugated by pedagogical or scientific standards. In many countries there is still resistance and opposition to artistic research on artistic bases and art is forced into areas that demand methods, theories and training developed for science. (Lilja, 2021, p. 28)

In the recent history of the academy, a hybrid modality has gradually been instituted to give artists a place in academic production, which we can call a research-creation epistemology. In this modality, research, dictated by traditional methodological procedures of a given science, and artistic creation are juxtaposed. The research may have the juxtaposed artistic creation as its object, or it may have provided its materials, procedures or strategies, but in the end it is a contribution to the expansion of knowledge in areas such as musicology, anthropology, history, psychology, sociology, medicine or other disciplines, rather than in art:

> The object of artistic research is art. As artists we engage in research to become better at what we are doing, for the development of knowledge and methods. We introduce new ideas in order to rethink art, become leaders, increase audience engagement, investigate new presentation formats, tackle political and societal issues, or to develop sustainable practices. We do it for the relevance of art in an ever more complex and diverse society. (Lilja, 2021, p. 28)

Phenomenological accounts of performance processes – regardless of how they are documented or by which means (including diaries, audio recordings, video recordings, etc.) – have different objectives and goals. They are not meant to replace the temporal experiences of these processes, of the experience of actually performing or actively listening. However, artistic creation on its own is not artistic research either, since in order to obtain formal recognition, additional documentation for critical dialogue with peers/colleagues must be produced and shared, usually in written form whatever the medium used, satisfying the established conditions for producing knowledge in an academic system. Subjectivity

must be accounted for in the documentation in order for artistic research to achieve the targeted goal of art.

However, mere description will not be enough to share subjective impressions and vivid experiences adequately. Subjectivity is fundamental in our artistic experiences, both as creators and as recipients, in that its involvement in meaning-making processes is crucial. We must mobilise our individual (and subjective) stock of body-based knowledge and affections to create meaning. It is my belief and choice that without the involvement of this bodily base, implying unconscious cognitive dimensions in meaning-making processes, experiences do not reach the aesthetic realm. However, within reflexive phenomenological and auto-ethnographic accounts, subjectivity seems to be understood as a conscious personal account of the phenomenon not emerging from processes of bodily based meaning constructions (embodied meanings). Rather, they result from logocentric descriptions that establish a distance by eliminating the singularities of each subjective construction, which, again, are essential to the meaningfulness of aesthetic experiences.

> Self-reflexivity has become both a common mode of thought within artistic research (and even one that has been valorised by the enshrining of the reflective commentary as a component of specific artistic research PhDs). This elevation of subjectivity is a phenomenon that has, with some justification, attracted a certain amount of criticism. (Crispin, 2019, p. 46)

In my view, it is not so much about valorising subjectivity as worthy of inclusion in research, but about being aware of one's epistemological choices as a researcher. If researchers seek to explore different modes of self-reflexivity, but within the established epistemological frameworks in which auto-ethnography, for example, is understood as an autobiographical genre linking the personal to the cultural, social and political (as a means of reflecting on one's creative work in a culturally insightful rather than artistic way), then they do not escape a logocentric discourse based on the distance and abstraction imposed by observation and analysis.

Nevertheless, if artist-researchers seek to explore different modes of self-reflexivity, in which they explore ways of sharing their subjective impressions in order to clarify their artistic interventions (adding

connections and insights to help recipients comprehend and appreciate them more thoroughly), then they will be responsible for developing a discourse in the narrative mode. They will follow an emotional logic where feeling and thinking are linked, and where empathy is the means of communicative interaction.

The epistemological fracture

The difficulty in distinguishing these two modes of knowing is directly related to a fundamental epistemological divide between the analytical/ scientific or paradigmatic mode of knowledge and the narrative mode of knowledge: In the paradigmatic mode, researchers focus on what can be similarly understood by the receivers (thanks to abstraction), on what is objectively measurable, seeking replication and consistency of results in experiments and analysis; In the narrative mode researchers accentuate the singularities and the immeasurable aesthetic qualities of a given artistic intervention. Friedrich Nietzsche (1872) pointed out the possibility of thinking of the individual, the corporeal, the instinctive, without

Modes of Knowledge		
Observation and analyse Knowledge based on the sense of reality		**Material thinking** Knowledge based on the sense of possibility
Paradigmatic, propositional, conceptual	EPISTEMOLOGICAL FRACTURE	**Narrative, gestural, symbolic**
Operates with signs in a logic of abstract/conceptual coherence		Operates with symbols in a logic of affective/emotional coherence
Communication aimed at the non-individualised representation of meaning		Communication/Interaction aimed at individual re-enactment
Message decoding		Co-creating meaning
Validation (empirical verification / logical demonstration): - Calculus and re-association (Inductive and deductive) - Analysis and logical inference - Interpretation of actions - Relevance		**Validation** (aesthetic appreciation / mythopoetic reconfiguration): - Commitment to an aesthetic, ethical and political ecology - Symbolic associations - Empathy - Relevance

Figure 1. Modes of Knowledge and the Epistemological Fracture

renouncing the sharing of thought and knowledge. Far from sustaining an abstract thought, which imposes generalisation and impersonality, the embodied or embedded subjectivity of an artistic intervention proposes the universality of the absolutely singular. There are thus two modes of knowledge on either side of the epistemological fracture.

There is broad agreement on the distinction between these two modes of knowledge, but if artistic researchers continue to understand research exclusively as description, they will always fall into the temptation of explaining artistic interventions by resorting to paradigmatic discourse.

> There is a fundamental distinction at work here: research describes the world; composition adds something to the world. Research, at least of the scientific kind to which musical composition is generally assimilated, aims to produce generalizable results; the significance of a piece of music lies, on the contrary, in its particularity. (Croft, 2015, p. 8)

In his polemic article "Composition Is not Research", John Croft exposed the crucial issue: The general tendency of academia is to understand research as description rather than creation. Hence there exists a desperate and obsessive insistence to account for artistic creation by resorting to a paradigmatic discourse. Paradigmatic discourse is not suited to giving a verbal account of both sides of the epistemological divide. Only the narrative mode of discourse is able to articulate with the poetics of artistic creations, to explore their connections and associations, and to create an open system of dispositions and interactions, in other words, a poetic, aesthetic and political ecology. Narrative discourse is not limited to a structural analysis of regularities and elements in common, nor does it necessarily imply a historical perspective, nor aim at some articulated and homogeneous coherence. The relational operations of narrative discourse may include discontinuity, variations, contradictions, migrations, nomadisms (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980), and many other modalities of relation that may even be paradoxical.

This narrative account, that is, the documentation that integrates artistic research, offers a kind of clarification that would foster the recipients' involvement, both emotional and symbolic, with the artistic interventions, valorising their aesthetic experiences. Any clarification of an

artistic research project should at least explain whether what was convincingly challenging and relevant at the onset of the proposal had, at the end of the project, an equally convincing and relevant artistic response. In this way, the clarification of an artistic intervention would adequately respond to the academic demand for knowledge sharing, but again, this is only possible through discourse in the narrative mode, which communicates (i.e., interacts), shares and convinces, not through the rigor of conceptual and abstract constructions, but through empathy. The narrative mode of discourse follows an emotional logic where feeling and thinking are not separated.

When HIP reaches across the epistemological divide

As is well documented, the early music movement has developed under the aegis of authenticity since the 1950s (Fabian, 2001). Authenticity is a legacy of scientific history, now outdated, which led to musical works being objectified, and performers being charged with making them live again as they once did. Progressively, scientific history was replaced by a new vision that understands history as critical analysis and interpretation of data, but retains the old belief in objectivity (Burke, 2008). Concurrently, the early music movement has been moving away from seeking authenticity, and has paved the way for the much more open notion of historically informed performance, and later, for an even more uncompromising notion of historically inspired performance (Haynes, 2007). In a more or less uncompromising way, the HIP movement, in addition, has not failed to coincide with the aforementioned shift in the notion of history by maintaining its allegiance to objectivity – in the sense that it continues to rely on the study of historical sources and artefacts.

> […] if we distance ourselves too much from the discipline we claim, we do not contribute to broadening its perspectives effectively enough, but become the "other" who is distant and part of something else that is not "us". (Rolfhamre, 2022, p. 55)

However, critical analysis and interpretation of data, required by the new view of history, are somehow absorbed into HIP, which is therefore no longer about the mere performance of historical artefacts. The dimension of performance – the performance turn – adds co-presence, corporeal involvement, and socio-emotional context to musicological knowledge. Thus musical objects are freed from the imaginary museum, where they were imprisoned, to become artistic (cultural-socio-political) interventions.

> […] it is the very historical artefact that, through contextualisation, makes other futures possible through active and conscious past-present relations. (Rolfhamre, 2022, p. 63)

This "invention" of other futures through contextualisation produces knowledge that is based on a sense of possibility, i.e., a form of practice whose analytical framework is not limited to the study of what already exists, but acts by bringing something new to the world. Rolfhamre proposes "a shift from aesthetically contingent readings of early music to rhetoric, and performativities centred approaches [that] may provide HIP with new sorts of agencies" (Rolfhamre, 2022, p. 62), and reinforces the ethical dimension of these practices by regarding HIP as a pedagogical activity:

> […] not only reflecting on the past and seeking to understand it from our present, but also by extending the invitation to use it as a pedagogical means to relate to the past in the present. That is how we can choose to create and re-create ourselves through connections between our own subjectivity, historical empathy, operative performative and rhetorical mechanics, and some sort of consciousness of how we are subject to societal norms and expectations. (Rolfhamre, 2022, pp. 62–63)

Understood in this way, HIP would act on both sides of the epistemological fracture: a musicological investigation into the musical artefact and its context, in a paradigmatic approach based on observation and analysis, on the one hand; and the creation of a rhetorical and pedagogical narrative based on the exploration of subjectivity and empathy, on the other. It becomes a narrative committed to an aesthetic, ethical and

political ecology, provoking mythopoetic reconfigurations. HIP would produce knowledge in a hybrid manner in both a paradigmatic mode – observation and analysis aiming for an unambiguous representation of meaning in a logic of abstract/conceptual coherence – and a narrative mode – creation, aiming to interact in order to provoke individual re-enactment in a logic of affective/emotional coherence. Each research project will define in which direction the dial points, indicating the relevance of the knowledge produced in each mode, and in what proportion of each mode the project should be evaluated or appraised. An essentially musicological project, with a residual or merely illustrative artistic production, would be at one extreme, and a project of artistic research, in which the musicological contextualisation does not bring new knowledge, but only serves as inspiration for artistic creation, would be at the other. A myriad of possibilities lies between these two extremes, articulating research on both sides of the epistemological fracture. I thought that it would be interesting to exemplify how the dial oscillates between the two aforementioned extremes or if there are rather two dials as in the case of hybrid research projects, by epistemologically situating the research work reported in each of the remaining chapters of this book.

Randi Eidsaa's project, in chapter 6, is a good example of musicological contextualisation not really bringing new knowledge: "Even if the Pluvinel's Academy artistic idea was based on historical events, the project was not intended to be documentarily correct" (Eidsaa, 2022, p. 28). At the heart of the project is an artistic intervention, so it is about creating something that did not exist before, it is about creation. However, without experiencing the performance one cannot interact with it and empathetically co-create meaning and knowledge. Such an experience would be further deepened and clarified by documentation that includes the narrative mode: "[The] project uses traditional verbal texts and other written formats such as vignettes, manuscript excerpts and quotations from students' reflection reports, and assessment papers. Performance photos and video clips exemplify various components of the project and are essential modalities for documentation" (Eidsaa, 2022, p. 8).

In chapter 4, Daniel Henry Øvrebø places the emphasis on perception, specifically how contemporary music – whether by juxtaposition or by

incorporating techniques of more recent aesthetics – can change the perception of Baroque music for a modern audience. As in Randi Eidsaa's chapter, it is about a pedagogical approach in which artistic experiences, exploring a sense of possibility are reported, but in Øvrebø's examples the historical context is not explored at all. It is reported "how early modern music, exemplified by Telemann, can be communicated to a modern audience without relying upon the concept of historically informed performance, but instead communicates through the operation of semiotics in performance" (Øvrebø, 2022, p. 1), what can be called the fantasias' genuine aesthetic content. In both cases, it is about artistic education operating on the narrative side of the epistemological divide where, in a logic of affective/emotional coherence, knowledge is shared primarily through empathy.

Inga Marie Nesmann-Aas (2022) concurs with Rolfhamre (2022) in the belief that for musicologists and performers, "understanding each other's perspective, and learning from each other's practice, can result in more meaningful research and more well-informed and creative artistic practice" (Nesmann-Aas, 2022, p. 8). The more information about the historical context – "about how the composers, writers, performers and audiences viewed the work and how they approached it" (Nesmann-Aas, 2022, p. 8) – the freer the performers are to develop new ideas and creative interpretations. Nevertheless, "the historical is the premise, even though we recontextualise it and make it meaningful as an artistic expression and communication in our own time" (Nesmann-Aas, 2022, p. 10). Based on classical rhetoric, topomorphology is also applied to reveal layers of meaning embedded in the textual structures. Thus, in the research reported by Nesmann-Aas there are historical and musicological findings, which result from empirical verification (observation and analysis), and constitute a contribution (new knowledge) to these disciplines. In this case, the dial is on the paradigmatic side of the epistemological fracture.

> As such analysis of the textual material has not been previously applied, this is also one of my new contributions to the historical-musicological research on this material. My interest in such analysis is not only for its own sake, although the knowledge revealed is fascinating in itself. The goal is always to apply it in a performance context in our own time. (Nesmann-Aas, 2022, p. 14)

But obtaining these paradigmatic results is, in essence, only a means to the main goal, which is to apply them in the creative work of developing a performance. However, this creative work implies a leap to the other side of the epistemological divide by operating with symbols in a logic of affective/emotional coherence: "As a performer, then, it is now natural to make conscious choices based on a combination of extensive knowledge and artistic sensibility" (Nesmann-Aas, 2022, p. 14).

Assuming that both research findings are relevant in their respective domains, it might be useful to discuss whether the relevance of the findings on one side of the epistemological divide intensifies the relevance of the findings on the other side. Setting aside the pedagogical relevance they both arguably have – "As a teacher, the goal is to enable the students to become independent and apply their knowledge and competence in a meaningful manner" (Nesmann-Aas, 2022, p. 19). It is not the value of the historical sources that guarantees the relevance of the artistic intervention. Nesmann-Aas wrote that "As such, this approach has the potential to inspire a free and creative recontextualisation that will become more than a mere historically informed performance" (Nesmann-Aas, 2022, p. 20). When it comes to the relevance of artistic intervention per se (i.e., outside the pedagogical context), it does not matter whether the sources that will inform and/or inspire free and creative recontextualisation are well-documented historical facts or not. It is reasonable to imagine irrelevant artistic research that was rigorously informed historically; as much as it is reasonable to imagine relevant artistic research that was inspired by non-validated historical information, by other contexts, or even by invented facts and fictional contexts. Considering that it is the respective artistic production at the centre of an artistic research project, Taruskin's (1988) notion that performance will always be intrinsically a matter of persuasion seems very pertinent here:

> It is true that some performance styles that have arisen in the last quarter century under the banner of historical verisimilitude have proven extremely persuasive, influential, and (with the passage of time) authoritative – at least within the world of performance. […] Whatever the case a scholarly prosecutor might choose to bring against them, they will remain as persuasive and authoritative as ever, until a more persuasive style, as is inevitable, comes along to supersede

> them. What makes for persuasion, I want to emphasise – and hence, what makes for authority and authenticity, in a sense I would approve – has to do both with the persuaders and with the persuaded. (Taruskin, 1988, pp. 141–142)

The ultimate determinant of the relevance of an artistic research project is its potential to interact empathetically with the audience, and to reconfigure their old mythopoetic configurations. This is how knowledge is produced and shared on the narrative side of the epistemological divide, and it is on this very side that Frida Forsgren, author of chapter 7, develops an art-based pedagogy as she describes her pedagogical strategies in a course devoted to teaching American Beat culture at Agder University. Instead of studying historical and contextual information first, in order to subsequently consider a range of more conscious choices throughout the process of creating a performance, as Nesmann-Aas proposes in chapter 3, Forsgren, committed to the "hands-on", "learning-by-doing" pedagogy of John Dewey, claims to "do history through art". In her course, students learn through vivid artistic experiences how to present, enact, re-enact, live, re-live and fantasise a historical past. It is about doing, about creating artistic projects in order to develop historical empathy and critical thinking. It is not about distant, abstract, paradigmatic knowledge – knowing what Beat is – but about seeking a deeper meaning, in which feeling and thought are inextricably linked.

Despite the different levels of excellence and familiarity with early music performance at different stages of students' education, Forsgren suggests that there will always be a choice between a (paradigmatic) "learning mode that aims at a correct understanding of the work of art as an artefact [or another (narrative) mode of learning in which it is intended that] they become familiarised more with aesthetic-ethical processes and practices leading up to the artwork" (Forsgren, 2022, p. 16).

Concluding considerations

Understanding HIP within the framework of academic research has profound epistemological implications, since performance carries with it an irreducible knowledge that does not separate objectivity from subjectivity in a dichotomous way, and develops through intertwined reflection

and action – the poietic and poetic of artistic creation. The substance of knowledge is found in what is done in creation itself, in its material products and in its various forms of writing, and not in the theoretical reflection that eventually may also accompany such processes. I emphasised that creative performances are activities that explore the sense of possibility, reconfiguring our old-established mythopoetic configurations.

It was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter how long it took to incorporate new activities like creation into music teaching and performance, mainly due to the disciplinary subjugation that was forced on performance research. During this transformation period, some of the general myths uniting Western European classical music have been fading away. In his book *Music as Creative Practice*, Cook (2018) summarised these myths into a series of binaries, giving an account of how research interests have fluctuated: "The focus was on the individual rather than the group, the producer rather than the receiver, composition rather than performance, text rather than context, mind rather than body, men rather than women, and the exceptional rather than the everyday" (Cook 2018, p. 6).

Nonetheless, there are still two logocentric assumptions that persists with much resilience in academic circles, despite other forms of knowledge being widely recognised and accepted, namely tacit knowledge (Collins, 2010) and embodied knowledge (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). And yet mythical knowledge, too, has always regulated and continues to regulate our lives individually and socially, including in determining our options in the development of scientific and philosophical knowledge. I refer to the "logocentric" myth, which asserts that only the paradigmatic (propositional, conceptual) mode is suitable for archiving and transferring knowledge, regardless of the field of research. As practical and effective as it has proven to be, the paradigmatic mode imposes abstraction, "which makes it useless, to explore such a peculiar, specific mode of communication [interaction] that is characterized by being direct, non-mediated by a linguistic system, and grounded on empathy" (Correia & Dalagna, 2020, p. 6).

I have argued that relevant artistic interventions affect us on the level of our deepest mythopoetic configurations (precisely because of their

specific mode of communication being interactive, direct, unmediated, empathic), which are founded on an intersubjective network of exemplars (Lehrer, 2012), where feeling and thinking are intertwined in an inextricable amalgam. These exemplars, like gestures, are not universal, but may be generalisable within a community and can only be reached and reconfigured through subjective re-enactments. Thus, it is through this peculiar interaction – implicating re-enactments and embodied meanings – that artistic interventions pave the way to mythopoetic reconfigurations. Subsequently, only a discourse that resists abstraction, and retains similar gestural and symbolic dimensions, may add to artistic experience by both exploring creators' subjective impressions of their creations, and clarifying the aesthetic, ethical and ecological pertinence of artistic interventions. In other words, there is a territory, constituted by an embodied intersubjective amalgam of beliefs, convictions and mythopoetic configurations, in which artistic research fulfils all the conditions for exploring new possibilities, creating new realities and intervening to provoke changes and reconfigurations. The social sciences can describe and analyse this territory, but the distance imposed by their logocentric abstraction is always reductive, because it excludes embodied meanings and subjective creative re-enactments. To observe and analyse in order to produce taxonomies and conceptual structures is to focus on the past, remaining on the paradigmatic side of the epistemological fracture. The authors brought together in this book explore the past but are pedagogically and rhetorically committed to the future. They create new possibilities, and are thus artistic researchers, crossing over to the other side of the epistemological divide. They look back at the past in search of new possibilities.

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