CHAPTER 2

Performative Musicology and HIP as Rhetoric and Pedagogy for the Past in Present and Future

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Abstract: In this chapter, I examine early music performance, musicology and music pedagogy in order to propose moving from what I argue to be an understanding of HIP (historically informed performance) as something analogous to a learning outcome, to the idea of utilising its potential as a pedagogical and rhetorical practice, providing a different context in which to develop its potential. First, I present a canvas on which HIP is delineated. Next, I engage in a logical exercise to unlock and explore HIP's inner workings. Expanding on John Hillis Miller's (2009) performativity sub one and sub two, I proceed to propose four different types of performativity (i.e., performativities$_{0–3}$) centred on John Langshaw Austin, Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler respectively. Providing some foundation for this exercise is a survey based on 132 music research journal articles published over the last five years in six representative, refereed journals. This leads me to a first attempt at proposing a dedicated performative musicology. Here, I introduce a rhetorical perspective on the past in the present based on the work of Antonis Liakos and Mitsos Bilalis (2017), Rivers and Weber (2011) and Rueger (2011). This ultimately leads to a final perspective of regarding HIP as a pedagogical activity providing a space for future ethical concerns. Or, more descriptively phrased: a pedagogy for the past in the present and future.

Keywords: historically informed performance (HIP), early music, performativity, rhetoric, pedagogy, ethics

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Introduction

In this chapter, I will propose a possible framework for approaching historical musicology performance as an active and productive phenomenon – one that acts and facilitates human growth – rather than one that merely represents the past in a museum-like manner. I will work from the hypothesis that the historically informed music performance, when re-situated and re-contextualised, can indeed offer to do more than provide an opportunity to re-experience or even fantasise a reliving of the past. To do so, I examine early music performance, historical musicology and music pedagogy to propose moving from what I argue to be an understanding of HIP, that is, the *historically informed performance*, as something analogous to a learning outcome (see below), to the idea of utilising its potential as a pedagogical and rhetorical practice, providing a different context in which to develop its potential. This has led me to explore the inner workings of the HIP concept from a performative perspective – one such approach among many – and thus to propose an analytical-methodological research practice from a foremost pedagogical and rhetorical perspective. I will through philosophy aim both to distinguish various operative concepts of performativity, and clarify what they offer to a historical music discourse. In addition, I will argue for an HIP understood not so much as a set epistemological apparatus, but as a pedagogical potential for learning and doing early music contextually, for utilising the past to learn about the present and future, as well as for introducing ethics (or at least a first incentive to do so in future research) into traditionally historical object-driven discourses in music. It is, of course, quite an undertaking, an emprise, that cannot be accomplished all at once, but I will attempt to present a satisfying framework from which future discourse can evolve.

From a safe harbour in music pedagogy, rhetoric and performativity, the chapter seeks to offer contributions within musicology that come to terms with and expand the potential of performativity-driven discourses within musicology. Notably it also seeks to contribute to music pedagogy and historical music research by introducing alternative views on HIP as an activity that does something. First, I present a canvas on which HIP is delineated. Following, I engage in a logical exercise to unlock and explore

HIP's inner workings. Expanding on John Hillis Miller's (2009) performativity sub one and sub two, I proceed to propose four different, selected types of performativities (performativities$_{0–3}$), which are then discussed comparatively through various perspectives. The multiple concepts are, here, centred on John Langshaw Austin, Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler respectively. Providing some foundation for this exercise is a survey based on 132 music research journal articles published over the last five years in the refereed journals: *Journal of the American Musicological Society, Journal of the Royal Musical Association, Journal of Seventeenth-Century Music, Music Performance Research, International Journal of Music and Performing Arts,* and *Journal of Research in Music Performance.* The survey, as a representative sample, and the differentiation of various performativities leads me to a first attempt to propose deliberate modes of discourse based on such operatives – a dedicated performative musicology, one could say. In proposing a performative musicology, I am not necessarily introducing anything new, but merely drawing on already present impulses from neighbouring fields of study. This actually verbalises and directs attention to a specific phenomenon and possible cause-and-effect turn of events deduced thereof. A dedicated nomenclature can more effectively help to identify what perspective we are pursuing, also in the future. From here, I introduce a rhetorical perspective on the past in the present based on the work of Antonis Liakos and Mitsos Bilalis (2017), Rivers and Weber (2011) and Rueger (2011). I pursue this line of reasoning not only to understand the rhetoric, design and intention of the past aesthetic object/event, but to make rhetoric the prime operative itself within a performativities-centred setting. This then offers, perhaps, an equal opportunity to implement performativities$_{1–3}$, both for music as artefact and as practice. This ultimately leads to a final perspective regarding HIP as a pedagogical activity providing a space for future ethical concerns. Or, more descriptively phrased: A pedagogy for the past in the present and future.

HIP

The early music revival arose in the second half of the twentieth century following an increase in dedicated academic publishing activities,

expanding academic music departments and, more recently, through offering degree programs focusing specifically on early music (Echols, 2013). It was particularly following World War II, Dorottya Fabian informs us, that the impetus to revive early music indeed appeared (Fabian, 2016, p. 12). The focus was first directed towards the music of the Western Baroque and earlier. Still, the term early music has since expanded to include more or less all music whose performance practice needs to be reconstructed through various sorts of surviving material, also known as contemporary evidence (Haskell, 2001). By the 1970s, the new ideal to be sought was the truly authentic performance. It required an understanding of the musical work to be seen as some sort of artefact, that is to make the text come to life once more in a representative manner. This sort of artefact way of thinking is perhaps symptomatic of our society in general. As John Butt puts it: "In an age that has experienced both the catastrophic destruction of cultural artefacts and a phenomenal expansion of technological production and reproduction, there is a definite craving for the 'original' and 'authentic' in many areas of Western society". I doubt, however, that many current early music academics would readily subscribe to this worldview, and fewer still would do so publicly. The authentic performance of music is not an easy issue to settle in this context. When the search for the authentic becomes an imperative, it must also respond to a cultural need. The "authentic" as a truth function, therefore, is dangerous because "it implies some standard of transhistorical truth, to be valid whatever the era" (Butt, 2001).

The use of the term "authenticity" has, therefore, decreased considerably since the early 1990s, to be replaced by terminologies such as HIP (historically informed performance), historically aware, and period performance. These newer terminologies emphasise the "informed and aware" rather than the "true and correct", and have become significant movements in recent fields of study and activities dedicated to music performance. "It has opened up a wide range of possibilities", Butt comments, "for new ways of performing and hearing and, shorn of its claims to 'authenticity', represents an attitude to performance that, at its best, is both vital and invigorating." Yet, HIP does not reject authenticity entirely as it instead follows the same tradition, only adding the postscript "… as

far as we know and from what is manageable". Butt suggests that the historically informed performance should involve certain premises (some or all):

> 1) Use of instruments from the composer's own era; 2) Use of performing techniques documented in the composer's era; 3) Performance based on the implications of the original sources for a particular work; 4) Fidelity to the composer's intentions for performance or to the type of performance a composer desired or achieved;[1] 5) An attempt to re-create the context of the original performance; and 6) An attempt to re-create the musical experience of the original audience. (Butt, 2001)

Categories 1–3 relate to the artefact-centred approach where we turn to objects (instruments, technical execution and original sources) to reconstruct an ontology. Categories 4–6 naturally withhold an aesthetics-based approach shared by general historical musicology, ethnomusicology and music theory from which the early music movement grew. A typical approach to historical music performance is displayed in an online article by Michael Graubart, entitled "Musical Hermeneutics: The 'Authentic' Performance of Early Music" (2000). Here, the historical music performance is solely discussed from the perspective of hermeneutics. There is no mention of the phenomenological, intuitional and empirical (e.g., scientific studies of acoustics, instrument performance, psychological responses, etc.). Neither does he refer to past sociocultural practices and the music's original functions. Moreover, the music practice he describes is fundamentally rooted in the score, and he continuously refers to the "listeners" and, as such, rules out all other senses. Finally, instruments are mentioned only insofar as they relate to "their" realisation of the score and not the score's realisation of the instruments. He also makes no mention of the performer-instrument relationship found outside the realms of the mere "realisation of the score", which should be of interest to a philosophical website. We should not, however, simply accept the understanding of HIP as a uniform activity. In fact, research indicates that there is no generalised true view of what HIP is in practice: "because

1 Today, however, most would probably reject composer intention as anything meaningful.

practices never stand still," Fabian reminds us (Fabian, 2016, pp. 13–15). As such, continued attention to the phenomenon can contribute to even further theoretical and artistic developments.

HIP can be said to function in different ways. It can be a goal, something to strive towards to gain authority as a historical performer. It can also be a beginning, a sort of driving licence to qualify as an early music performer, for instance. (This, of course, follows the same cultural mechanisms as those of the earlier authenticity movement, although it appears more nuanced in its present state.) But what happens in the liminal space between HIP and not HIP, as well as between HIP as goal or beginning? What is the inner functionality of the historically informed performance? Despite the fact that HIP looks past the idea of absolute truth, it still works within the boundaries of right and wrong. One performance could be more historically informed than another. The same performance could be more authentic in some of its features than in others (Kania, 2017). Yet, there is a consistent mode of operation accompanying the HIP movement, in which the authenticity of a performance is directly related to the authenticity of the sources from which it has developed, and in various degrees can cause what is absent to negate the subjective attempts to fill the gaps (Butt, 2001). This, in turn, relates intimately to the fundamentalist approaches to the ontology of what constitutes a musical work (Kania, 2017). This sort of divide between data and subjectivity has traditionally caused music performers and scholars to walk different, parallel paths representing different ambitions and agendas. Kartomi suggests that scholars' activities centre around writing academic articles, books and editions. Performers are more preoccupied with performing (live or in recorded formats) what they have analysed and prepared, sometimes with liner notes or annotated texts. Performer scholars have to deliver both (Kartomi, 2014, p. 193). According to Anna Maria Friman, early music scholars tend to seek some sort of objective reliability and critical distance, while performers, naturally, are more obliged to cultivate the subjective and emotional. Or, put differently, scholars seek strong arguments to acquire reputation through publishing activities, and performers seek some sort of "likeability" (in the sense of their reliance on a loyal audience to pursue a performance career)

(Friman, 2008, p. 112). There is, then, some sort of epistemological divide between a paradigmatic mode based on propositional meaning (relating to a lineage from mythical thought, to abstraction, to concepts, to reason, to sciences, to paradigmatic knowledge), and embodied meaning (from mythical thought to narratives, to gestures, to know-how, to arts, and to material thinking). Problems and conflicts often arise when trying to translate the artistic and embodied domains into the declarative and discursive modes (Correia, 2020). From John Butt's perspective:

> If some tend to assume that musical works are objects that are basically non-human and thus stable in character (those on the side of analytical philosophy and music analysis), others have surely gone too far in the direction of social constructivism and assumed that pieces of music exist only by virtue of the attitudes of a particular society – that there is nothing essentially "there" beyond the cultural norms at hand. (Butt, 2015, p. 4)

From a pedagogical perspective, I perceive HIP as a somewhat normative, ontologically focused learning outcome. That is, it is something to be achieved if one knows enough of a specific historical musical practice and repertoire, and channels it through the integrity and artistic ideal of the performing artist. It not only entails nomenclature for describing an artistic movement or aesthetic ideal, but also has pedagogical implications. First, this is because of its preference for the objective and empirical, as well as its emphasis on the recreation of the past, rather than the present, which is something else than the present-ness and subjectivity of the music teaching situation. Second, it relies on someone holding the power of definition (e.g., judging when something is authentic or not). When the idea of what HIP effectively entails, and what qualifies as a successful practice is not settled, and in some way becomes part of a general agreement, it becomes too vague to be pedagogically useful by itself. We must then leave it to the individual pedagogue to decide. Third, as we will see below, there is a lack of conformity in relation to knowledge, practice, appearance and perception. With this as a background, during my time as music performance teacher and scholar I have come to question how useful HIP – that is, the stylistic movement dedicated to the historically informed performance – indeed is from a pedagogical perspective,

focusing on the performance itself rather than the theory and data to which it owes its credibility. When used in the sense of quality, assuring that a historical music performance is true to its epistemological preferences and research foundation, for instance, it fails as pedagogy and rather becomes a learning outcome. "If you learn all this and do all that, then your performance becomes an HIP," one may say to the student. It comes with a sort of readymade answer related to its canon and codes of proper conduct, and leads to achieving a status of belonging rather than fully welcoming alternative practices (Bergeron, 1992, pp. 1–2, 4–5). On the other hand, if one does not celebrate the past and historical evidence, there is no "historical music performance", only "music performance".

How HIP operates (logically)

A discourse on what constitutes an HIP relates strongly to what is considered to be the work performed, that is, its ontology. Most prominent among music ontologists is perhaps the fundamentalist debate on the metaphysics of classical music and what constitutes an authentic performance of a musical work. The most popular stance is to accept the existence of a musical work (realists) while others deny this (anti-realists). Among the realists, some deny that musical works are mental entities (idealists), others that they are actions. Some prefer a platonist (musical works are abstract objects) framework, while others cling to the nominalists (music is a collection of concrete particulars), or those preferring a culturally-based position. The latter may very well be perceived as the most dominant position these days, rooted in continental, rather than Anglo-American, philosophical traditions. Regardless of the philosopher's individual preference, the fundamentalist debate is quite heavily concerned with technicalities, whereas the related authenticity debate discusses how performers relate to such entities (Kania, 2017). That means how we can, should or sometimes must relate to different ontologies, and what sort of mandate and quality criteria they impose on the performer.

Although there is much pedagogical potential in historical artefacts (Barty, 2004), I choose a different path. Due to my present concern with early music as practice, rather than as a collection of technicalities and

artefacts understood as forms of measurable learning outcomes, I will employ a rhetorical, communicative entrance to the musical work comprehended through a given situation. In the following discussion, therefore, there is an underlying assumption that the "musical work" exists as an agreement between the performer and the audience within a certain context. I use logic to develop this relationship through an agenda of identifying certain mechanisms and rhetorical scaffolds, which can support the later turns of my argument towards a pedagogy for the past in the present.

If the musical work performed is a result of an in situ communication, or negotiated through social interaction, then it should follow that HIP can be somewhat similar. When the performer acknowledges the audience's expectation of what constitutes a "performance" and a "work" by performing it, they also acknowledge that same understanding of the "musical work" within that particular context. Hence, If the performer does not meet the audience's expectations, the latter may be left confused or troubled as to what exactly the performance was that they had witnessed: "I did not understand the performance; I found it rather confusing". Naturally, any placement of the "work" can function – be it the music, the performance, the audience's experience of it, the film documentation of it, or whatever – as long as the audience and performer agree on the conditions for the performance and what to expect. (The element of surprise is not in consideration at the moment.) The "work" then is part of a communicational agreement between the performer and the audience, that is, even at the time when the audience decide to go to a concert venue, for instance, they create an expectation of: what they will experience beforehand according to the venue itself; who the performer is; what music is being played; and in what context the event takes place. The performer enters this communicational agreement when they present their event (or when accepting the conditions of the booking agents, for instance). The audience enters the communicational agreement when they attend the event at a given venue, and within a certain context. For instance, if I choose to go to the Royal Albert Hall to listen to some symphony orchestra's performance of Mahler (both maintaining a romantic tradition that is quite different from the early modern concepts of music

making), I soon create expectations of details, such as how the performers will dress, the rituals related to the conductors entering the stage, how I should behave as an audience, etc. My initial judgement of the event itself will be strongly influenced by my expectations, and if the performers perform what I expect them to, I am ready to understand what they seek to communicate to me from the very start. However, if I meet a situation that is very much different from what I expected beforehand, I may find myself surprised, or perhaps even overwhelmed, and my emotional response to that reaction is very much decided by how persuasive the performers are when presenting it. Whether I agree on the terms of the "work", and to being part of the communication they offer through their performance, is entirely up to me as an auditor, and it may not be either/or. I may accept some parts of the performance, but not all. Let us, furthermore, assume that I do not know much about historical music performance – I may even be an early modern novice – then at what point of the musical event does the historically informed performance, that is HIP, qualify as HIP?

For a performer to be historically informed, which in this early modern context means being informed about music that by far precedes ourselves and any sound recording system, there are certain features that must be considered. The historically informed musician (M) can only perform early modern music according to their understanding of certain historical data (*d*), certain literature (*l*), their intuitive imagination of the unknown (*q*), as well as their artistic skill and integrity (*s*): (∃d & ∃l & q & s)→M. (Of course, the reader is advised to remember that all these features are in themselves complexes with their own elaborate discourses.) In this sense, the historically informed musician performs their understanding of a certain historical musical practice as HIP, and as such, the "HIP" does not, in this context, refer to a normative, general HIP per se, but to their specific version of it. That is, "It is HIP because I say it is, I have done my homework". HIP is, therefore, an agential concept – "I say that my performance is HIP, and therefore it is" – and if the audience accepts it as HIP in that particular context, then all parties agree to the terms of the agreement and the music becomes HIP. This argument is easy to criticise because there are no conditions, whatsoever, of the quality of the historical knowledge,

but this is exactly the point of my argument. A scholarly audience and a historically informed musician may very well disagree on the music performance, either rightfully so because of a lack of knowledge, or because they simply belong to different scholarly perspectives. But when the audience does not consist entirely of trained scholars or music professionals, there is no way to decide the truth in relation to what HIP is, only the validity of the performer's and audience's agreement as to what constitutes HIP at that present moment. Just as A (audience) expects Wx (work *x*) → P (performer) performs Wx = Wx, earlier, then A accepts ^{HIP}Wx & M performs ^{HIP}Wx → ^{HIP}Wx. For the historically informed performance to take place (at least communicatively) the audience and performer must have an agreement both as to what the work is, and how HIP is being acknowledged within the specific context.

Continuing in relation to the novice audience, the only way for them to accept and experience HIP is to rely on the performer's offering: "The performer presents the music as historically informed and I accept it. They certainly play on some rather peculiar instruments, and it sounds like something I have never heard before. Surely, they must be historically informed". How easily the novice audience accepts and trusts the performer's ethos and historical informed-ness is proportional to how skilled and persuasive the performer appears, at least that is my hypothesis (see Fig. 1 below). The performer's ethos plays a crucial part here.



Figure 1. The Relationship Between the Acceptance of an HIP and the Performer's Ethos. My illustration.

Take a highly esteemed Renaissance musician who is internationally renowned for their competence in a certain kind of music as an example. The threshold for what they can present musically without having their HIP-ness brought in for questioning is vastly higher than it would be for an insecure, young music student performing their first few concerts. Furthermore, when the novice audience attends a concert or listens to a recording of highly esteemed musicians, just because they have heard of their competence, their initial reaction to music that is new to them may not be one of scepticism at all, but rather a simple, "Aha! So this is Renaissance music! Now I have learned something new". HIP, as performed by the performer, then, is not only an agential concept in the sense of how it constitutes itself, but it is also as a pedagogical tool. It mediates how the historically informed sounds to a novice audience, and they learn. The success of this pedagogical activity relates to the audience's response to the performer's ethos. Here, we must recall how HIP is performed by M according to their understanding of historical musical practice: (∃d & ∃l & q & a)→M. As a continuation of this argument, HIP is verified by the audience's acceptance of the performer's performed knowledge and artistic integrity, and their mutual understanding of what the musical work is within a certain situation. From the audience's repeated acceptance of, in terms of the performance's repeated insistence on, a certain understanding of the "work" and what is accepted as HIP in a given situation, HIP is agentially normalised as a general concept. It is how we relate to that concept that ultimately decides whether we are HIP or not. Furthermore, this general concept spreads the knowledge of historically informed knowledge without necessarily having to relate very much to cutting edge academic research. HIP is a "mutual understanding and agreement of" rather than a proven fact. This is an important feature of historically informed performance practice, because, although it relies on academic research to evolve (cf., M above) it does not rely on it to keep existing. My version of HIP may be grounded figuratively on theoretical work I did 20 years ago that I have not compared to any more recent research ever since. Nonetheless, until I am disproved by my audience (or some individual part of it), my concept of HIP is still valid as long as the audience accepts it, regardless of it being up to speed with current research or not.

From another perspective, the historically informed performance relates very strongly to what it is not (in the sense that, for instance, "day" relies on its opposite "night" to be "day"), and it exerts a certain otherness in today's more mainstream musical climate (here, relating to the collected fields of more general portions of the music market including generalisations such as classical, rock and popular). But in what sense is it something other? This question facilitates numerous strategies, ranging from Aristotelian syllogisms with all the logical risks, to the *reductio in absurdum* (reduction to absurdity; e.g., "HIP is not a hamburger." Then does "hamburger" really relate to "HIP" in the same manner as the aforementioned "day" to "night"? Does "HIP" rely on "hamburger" to be "HIP"?), to other deconstructionist arguments, and many more. In this present context, I will keep it simple and effective by focusing on "otherness" as "what it is not".

Early modern music is certainly different from many other genres, or at least that is what we are often led to believe. Baroque improvisation is somewhat unattainable because we *have* to improvise in a baroque fashion. However Baroque composers certainly did not do that; they simply improvised according to contemporary traditions and taste, like we do today. Rather than humanising the musical practice, today's baroque improvisation is often featured as a display of a musician's genius. How often do I hear in conversations with others how brilliant Johann Sebastian Bach was, being such a gifted improviser? But this focus on genius, originality and otherness (the musician is brilliant, and I am not; that is why they perform, and I listen) is not something very early modern at all. It is a much more modern invention, a romantic ideal of the acclaimed artist, that is not compatible with seventeenth or early eighteenth-century aesthetics (Potolsky 2006, locs. 294–296).

Furthermore, how often have I had conversations with audiences, family and new acquaintances (usually starting with ritualistic phrases like, "What do you do for a living?") in which the early modern is described as mystical because it is very different from today's genres. But, as I have argued elsewhere, the early modern concept of music making is, in fact, more akin to many current popular music practices than it is, indeed, to the romantic, "classical music" tradition (Rolfhamre, 2014). It was

pragmatic: they borrowed musical ideas from each other; dance was for a long period of time, in several parts of Europe, central to musical expression; one used the instruments at hand and if the music did not fit the new instrument, they made the necessary adjustments; solmization was a bodily experience, not only theoretical, as the hands were used to illustrate pitch (Early Music Sources, 2017b); the act of transposing a high-pitched melodic line notated with a G-clef was an automatic response because the idiomatic voice trumped the score (Early Music Sources, 2017a); etc. Even further, depending on period, genre and region, singing was about making the text clear, telling a story and not merely displaying tone qualities and technique. To me, at least, this shows that early modern music was closer to what popular musicians do today than what is often assumed. The "otherness" in this situation is not situated at the far end of a dichotomous scale, but operates gradually on that scale depending on the focus of our discussion. When does "early modern" music cease to be just that? In Graham Priest's *Introduction to Logic*, we read a comparable example of "fuzzy logic", where he proposes that a child is still a child one second later. This is also true three seconds later and ten seconds later. By repeating this one-second-later argument for 630,720,000 seconds, we could still assert that the child is still a child, but that is no longer true because the child could, by now, have reached an age of 25. "[…] Being a child seems to fade out, gradually, just as being a (biological) adult seems to fade in gradually. It seems natural to suppose that the truth value of 'Jack is a child' also fades from true to false" (Priest, 2000, pp. 68–70).

We could easily apply the same type of argument to the early modern music being performed today through the binary relationship of "early modern" to "not early modern". This brings us neatly to another perspective prompted by scholars such as Derrida: When criticising something, we are inevitably part of what we are criticising (Collins & Mayblin, 2012, locs. 398–399). For HIP, this is true in the sense that HIP, as I have repeatedly made clear, is an imaginative construct: one that cannot exist without being filtered out from our modern assumptions of what good aesthetics are. No matter how historically correct we are, we are still living and performing the music today. Thus, criticising how HIP something is, is a rather tiresome affair unless one also acknowledges the modernity of it

within a given context. By presenting "old" music (in layman's terms), we are also reinventing it and creating something new (cf., M above), which is quite paradoxical, as our historical attempts only result in innovation and alternative music to contrast, so to speak, other more modern genres.

However, the repeated formalisation of both the "work" and HIP creates a normative, general expectation of what is historically informed. Let us say that I have discovered a groundbreaking fact that widely contradicts our knowledge of how music from, for instance, the Renaissance is to be performed. I decide to bring this new knowledge to life through a performance without any additional persuasion involved. I neither write any descriptive notes in the programme nor present my findings verbally to the audience. It is not difficult to assume that I may be met with well-founded scepticism from those who have an idea of the music. By contradicting the normative HIP-practice, I become what it is not. I am not historically informed. Even if I am the only one who is "right" and everyone else is mistaken, that is irrelevant in this context because I break the terms of agreement of the communicative contract between me and the audience of what HIP is in a certain situation. I am counteracting, rather than reaffirming, my ethos. Hence the truth value of HIP is only secondary because the communicative agreement and acceptance of my agential presentation of my knowledge precede it. The historically informed performance, then, is a concept and general practice. It is neither truth, nor falsehood, but an agreement between the producing and the receiving parties.

Performativity

Performativity has developed into an ambiguous umbrella terminology with different applications in relation to what field of study one refers to and who utilises it. It has inspired various interpretations, applications and more or less competing and related derivative concepts (Kattenbeldt, 2010; Madrid, 2009; Parker & Sedgwick, 1995, p. 2). Scholar Morten Kyndrup argues, in 2006, that "performativity", as a terminology, has become ambivalent to the extent that it is, in fact, in danger of dissolving itself. It demands to be "situated within [, and differentiated

from,] the theoretical landscape and its processes of displacement. If this does not happen, we risk the term bursting like a bubble, replaced by an empty "umbrella" with neither distinctive power nor analytical potential" (Kyndrup, 2006, pp. 39 and 43–44, my translation). According to Ruitenberg, "The signifier 'performative' has no single meaning that could be called 'true' or 'original' and is always open to (intentional or unintentional) reinscription with new meaning" (Ruitenberg, 2007, p. 260). Axel Englund further suggests that:

> On the most basic level, the turn toward the performative designates a shift of attention from closed structures to an open-ended process, which in itself resists the linearity of a turn. As such, it cannot be conclusively dated or located, but has been detected retrospectively and proclaimed programmatically many times over. In this sense, what we need to get beyond is perhaps just the definite article: rather than a unified paradigm shift, "the" performative turn is a meandering network of movements from artefact to action. (Englund, 2019, p. 1)

Performativity, however, seems to have a common trait in that it seeks to highlight and review otherwise overlooked aspects of texts within arts and culture research (Böhnisch, 2010, pp. 28). This could range from intricate socio-political readings of events and actions to merely acknowledging that a musical text is indeed performed, and that it offers something else than the artefact it represents (see below). Camilla Jalving reminds us that performance, performative and performativity are not the same. Although they represent different elements, they share many features. One can compare them accordingly: Performativity encapsulates, collectively both performance and the performative (Jalving, 2011, pp. 29 and 62; see also a related remark in Butler, 1990/2006, pp. 71 and 74). To Sommerfeldt, Caine and Molzahn, "The suffix *-ity* [onto performativ,] indicates a condition or state of the noun. Hence, performativity is the condition or state that accomplishes or indicates the future accomplishment of the statement" (Sommerfeldt et al., 2014, p. 5). For the remainder of this chapter, I will keep this sort of division in mind. Moreover, Jalving also points out that the performative is a constantly developing concept that will not easily be presented once and for all, schematically (Jalving, 2011, p. 65). Because performativity seems not as developed and

integrated into general historical musicology as it is in theatre studies and the visual arts, for instance. I find it necessary to be somewhat schematic, nonetheless. The ambition, however, is not to provide a final answer to what it is, but to establish a starting point. For such a starting point to be of use, it must also provide some clarity (which I hope will be developed further in the future for the specific purpose of historical music performance studies).

To utilise performativity in a manner that enlightens a subject, rather than confuses it, we must understand what it offers and why. As the demarcation between various concepts can be unclear, Böhnish asks to what extent is a performative theory a reaction (Böhnisch, 2010, pp. 30 and 32)? Chiel Kattenbeldt, for instance, places the epicentre of performativity in general within theatre studies, and suggests that neighbouring art forms (such as music and visual arts) in reality return to theatre studies through a radicalisation of their performativity. "This paradigm [, he continues,] may be experienced as a counter-movement in which the arts refer to, and reflect upon, themselves in order to take up a critical position in the larger context of the performative turn in a culture in which mediatisation represents a strong exponent" (Kattenbeldt, 2010, p. 37). Following this logic, it seems that an analysis of music performance as something that happens on a stage, for instance, belongs in theatre studies, that theatre has the authority of and claims the stage. Indeed, looking at the institutionalisation of the arts in the Western world, this has become somewhat naturalised as the various academic departments claim one of the senses as their domain. Music departments claim and deal with the sonic and the auditory; touch and movement belong to dance; and the visual arts devote themselves to what we can see and sense (Eidsheim, 2015, loc. 342).

While I confess that it was through theatre that I found the inspiration for the present approach, I have some difficulty accepting the theatre as the singular centre around which all performativity revolves. I am more interested in finding a performativity, an enactment of the artefact, that infuses the musicology to which it seeks to contribute from within, rather than alienating itself by approaching it from the outside. In this sense, in the present chapter, I somewhat neglect the current developments of

performativity within theatre and visual arts studies in favour of returning to the roots, focusing particularly on Austin, Derrida (who both theorise within linguistics) and Butler (who approaches gender, feminist and queer performance from a socio-political and psychoanalytic framework). Below, I delineate other concepts and uses of terminology within musicology that differ from what Kattenbeldt describes, and which seem to exist in a quite different developmental stage, more or less detached from recent developments in theatre studies. What remains unclear, however, is whether different ideas of performativities are situated parallel to other pathways to the subject being studied, or above them. That is, whether they comment on, contribute to or consume other analytical approaches and, in all cases, what their ranges are (Böhnisch, 2010, p. 32). This is perhaps why numerous concepts of performativity's diverse implementation within the various art discourses are natural. They all rely on different premises and agendas that demand appropriate analytical tools and, as Sara Salih reminds us, there is always the risk of collapsing performativity into performance (Salih, 2002, p. 59).

The question is whether performativity's insistence on what has been systematically overseen in the analytical approaches from which it distances itself implies a competing, incompatible alternative to artefact-driven discourse. This would imply a difference imposing an opposition between action and sign, where the focus on one rules out the other. Furthermore, a focus on action looks past, and ultimately hides the knowledge derived from the research artefact itself, and as such becomes just as limited as the approach it opposes. This would abandon the idea that one analytical approach could fully embrace a field of study, and would be substituted by the performative approach, as well as the ones to which it finds itself in opposition (Böhnisch, 2010, p. 33). In HIP, the historical artefact is pivotal to what we do. It is what is left for us to theorise and to perform. It is the very reason why so many of us enter the field in the first place. This would perhaps suggest that the sort of performativity discourse seen in contemporary theatre and art performance (such as those of Marina Abramović, Joseph Beuys, Carolee Schneemann, etc.) would need considerable adaptation before being validated for a mainstream historical-musicological audience. Indeed, a historically informed

performance without history is merely an informed performance, while history is provided by the historical artefact.

To bring about a performativity appropriate for HIP – that does not seek to divide and conquer but to develop what we already have – we must crystallise an approach that naturally fits, extends and challenges its ambition and interest while transforming how it was understood before. As such, Böhnisch advises, we must ask how the two, the performative and what it opposes, relate to each other and what they seek to contribute. "This necessarily leads us to the question of whether the dichotomies used to introduce performativity ultimately dissolve themselves when implementing a performative theoretical-methodological perspective" (Böhnisch, 2010, pp. 34–36, my translation). This brings us to a central, possible function of what performativity (however it is conceptualised) can offer, as Sommerfeldt, Caine and Molzahne put it: "How performativity can open spaces for inquiry" (Sommerfeldt et al., 2014, p. 1). Or, from the Böhnisch perspective: "A vessel for transformation until the change it prescribes becomes naturalized and habituated" (Böhnisch, 2010, p. 37). This latter view is what interests me in the present context: its methodological potential. However, what needs to be determined is from what perspective and to what end it will operate.

If a performativity appropriate for HIP will function, it needs to be transparent in terms of what it offers, how it offers it, and for what purpose it offers what it offers. For instance, three articles all use the word performativity with an implied meaning and little delineation: one uses it as a synonym for performance; one in reference to Butler; and a third referring to recent derivatives within theatre studies. Confusion can lead to a less functional and effective concept. This would result in a less attractive analytical approach. As simple as this logic is, I attempt to show below that this is, in fact, the current status within historical musicology and that this may be the reason why performativity, as a theoretical-methodological activity, has not yet flourished within the field as it has done within other fields. Additionally, as music researchers have traditionally favoured the "the idealized and abstract at the expense of the sensible, unrepeatable experience," as Nina Eidsheim puts it (Eidsheim, 2011, p. 134), it is somewhat easy to grasp why unclear, internally conflicting approaches struggle to

persuade, whereas established practices are already operating satisfactorily. We need, then, a way of verbalising our efforts. This is provided by Böhnisch (2010) and Kyndrup (2006). According to Böhnisch, confusion can possibly be avoided if one first clarifies whether performativity is used as an analytical-methodological approach, or is a quality inherent in the subject or object being studied. Secondly, one must reflectively subscribe to one of the following mentalities: 1) Is the concept of performativity a non-compatible alternative to what it opposes, a binary entity: performative/not performative?; 2) Is it a compatible extension of what it opposes where we also deal with gradients: more or less performative?; 3) Does performativity suggest an attempt to impose transformation where the difference between performativity and the other is neither binary nor gradual, but transcendent? (Böhnisch, 2010, p. 39). Furthermore, while asking "[w]hat is [performativity] and [what] does it want, and what can it do and [what] will it not", Kyndrup proposes five approaches to a discourse of performativity (Kyndrup, 2006, p. 38, my translation):

1) Types of art and whether performativity is type specific and type dependant.
2) Aesthetic artefacts and their qualification as performative, either in a binary or gradual sense.
3) Where performativity stands in relation to perception, that is, if performativity comes from the perception or the artefact.
4) Where performativity stands in relation to various analytical approaches and if it represents a specific type of analysis.
5) The historical status of performativity. Is performativity only relevant to specific instances within the performative turn, or can it qualify for other uses in earlier historical instances? (Kyndrup, 2006, p. 38)

Finally, while contributing to a theoretical-analytical approach, Böhnisch offers three ways of understanding the artistic event:

1) A work-centric mindset. The (theatrical) work is on the stage, and the audience functions as passive receivers. The work is understood as an artefact with a designated meaning.

2) A reception aesthetic mindset. The work is to be found in the audience's consciousness. They are now individually active contributors to various meanings of the work. The work is understood as dynamic and open.
3) A performative mindset. The artistic event is neither claimed by the work nor by the audience as an artefact, but exists between the two where meaning is created through collective interaction. The work as artefact dissolves, to be replaced by the event.

Within these three mindsets we can detect a shift "from passive to active, from static to dynamic, from constant to variable, from individual to collective, from addressee to participant" (Böhnisch, 2010, pp. 40 and 87–88, my translation). Böhnisch and Kyndrup together provide a solid scaffold on which performativity can conceptualise with transparency.

My present project assumes a theoretical-analytical position addressing both the current and historical status of performativity. I seek to contribute an activity-based understanding of cause and effect within both historical musicology as practice and its artefacts, to expand on current historico-musicological and historically informed performance practices. The aim is to help promote a transformation from a representative, detached way of portraying historical music to an active pedagogically and rhetorically centred view of its formation and operation. Hopefully, this will help unite historical musicology and practising performers, in finding other ways to work together rather than working parallel. Naturally, what should now be asked is what status performativity has within the musicological discourse?

Performativities$_{0-3}$: A survey and a move towards a performative musicology

I have already implied that performativity has gained an increasingly strong foothold in, for instance, identity, feminist, gender, queer, LGHBT focused music studies (Hawkins, 2017; Green, 1997; Morrison, 2019; Spohr, 2019; Thurman, 2019), and within other fine arts discourses (Auslander, 2006; Fischer-Lichte, 2008; Jalving, 2011; Kyndryp, 2006).

It is my impression, however, that there is still a struggle to gain widespread general acceptance within some discourses, particularly those focusing on general Western classical music and early music (outside feminist and gender studies). Perhaps this is because it has not yet been properly defined, delineated or differentiated in these contexts, so as to offer something beyond what is already offered by established practices. Margaret Kartomi (2014) presents what seems to be a promising effort in her article "Concepts, Terminology and Methodology in Music Performativity Research". But Kartomian performativity seems, through its reliance on and approach to a music performance's many stakeholders, to be more in line with Christopher Small's term "musicking" (1998), than with Austinian performativity serving as the foundation for her argument (Kartomi, 2014, p. 191, I give Austin's performativity more attention below). Here is why. When proposing a "comprehensive methodology for research into performativity (i.e., the condition and behaviour of musicians while performing) and ultimately into the whole musical and socio-cultural process of bringing performance to fruition," she proposes a model based on "[…] adapting Austin's three-level framework and adding Sedgwick's level as a fourth". This results in four categories, including:

1. The actual music performed, including the rationale behind repertoire choice.
2. The execution of the music and factors that affect it, such as performance style and the performers' persona, competence, ensemble interaction, cueing techniques, entrainment, and attitudes to tempo, tone colour, intonation, and so forth.
3. The effects of the performers on the audience and vice versa.
4. The contributions of all stakeholders to the success of the event, including the roles of the event organisers, technicians in charge of the venue's spatial and acoustic conditions, private and public fundraisers, publicists, entrepreneurs, technicians, and the media.

Through a systematic comparison of findings related to the four categories, and by connecting them to suitable performances, one may "draw general conclusions about performative issues and, eventually, about the

nature of music performativity itself" (Kartomi, 2014, p. 192). But she does so only by focusing on the action as "to act", rather than what it establishes or constitutes as a direct result of it being acted. They are both closely related, of course, but there is a difference in emphasis. Whereas the first approaches issues from within the action in a descriptive manner, through a contextual reading of something leading up to an event, the latter favours the result of the actions (I declare you married; I promise). It makes me wonder whether her reference to Austin is indeed properly grounded in his Harvard lectures, or if it is out of mere habit that she refers to him (as the "founder" of speech act theory), given that she focuses more on the action of performing rather than its constituting effect (Kartomi, 2014, p. 191).

This disconnection of the theory she ascribes to from what she argues for begs several questions. In what sense does she move beyond a classical descriptive field note written by an outsider (as she is not part of the group serving as her case)? And in what way does her "performative" within an ethnomusicological context differ from the rich tradition and the basic modus operandi of other fields of study, such as music performance studies? The latter springs to mind when she identifies three types of performativity research: "that which performers themselves believe or write about their performances; that which music scholars – most of whom are former or current performers – write or say about others' performances; and that of performer-scholars who write about their work" (Kartomi, 2014, p. 207). In no way, do these categories provide any premise for judging what act or truth they constitute merely by being performed, rather they refer to production, the being in an action and performing. Consider her Acehnese case study "which describes the music and dance performed, comments on its execution, refers to interaction between performers and audience (including judges), and describes the contributions of the many stakeholders" (Kartomi, 2014, p. 207). Here she poses no evaluative judgement on whether the performative act indeed constitutes what it intended to do (in the Austinian sense), but rather shares with us a descriptive process unveiling comparable data, that is field notes subject to analysis with an emphasis on the outsider position. Consider, for instance, comments such as: "Many also felt the need to experience a culture's music from

the inside—by learning to perform it, thereby coming vividly to appreciate the social, emotional, and rational affects embedded in its practices" (Kartomi, 2014, p. 195). Kartomi's performativity, then, is perhaps more a matter of "performance" and "performing". Although I do agree with her that the "limited amount of research into music performativity carried out to date has drawn attention to the need to develop a potentially comprehensive methodology with which to document and analyse the complex issues involved" (Kartomi, 2014, p. 207), I still think we need a fresh beginning, a ground zero, from which the various potentials of "performativity" can evolve starting with the concept, rather than ascribing nomenclature to a situation. Indeed, by applying performativity to music research, or HIP in the present context, we must take care not to reinvent already established, parallel practices, which already have advanced procedures and traditions, but are only called something else (Kyndrup, 2006, p. 44).

Another, more promising and in-depth approach to performativity comes from music theorist Andrew J. Chung who presents what he calls a use-theoretical notion of "meaning"' (Chung, 2019). Drawing on Austin and Wittgenstein, he promotes a performative perspective on the musical work as an artefact, as "an invitation to set down momentarily a certain tool we are accustomed to wielding as part of our sense-making circumspection toward the sounding, musicking. That tool is the conceptual framework underwritten by meaning-as-mapping". It employs speech act theory as a conceptual tool for registering meaning in musical sound and sonic environments, as well as bridging musical and linguistic thinking. But what limits Chung's efforts is his seeming reliance on music as an artefact, and as sound (cf., Eidsheim's remarks about the institutionalisation of the senses above; Chung, 2019), a matter that I seek to contribute to through my proposal. The strength of his contribution, I would argue, resides both in his theoretical detail and depth, as well as his maintaining that "[u]se and efficacy are not merely affordances of musical semantics; use and efficacy stand beneath musical semantics as the ground out of which semantic claims can even emerge at all". This is perhaps what we now need in order to make performativity count as something worthwhile in transitioning the performance of early music,

for instance, from mere representation to a "pragmatics-first" concept, not only of musical "meaning-as-use" as Chung proposes (2019), but of early music performance and "research-as-use", so to speak. The important approach furthered by Chung is what he identifies as a less represented perspective in music scholarship: "[W]hat it is for music to be meaningful". Chung identifies two types of performativity: P_1-Performativity and P_2-Performativity. The first addresses the aliveness of performances as bodily acts, as well as "the materiality or eventhood of performing". The latter "highlights semiotic efficacy" focusing on the artefact (be it, e.g., the score, the staged performance, a painting or a sculpture).

What then is the current status of the word "performative" in music research beyond Chung and Kartomi? A search through the articles (round tables, editorials and book reviews excluded) of the Open Access volumes over the past five years in the refereed journals *Journal of the American Musicological Society, Journal of the Royal Musical Association, Journal of Seventeenth-Century Music, Music Performance Research, International Journal of Music and Performing Arts, Journal of Research in Music Performance* reveal a very restricted use of the word performativity.[2] Only 46 articles out of 132 (i.e., approximately 35%) employ the word at all. The articles surveyed in the *Journal of Seventeenth-Century Music* revealed no use of "performative" or "performativity" at all. (I will refer to the individual articles when relevant below.) A survey of this sort has an apparent weakness, as it only focuses on the appearance and implementation of a single word within limited source data. Although the aim here is merely to provide an indication based on a sample, further research is needed to provide a fuller metaperspective of the issue.

2 There are of course several other journals that would have been relevant here, particularly those focusing more explicitly on early music, but to access the more general musicological debate and to provide some sort of selection criteria to restrict the data into a manageable format for this project, I chose to focus on more generally framed, fully Open Access journals. Several excluded journals were considered beyond the Open Access criteria, but, at least it was my impression at the time that although these would certainly enrich the discussion and provide an even more realistic representation of the field, they still would not significantly alter the results. I hope to pursue the representation of performativity and other related issues in future research based on a broader data foundation.

I would like to embrace and expand John Hillis Miller's (in addition to A.J. Chung's similar effort) approach distinguishing between Performativity sub 1 (the performative speech act) and Performativity sub 2 (performing something). Performative sub 1 and performative sub 2, Miller argues, are often but not always mistakenly confused by "those in 'performance studies'" (Miller, 2009, p. 308). Janelle Reinelt goes further within theatre-focused research, ascribing performance and performativity as "central organizing concepts" to Anglo-American theorists, and theatrically to their European colleagues (Reinelt, 2002, p. 207). In music scholarship, I find that the confusion is far more critical than what Miller portrays, and I would like to suggest a new set of categorisation for this present context. In an effort to sort things out in the context of a music discourse, at least briefly and superficially, I will try to backtrack the term through four perspectives: first, ground zero, Performativity sub zero (Performativity$_0$), to perform in general (i.e., I perform music, therefore I am performative); second, the often-claimed founding father, John Lewis Austin (Performativity$_1$); third, Derrida's concept of the phenomenon (Performativity$_2$); and finally, Butler's influential and popular performativity (Performativity$_3$). Often, discourse is grounded in later scholars' theories while only automatically, for the sake of tradition and genealogy (so it may seem), referring to Austin as the founding father, so to speak, without thinking much about the consequences of heritage as speech acts transferred from one ontology to the next, while operating in different contexts and with different aims and concerns. Some even argue that this lineage from Austin to Derrida to Butler is faulty, a mistake because they aim at different things in separate contexts (McKinlay, 2010, p. 120; Miller, 2009, p. 307). As McKinlay puts it: "There is a real danger that doing things with words is morphing into doing anything – everything – with [Austin's] word, performativity" (McKinlay, 2010, p. 139). For the sake of clarity, I will centre this survey around the three mentioned philosophers, fully aware that by doing so, I overlook other competing concepts of the term. To separate the Austinian, Derridean and Butlerian discourses figuratively, I suggest that Austin's is a kind of temporal, situation-focused in situ, acted here-and-now performativity, while Derrida's is a linear sort connecting several

instances over time and space. Butler, I argue, presents a circular alternative in which an act upholds the phenomena's insistence on its later repetition and, as such, both acts out and causes its own performance (see Figure 2 below). The aim of this figurative exercise is not foremost one of explanation and coming to terms with, but rather separating and organising the following argument to avoid confusion, and pinpointing their individual operational potentials more equally and individually than merely serving the discursive route from one to the other (for the latter see e.g., Parker & Sedgwick, 1995, p. 2). The performativities$_{0-3}$ portrayed here are in no way conclusive, nor do they satisfyingly pay respect to the fuller dimensions of their operation and potential, rather what I offer is a landscape. This landscape may help us understand enough to navigate and see different performativities through their contributions, in order to suggest other perspectives on historical musicology, and how we understand and utilise historical music performance. To paraphrase Miller, I aim to distinguish carefully between several kinds of performativity and show their helpfulness in reading historical music, music performance, and HIP (Miller, 2009). Numerous publications describe the developmental aspects of the theories of Austin, Derrida and Butler (Hall, 2000; Hollywood, 2002; Kohli, 1999; Loxley, 2006; Loxley & Robson, 2013; Marshall, 1999; McKinlay, 2010; Parker & Sedgwick, 1995; Potter 2001; Sommerfeldt et al., 2014; Ruitenberg, 2007; Reinelt, 2002). I see no point in offering yet another exhaustive historiography in the present context, but will rather focus on their core methodological potential.

Before I proceed, it should be noted, however, that other performativities centred on other contributors are both possible and present. One obvious example would be Jean-Francois Lyotard, who utilises a performativity based on a quest for efficiency: "the best possible input/output equation" (Lyotard cited in Locke, 2015; see e.g., Jalving, 2011, p. 53; Koopman 2005; Locke 2015; Parker & Sedgwick, 1995, p. 2). As such, Lyotard could possibly represent a Performativity$_4$ category operative within, for instance, educational research scholarship. This type of performativity would directly address the situation introducing this chapter, but which I judge to be somewhat premature until the framework proposed here has been

sketched out fully. I hope to pursue these perspectives in future research to expand the approach presented below.

Figure 2. A Visual Representation of In Situ, Linear and Circular Performativities. These figures can be understood as visual aids in conceptualising the time domain of each phenomenon, and how they differ from each other in this respect. Time is represented by the horizontal axis. My illustration.

Performativity$_0$: Synonymity to performance (noun or adjective)

This level refers to uses of the word performativity in its simplest form. I perform music, therefore I am performative. A song lyric is performative if someone sings it, poetry if it is vocalised and sheet music when someone plays it. In this sense "performativity" functions as a synonym for performance, an alternative nomenclature. As such, performative/performativity functions as an opposite or alternative to something else. We could, for instance, distinguish between: performance/not performance (Kennaway, 2015; Llorens, 2017); performance practice/work/performance (Golomb 2017); work analysis/performance (Curry, 2017; Korhonen-Björkman, 2019); performance/narrative (Clarke et al., 2016); oral/text/performance (Caldwell, 2018); interpretative/performative (Williams, 2016); poetry/performance (Weaver, 2017); sign and notation in representation/performance in the sense of live presentation (Schuiling, 2019); and aesthetic object/activity (Zanovello, 2016).

Although it comes in handy as an adjective, I would personally advise against "performative$_0$" use simply because the inherited connotations and applications merely result in confusion and ineffectiveness. As I will show below, Austinian, Derridean and Butlerian performatives take us on different paths. This is not to mention other derivatives which will

not be given much attention here, such as Cavell, Searle, Felman, Fish, Turner, Sedgwick and Lyotard's concepts of the performative (Koopman, 2005; Loxley, 2006; Marshall, 1999; Sommerfeldt et al., 2014, p. 5).

Performativity$_1$: John Langshaw Austin

In my opinion, Austin's lecture series at Harvard in 1955 (1962) represents an in situ, here and now type of performativity, which confines itself to a specific, delineated situation. Concerned with pragmatic, applied views on the philosophy of successful and flawed language, particularly utterances (Potter, 2001; Ruitenberg, 2007, p. 262), he proceeds to unveil the capacity of spoken language in everyday life through a very focused and narrow perspective (Loxley, 2013, p. 2–3). Using Oxford "house-style" plain prose he reduces complex philosophical issues – those identified by logical positivists in particular – to simple statements about everyday and commonplace situations to better understand, as Alan McKinlay puts it, "the social embeddedness of everyday language" (Hall, 2000, p. 184; McKinlay, 2010, pp. 125 and 137;). As such, his "performative" has attracted much attention from scholars who read and criticise him in different ways, to which the long dispute between Jacques Derrida and John Searle testifies, as well as the many variants of performativity that have been developed since (for an account of the Derrida-Searle debate see e.g., Loxley, 2006). To James Loxley, "[i]t is the assumption that Austin's work presents no real challenge to its readers, that its philosophical or theoretical status is swiftly registered, that has engendered the confidence with which that work is then summed up and criticised in many accounts of performativity" (Loxley, 2006, pp. 1–4). (It should be noted that none of the surveyed journal articles above cite Austin in their bibliographies.) In short, we can boil down his contribution to three main features:

1. Constatives and performatives
2. Locutionary, illocutionary, perlocutionary utterances
3. A known and accepted conventional procedure (Marshall, 1999, pp. 312–314)

Constatives and performatives differ in that the first refers to statements that are descriptive in a verifiable or falsifiable sense, and the latter simply does what it says. The performative utterance does not describe or report, it does something actively in the present by someone authorised (Austin, 1962, pp. 3, 5–6, 60, 67 and 139; Loxley, 2006, pp. 2 and 8; Ruitenberg, 2007, pp. 319–320). But "to do something" is a vague expression, and the performative is not always easy to distinguish from the constative (pp. 91 and 94). This could explain, at least in part, how quick superficial readings of his work – or even merely citing him as the founding father of performativity through other authors – give rise to competing interpretations of what performativity is, and how it is something more than performance in general (see below). Performatives are bound by intention, not truth, and for them to work successfully, certain conditions must be met and key, authorised participants must play their part (Loxley, 2006, pp. 9–10 and 26; Sommerfeldt et al., 2014, p. 5). Moreover, the conditions must be met in a contractual fashion between utterer and recipient, which emphasises the situation's participants, as well as the one doing the uttering (Jalving, 2011, p. 49):

(A. I) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,

(A. 2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.

(B. I) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and

(B. 2) completely.

(*Γ*. I) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must, in fact, have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further

(*Γ*. 2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently. (Austin, 1962, pp. 14–15)

There are numerous ways in which each individual step can misfire and, if unlucky – depending on how much authority is assigned to them – cancel the act performed. James Loxley points out that "performative utterances are exposed to trouble because they are conventional [and in some way institutional] – ritual, ceremonial – performances", which "can be quoted, cited, or repeated beyond their normal conditions of employment". A proper, sustained account from Austin on what he means by convention, however, is missing (Loxley, 2006, pp. 11–12, 51–52; for one possible account of the ritual of the performative, see Hollywood, 2002, as well as Loxley, 2006).

Next, Austin distinguishes between "locutionary" (which has a traditional sort of meaning, with a certain sense and reference), "illocutionary" ("which has a force in saying something," a conventional force), and "perlocutionary" utterances (which is "the achieving of certain effects by saying something"; can have a perlocutionary object or sequel; Austin, 1962, pp. 103, 108–109, 117):

(E. 1)

Act (A) or Locution [can be true or false]

He said to me "Shoot her!" meaning by "shoot" shoot, and by "her" her.

Act (B) or Illocution [can be happy/unhappy, i.e., successful/unsuccessful]

He urged (or advised, ordered, etc.) me to shoot her.

Act (C. *a*) or Perlocution

He persuaded me to shoot her.

Act (C. *b*)

He got me to (or made me, etc.) shoot her.

(E. 2)

Act (A) or Locution

He said to me, "You can't do that".

Act (B) or Illocution

He protested against my doing it.

Act (C. *a*) or Perlocution

He pulled me up, checked me.

Act (C. *b*)

He stopped me, he brought me to my senses, etc. He annoyed me.

(Austin, 1962, pp. 101–102 and 147)

Austin focuses on the illocutionary act for his performative utterance in its singular present indicative active tense. Loxley comments: "It is precisely a matter of invoking procedures or formulae; it requires such an aspect in order to achieve its effects and make its special impact in the world […,] to be understood as linguistic events produced or enabled by convention or rules" (Austin, 1962, p. 91; Loxley, 2006, p. 53).

From a rhetorical perspective, Chaïm Perelman and Lydia Olbrechts-Tyteca present compelling reasoning, arguing that the successful efficacy of an argument intended for a specific audience intensifies the commitment of the receiver to making the intended action happen or increasing their willingness to act. In the age-old debate between philosophers seeking the absolute and rhetors involved in the action – between truth and opinion; convincing and persuading; knowledge and action for specific results; free poetic works and the art of speech for a practical, final purpose – they apply "the term persuasive to argumentation that only claims validity for a particular audience, and the term convincing to argumentation that presumes to gain the adherence of every rational being" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, locs. 253, 636, 662 and 997; Rueger, 2011, p. 204). Before aesthetics became a thing, however, during the early modern period, works of art were also meant to persuade the audience, just like rhetoric (Rueger, 2011, p. 204). According to Jacobo Zabarella (1533–1589), for instance, poetry and rhetoric were both branches of logic, and neither were a proper science. Alexander Rueger argues that "[b]oth rhetoric and poetry are thus directed at inducing action or moral improvement in the audience; therefore they are associated with the 'active sciences,' with moral philosophy" (Rueger, 2011, 205).

As Austin illustrates how illocutionary utterances can perform something by being uttered, beyond merely generating consequences (Loxley, 2006, p. 2), Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca emphasise the perlocutionary force of arguments. The two perspectives do not exclude each other, and they are not easily separated, as Austin repeatedly demonstrates (1962). We can, therefore, speak of both how an utterance is designed and supported to produce a certain effect, and how uttering it effectively makes it happen. Consider, for instance, the ethos of the teacher. The educator, through their position, becomes a spokesman for the values recognised

by the community (or the deciding politician, at least). Different from the propagandist who must "gain the goodwill of his audience", the educator is already in a better position to gain acceptance for what they teach through "the prestige of [their] office" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, loc. 1133). Their pedagogical activities' perlocutionary effect depends on structure and design, but the ability to construct a truth can also be illocutionary through their institutional agency as knowledge providers, either through persuading or convincing alone, or through the one leading to the other: "You are wrong, dad, my teacher said it was so". Obviously, interesting stuff can happen when rhetoric and performativity$_{0}$ coincide. And this separation, both when relating to the historical source and through its implementation and application today in artistic, pedagogical and sociopolitical settings can contribute to already ongoing historical and critical musicological discourse.

Performativity$_{2}$: Jacques Derrida

At the end of his *How to Do Things With Words?* (1962), Austin argues that all utterances are performative in some sense. This sets the scene for utterances to be viewed as actions, introducing possibilities that did not pass undetected by later scholars (Hall, 2000, p. 184). Derrida, being one of those reworking Austin's theories, often functions as a sort of bridge between Austin and Butler within a standard narrative of the performative (Loxley, 2006, p. 2; Sommerfeldt et al., 2014, p. 6). Derrida's performativity is vastly underrepresented in the surveyed journal articles, at least beyond providing mere transition leading to Butler. A few draw on Derrida in general (Mathew, 2018; Moseley, 2015; Schuiling, 2019), but only Venn (2015) does so (at least explicitly) in terms of his concept of performativity.

Writing a sort of eulogy (or something close to it), Derrida's interest in Austin is diagnostic, and was presented as a contribution to a conference on communication (Bearn, 1995, p. 4; McKinlay, 2010, p. 132). What Derrida does is to resituate Austin's performative within the act of writing rather than speaking, in which he favours a transcendental, general theory of the mark over the narrow, case-specific one promoted by Austin (Hollywood, 2002, pp. 103–104). Perhaps what we see here,

both in Derrida's reading of Austin and in the following, heated debate between Derrida and Searle mentioned above – which I do not pay specific attention to in this chapter for the sake of efficiency – is a sort of manifestation of the differences between what Stephen Davies compartmentalises as Anglo-American analytic philosophy (i.e., issue-focused, problem-based philosophy), and continental philosophy (describing over-arching, complete systems, placing the theme of study within its embrace) (Davies, 2010, p. 18; Loxley, 2006, p. 1). Philosopher Amia Srinivasan suggests that analytical philosophers look for the coherent and non-paradoxical in opposition to their continental philosopher colleagues (Srinivasan, 2018, p. 215). This is arguably why the performative takes such an interesting turn through Derrida as it shifts from the specific to the general. According to Amy Hollywood: "He suggests that in providing a more general theory of language (as writing), a generalizing movement eschewed by Austin, he is able to show the way in which that which seems external to the operation of the performative is also internal to it […]" (Hollywood, 2002, p. 105; Loxley, 2006, p. 83). What Derrida identifies in Austin's writing is the interdependency of context and intentionality, which he finds troublesome since we cannot ever fully know the context of the written text (Hollywood, 2002, p. 105). Loxley, however, finds that Derrida assumes too quickly that Austin shares his aim of generating a transcendental, general theory: "an assumption that has misled a number of readers over the years with occasionally disastrous consequences […] In fact, the thinking of the performative from Austin onwards is inflected by a sense of language as somewhat machine-like" (Loxley, 2006, pp. 86–87 and 91–92).

Following a critique of Austin's linguistic performative, Derrida presents what I call a "linear" type of performativity as it focuses on the repeatability of the ever-changing sign over time, which before him had been conceived more as a secondary effect (Loxley, 2006, p. 109). In my understanding of Derrida's performative, I identify three main themes:

1. Meaning and communication
2. Detachment from the original context
3. Iterability and citationality

When Derrida addresses "communication", he questions whether it implies specific content, value or identifiable "meaning". No, he argues, particularly when we do not limit our focus to spoken communication, and instead look at communication through the written word. Whereas Austin's theory operates within a traditional way of thinking about communication, where some meaning is transferred from one party to another, Derrida is more concerned with the seemingly naive question of what makes communication possible. Writing, he asserts, is a powerful means of communication which by far extends the temporal boundaries of something being said. It is a representation and imitation of its content – which does not have to be some identifiable meaning of something specific – that lives on when both the author and addressee have left the communicative situation. When people read books, they deduce and comprehend different meanings from the given text, and may come to completely different conclusions about its contents. The communicative text thus seems to remove the identifiably social from language and utterances. The original context is not unimportant, but we cannot know it (Derrida, 1982, pp. 309 and 311; Hollywood, 2002, p. 105; Loxley, 2006, pp. 76–77).

From this it follows that the content and meaning of the text is detached from its original context. That is, the context is never fully determinable, fully known. If communication depends on a known intention and content, communicated from A to B, writing cannot be communication in the traditional sense. It instead communicates something else that is supplementary and particular. The absence of addressee and addressor puts the text in a situation where it alone, as a representation of something, communicates with someone unknown. It still, however, communicates something (Bearn, 1995, p. 10; Derrida, 1982, pp. 310–311, 313–315; Loxley, 2006, p. 103; Wolfe, 2013, p. 253). According to Kira Hall, this instigated a small revolution in literature studies: "The buzzword in poststructuralist literary theory becomes 'iterability', the endless repetition of speech acts within a discursive history that has lost its original context" (Hall, 2000, p. 185).

When introducing the terms "iterability" and "citationality", Derrida seeks to develop this perspective further (Ruitenberg, 2007, p. 264). The

text and the sign must then be repeatable, even when removed from the addressor and addressee. A written sign is a mark that remains, and which can be cited, even replicated, elsewhere and by others. To be legible, it must refer to something recognisable, an identifiable, repeatable code which constructs what it refers to even when removed from its original situation. Things can be cited, put between quotation marks, and function within, as well as form, new contexts. These citable codes are what makes performative utterances possible. Citations transcendentally provide the scaffolding on which communication evolves regardless of its original intent (Derrida, 1982, pp. 315–318 and 326–329; Hollywood, 2002, p. 104–107). Iteration is both imitation and change: the first stems from citation and repetition, the latter from alteration and new contexts (Loxley, 2006, pp. 78–79 and 82; Ruitenberg, 2007, p. 264). Loxley adds, "If it is essentially repeatable, it can be extracted from any set of linguistic or social circumstances and grafted into another […]. It can, in other words, be redeployed, quoted, or cited, in principle ad infinitum" (Loxley, 2006, p. 78).

Looking at reiteration historically, then, offers cumulative perspectives on historical fragments being implemented in agential settings. When doing HIP rhetorically as an HIP, what do we exclude from that rhetorical scaffold when we utter? What is being said, and what is not? And what do we wish to achieve by introducing that utterance into a given setting? As Jonathan Culler puts it when speaking of context in the light of Derrida's criticism of Austin: "[A]ny attempt to codify context can always be grafted onto the context which escapes the previous formulation. Attempts to describe limits always make possible a displacement of those limits […]. Its denial establishes a connection that can be exploited" (Culler, 1981, p. 25). Clearly, I am not deserting Austin's premise of intention in my perspectives here, which Derrida would oppose, but, somehow an HIP is primarily intended. One does not merely learn to play a "lost" instrument to the extent that one becomes a historically informed performer by accident. What is lost is the original intention and context, but its transformation into a new purpose and its inclusion in other communications persist, only that it is someone else's than it first was. Thus perlocutionary rhetoric and illocutionary utterances coincide once more with artistic

designs made to convince by representation, association and analogies. Not only individually, but also as collectively cumulative. Artists use previous texts, recordings and films as a reference to inspire their HIP, which again becomes a part of someone else's foundation in the future. Genres assert and establish themselves (not necessarily by the force of the artist) through compartmentalised similarity and repeated citation. HIP does not communicate what it once did, does not perhaps even represent it, but creates some new shifting normativity, with secondary and supplementary features to be communicated. This again is reinforced through rhetorical and pedagogical activities in the name of HIP. (This, of course, extends an open invitation to ontologists concerned with work conceptions, but I will not treat that here. See e.g., Butt, 2015 for a short summary of the ontological debate in classical music.) "Paradoxically," Amy Hollywood adds, "the force of this rupture or of the break constitutive of history is what enables the fiction of a universal, disembodied, self-present subject" (Hollywood, 2002, pp. 106–107).

Performativity$_3$: Judith Butler

Finally, I argue that Butler, focusing on gender and identity, represents a circular performativity that is political (which is also reflected in her serious and carefully balanced language, in opposition to Austin's playfulness and quirky rhetoric). This seems to be the most common and most recent interpretation of the performative today (Butler, 1990/2006, pp. 3, 172, 185 and 203; Loxley, 2013, p. 6; McKinlay, 2010, p. 131; Sommerfeldt et al., 2014, p. 7). The literature in the above journal survey, as well as additional music-related work cited elsewhere in the present chapter, bases an understanding of Butler's performativity on her earlier 1990s work, that is, if they refer to her at all. In fact, only two of the 46 survey journal articles using the terminology (i.e., only 4%) cite the work of Judith Butler in their lists of references at all (see Cole, 2018; Hambridge, 2015). To this, we can add a few other articles included in the present chapter (Franko, 2003), which also only refer to the 1990s publications.

Butler's performativity operates on the border between the linguistic performative and theatricality, and when drawing on her work, one

may draw on one or the other. The presence and, it should be noted, the importance of performance to her performativity easily tilts related discourse in favour of theatricality (Miller, 2009, p. 308; Ruitenberg, 2007, pp. 260–261; Salih, 2002, p. 59). Butler, however, makes a clear distinction between performance and performative, and does not claim gender to be mere performance (Salih, 2002, p. 56). In attempting to provide a philosophical space for both the effable and ineffable, she holds that the body is defined by language. This is, however, not to be comprehended as a reduction of the body into merely abstract language, but an acknowledgement of the fact that for there to be a language of the body, the body must be real thus providing something for the language to claim (Salih, 2002, p. 56; Srinivasan, 2018, pp. 215–216). In doing so, Wendy Kohli adds, "[s]he shakes up liberals and Marxists alike – including many feminists" (Kohli, 1999, pp. 321–322). Where Austin speaks of the singular utterance as it is being acted out, Butler follows Derrida's lead to focus on its cumulative power (Kohli, 1999, p. 321; Ruitenberg, 2007, p. 262). And, where Austin is mostly preoccupied with illocutionary utterances, Butler leans more towards the constative (Munday, 2010, pp. 284–285). From Kohli's perspective, "Butler performs Austin through Derrida through Foucault" (Kohli, 1999, p. 320). In Butler's account, the body is itself temporal and mortal, but it gains its significance and categorical belonging from the realisation of long-lasting norms, blueprints, so to speak – the key is repetition (Franko, 2003, p. 72; Jalving, 2011, p. 54; McKinlay, 2010, p. 137; Munday, pp. 284–285; Salih, 2002, p. 55). The force of efficacy that Austin and Derrida ascribe to the word (said or written) can subsequently also be acted out by the body (Hollywood, 2002, p. 99 and 110; Loxley, 2006, p. 115). As such, Butler refuses binaries and dualities. Two perspectives will be pursued here:

1. Norms and reinforcement
2. Possibility of change

The primary conditions for Butler's performative are norms and reinforcement. This perspective has its roots in her idea that "[g]ender is always doing. Gender identity is performatively constituted by the very

expressions that are said to be its result" (Butler, 1990/2006, p. xv, 34). Hence, expectations promote actions, and actions withhold expectations, in a circular stylised fashion (Hollywood, 2002, p. 96; Loxley, 2006, pp. 117–121). To Butler, the subject is both acted on and acting (Salih, 2002, p. 55; Srinivasan, 2018, p. 218). We expect a certain categorisation, or ideal, and then live up to it as we perform the associated acts, repeatedly over time as a sort of ritual, until they become a naturalised part of our everyday conduct, which again constitutes and upholds the very same categorisation that we first expected. As such, our compliance with that ideal is not who we are, physically, but who we perform as. Separating sex from gender, i.e., our physical, biological sex contra labels such as man, woman, she-male, gay, lesbian, etc., she speaks of a real and a fantasised body, which are separate phenomena. The fantasised body is political, social and ideological, and exists in relation to culturally infused normative truths. It conforms to a historical, but not fixed, possible idea that is sustained and spread through repetition and citation. Identity is acted out according to expectations of what it should be (Butler, 1988, p. 520, 1990/2006, pp. 71, 74 and 97; Loxley, 2006, p. 134; Salih, 2002, p. 55). As such, the social and juridical laws of a society, through their normative constitutions and compositions, produce what they claim to represent (Butler, 1990/2006, p. 3). Legalisation here is important. For instance, one could be the same person, but at one point in history you are criminalised (abnormal and non-accepted), and in the next, following new legislation, you are "normal" and accepted. Similarly, in terms of mental health, you could on one occasion be outside what is, at the time, statistically normal, but the population and research develop, and suddenly you are within the bounds of normality (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, loc. 1241). "In effect, the law produces and then conceals the notion of a 'subject before the law' in order to invoke that discursive formation as a naturalised foundational premise that subsequently legitimates that law's own regulatory hegemony."

What norms and reinforcement provide through their institutional presence is the possibility of change, or collective re-signification, to break out from the power of repetitive signs (Butler, 1988, p. 520; Hall, 2000, p. 186; Hollywood, 2002, p. 97; Loxley, 2006, p. 127; Salih, 2002,

p. 58). Rather than merely accepting the social framework promoted by a group of people holding the power of definition, it also invites actions to undermine it. According to Butler, we should pay better attention to what has been historically excluded in order to propose alternatives that we can actively pursue (Butler, 1988, p. 520; Ruitenberg, 2007, pp. 255–256 and 267). In recasting iterability, Butler similarly targets "the political promise of the performative" (Loxley, 2006, p. 135). Not only does this align well with Foucaultian worldviews, but particularly, also enables music and musicology to be seen as practice and action. Drawing on the historical situation of African-American women and American legislation, Mary Frances Berry suggests that "in any society law reflects the will of the powerful, their will is to keep the power in their own hands" (Berry, 1991, p. 835). This resonates with Bergeron's remark mentioned earlier, that scholars negotiate their scholarship to comply with norms and codes of conduct set out by the ruling body (Bergeron, 1992, p. 5). Yet, Berry implies: "Depending on who they are, some thinking people might discourage saying such things to the powerless, who might mobilize against the powerful" (Berry, 1991, p. 835).

From a rhetorical perspective, Butler understands "constituting acts not only as constituting the identity of the actor but as constituting that identity as a compelling illusion, an object of belief" (Butler, 1988, p. 520; cf., Burke, 1992), Thus, in citing historical signs we can promote a persuasive argument for settling a norm, but at the same time we also construct a representation of a possible reality that has political, ideological and social implications through inclusion and exclusion (see, e.g., Liakos & Bilalis, 2017; I return to this below). As such, conforming to certain norms, such as educational policies or some perceived ontology of HIP, and educating others to do the same, these structures are pretty much maintained. Those who do not comply may be excluded and dismissed as outsiders.

A summary of the survey: Proceeding towards a performative musicology

We could argue that Performativity$_{o}$ = Performance in one sense, but the former is used rather simplistically, as an alternative nomenclature for

simply performing something, while the latter has received more elaborate theorisation and development. I have proposed that the remaining performativities focused on here be compartmentalised as follows (Table 1 below):

Table 1. Operational and Conditional Differences Between Performativities$_{1-3}$

Central figure	**Austin**	**Derrida**	**Butler**
Type	Performativity$_1$	Performativity$_2$	Performativity$_3$
Conditions	We know who says it and their intention. We know their authority to say it. We know what it establishes. We know the context that enables it.	We may not know who writes it and their intention. We may not know their authority to write it. We know that it establishes through citation.	We know who does it. We know the norm it corresponds to and maintains. We have a theory of how they both relate to and enforce each other.
Situation	Singular utterances in known contexts	Citational utterances detached from their original contexts	Cumulative actions in mutual relation to societal norms
Focus	Speech	Writing and literature	Embodiment and culture
Operative mode	In situ	Linear	Circular

The different performativities share a, sometimes ill-conceived, genealogy and operate on different levels and in separate contexts. It is not surprising that performativity can be confusing and unfocused if maintaining that the genealogy represents one prevalent performativity. Returning to the above journal article survey, some articles are even difficult to place, as their use allows several possible interpretations inherited through citation (see Freitas 2018; Moseley, 2015; Romero, 2019;) or implied meaning, which enables several possible readings, yet are not delineated sufficiently to make the intended terminological use apparent to the reader (Arendell, 2015; Butt, 2018; Flory, 2019; Kennaway, 2015; Mathew, 2018; Morais, 2015; Rindom, 2019; Robin, 2018; Romero, 2019; Saltzstein, 2017; Shelley, 2019; Spohr, 2019; Valiquet, 2019). A more schematic view of how performativity is conceived for the selected articles (see Table 2 below) can help. In doing this, I have tried to trace the inherited meaning by following the references (although, it is not always clear if the inherited meaning is intentionally continued

by the article author). In the case of implied meaning, I have based my categorisation on my own judgement of the contextual implementation of performative/performativity. In fact, 32% of the surveyed journal articles containing the words performative/performativity (i.e., 15 out of 46) only use the word once (Arendell 2015; Bianchi, 2017; Bonds 2017; Citron, 2017; Clarke et al., 2016; Cypess, 2017; Goldmark, 2017; Korhonen-Björkman, 2019; Lie, 2019; Mathew, 2018; Rindom, 2019; Romero 2019; Saltzstein, 2019; Spohr, 2019; Weaver, 2017). Some only use the word when contained in citations of other authors (Lie, 2019; Slater, 2016; Vandagriff, 2017; Venn, 2015).

We should be reminded that the present survey of a total of 132 journal articles revealed that performativity, as a terminology, is underrepresented and falls between only two perspectives (with the one exception being Venn (2015)): a generic nomenclature somewhat synonymous to performance grounded in the musical text as an artefact (Performativity$_0$); and a performance theory based version focusing on the situation at hand, preferably in relation to feminist, gender and ethnicity studies (Performativity$_3$). This disregard of Austin's and Derrida's conceptions of the performative is perhaps natural since Butler comes from the realms of more music performance friendly performance theory (see e.g., Loxley, 2006, pp. 2, 120, 125 and 140). Austin's and Derrida's performativities, on the other hand, belong in linguistic discourse. And when Venn (2015) draws on Derrida's writings, it is in the interest of hermeneutically interpreting a composition as text. Of the 46 surveyed journal articles using the word performativity/performative, 26 focus on the stereotypical classical music repertoire including contemporary art music following a traditional format (often involving string quartets, grand pianos, opera, ballet, symphony orchestras, early music and the like, as opposed to popular music, electronic music, film, cabaret, etc.). Of those, 10 articles focus on the music of the Baroque or earlier. It is interesting to note that of the 26 classically focused cases, I would categorise 65% as performativity$_0$, 30% as performativity$_3$, and only 4% (one single article) as performativity$_2$. Focusing only on those dealing with the Baroque era or earlier, performativity$_0$ is represented by 70% and performativity$_3$ by 30%. The first emphasises the text as an artefact, the

latter the situation of the text. Additionally, the surveyed journal articles mentioned here are aimed mostly at canonical works and figures (cf., Bergeron, 1992).

Table 2. The Various Performativities and Their Respective, Approximated Literature Relationships Based on Their Main Theory Focus, According to the Present Survey. Underlined references appear in multiple categories. Parentheses imply that the terms performativity and/or performative are only used within quotes. An asterix suggests that performative, or performativity, as words, appear only one time in the article. A question mark suggests an inconclusive entry.

	Performativity$_0$	**Performativity$_1$**	**Performativity$_2$**	**Performativity$_3$**
Modus operandi; form	Synonymous nomenclature; to distinguish from other modalities; a noun or an adjective	In situ	Linear	Circular
Cited literature in survey	Saltzstein, 2019*?; Shelley, 2019; Bonds 2017*; Arendell, 2015*; Morais, 2015; Bianchi, 2017*; Ferreira, 2016; Citron, 2017*; Rumph, 2015; Goldmark, 2017*; Clarke et al., 2016*; Caldwell, 2018; Williams, 2016; Cypess, 2017*?; (Slater, 2016*); Weaver, 2017*; Butt, 2018*?; Llorens, 2017; Korhonen-Björkman, 2019; Golomb 2017; Schuiling, 2019; Curry, 2017; Zanovello, 2016	–	(Venn, 2015*)	Kohli, 1999; Franko, 2003; Freitas, 2018; Hambridge, 2015; Moseley 2015; Flory, 2019; Callahan, 2018; Saltzstein, 2017; Spohr, 2019*; Mathew, 2018*; (Lie, 2019*); Robin, 2018; Morrison, 2019; Thurman, 2019; Romero, 2019?*; Rindom, 2019?*; Cole, 2018; Kennaway, 2015?; (Vandagriff, 2017*?); Valiquet, 2019?; Summers, 2015?; Musser, 2019

Clearly, a more differentiated performativity has much to offer musicology as its various versions can highlight new perspectives, otherwise implied or passed by in silence thus only to be overseen.

When each step of its evolution is acknowledged for its own individual contribution and operationality, each version can provide individual assets that in comparison unlock complex matters. So far, I hope to have shown this potential, and how together with rhetoric and logic and unveiling mechanisms that otherwise may be taken for granted, it will have consequences for how we relate to the past—perhaps more significantly, how the past and present effectively construct and maintain each other through a different perspective than traditional hermeneutical discourse.

By applying their individual perspectives to the artefact or situation being studied and examining the cumulative knowledge arising from their individual contributions and differences, we may find new ways of embracing HIP within other fields of study. We may find ways of relating the past, present and future at the intersection between practice and artefact, text and situation, self-referentiality and external norms, etc. Therefore, a performative musicology supersedes the ontological status of one preferred definition over others, thus producing interrelated knowledge where the performative act plays the role of an operational catalyst through its inner differences rather than in spite of them. A performative musicology based on the strands and central ideas presented here, then, is nothing new per se. It is a cumulative perspective, where performativity is not taken for granted, and does not add to an already confusing umbrella phenomenon where references to Austin, Derrida and Butler are made out of habit without considering their different agendas. It is not strictly artistic research, nor traditional musicology because it lies in between. Rather than excluding or dividing, it aims at including and inviting all who find performativities to be feasible within new contexts, outside of drama and theatre studies, gender studies, feminist studies, ethnicity studies, and so on. As such I am not (naively or arrogantly) claiming to be inventing a new type of musicology, I am merely lingering on what seems to be a confused, insufficiently explored concept, through which musicology dedicated to classical music and early music in particular, seems to be lagging behind the other arts in accepting its potential. Perhaps the performative turn should still be talked about in present rather than in past tense, particularly when talking about

the past in the present. As Foucault put it in a paper delivered in Japan in April 1978:

> For a long time one has known that the role of philosophy is not to discover what is hidden, but to make visible precisely what is visible, that is to say, to make evident what is so close, so immediate, so intimately linked to us, that because of that we do not perceive it. Whereas the role of science is to reveal what we do not see, the role of philosophy is to let us see what we see. (Foucault cited in Marshall, 1999, p. 309)

Rhetoric and HIP

Of course, the issue raised by Foucault has already been vigorously pursued through centuries in various forms and guises. My shift to rhetoric, however, is not by accident. In today's Western societies (which constitute the reality of my present scholarly contribution), I think it is more apt than ever to promote and emphasise the rhetorical perspectives of our musical lives, and our historical past. This is applicable especially in what could be described as a Western "post-truth" society where our collective worldview is not necessarily guided first and foremost by truth, but by emotion and opinions – what I like to call (with a not so subtle, courteous nod to Descartes) modes of *sentio ergo recta* (I feel, therefore I am right) and *puto ergo recta* (I believe, therefore I am right). Alternative realities have now, more than ever, become vessels of political strategies to subordinate reality, as Lee McIntyre puts it, to challenge truth "as a mechanism for asserting political dominance". Post-truth, as the Oxford Dictionary defines it, denotes a phenomenon where emotion and personal belief guide public opinion, collectively rather than individually, at the cost of objective facts and those who produce them. Through social media, we have been given direct access to politicians and the public where they, or anyone, can post anything uncensored (McIntyre, 2018, pp., xii–xiv, 4, 14, 87; authors' italics removed from the original). This relates not only to politicians but to any authority. As we saw above, we can accept baroque music to be a certain way just because an authority on the subject said so, convincing by uttering. A rhetorical perspective,

thus, serves two functions: 1) to identify opinion creating mechanisms both in past and present sense (and tense); and 2) to use rhetoric again to construe possibilities of efficacy where performativity is a mechanism within a rhetorical ecology.

I have already illustrated that HIP, as I conceive it, is very much a rhetorically based phenomenon. Whether it is understood to have a distinct meaning operating within set premises with an already known social construct (performativity$_1$), or through its detached temporal repeatability (performativity$_2$), or as a construction and self-reassertion through performance (performativity$_3$), it is still a matter of citing fractions (singular or related) of the past, and using them in some guise to persuade in the present. Scholars Antonis Liakos and Mitsos Bilalis (2017) ask "how the past, and which past, comes back to the present with such a dynamism". One must explore "[…] the sudden reappearances of the past in the present, and the outbreak of smaller or larger disputes which dominate the public sphere, break the present and the temporal order, create unjustifiable tensions and construct particular senses of the past" (Liakos & Bilalis, 2017, pp. 208–209). Reconstructions and various combinations of historical fragments of the past are used actively in diverse rhetorical contexts – familiar, social, educational, political, propagandistic, etc. – to provide perspectives on the present, to conceive the now and forge the way to the future. Supported by various conditioning agents – including music, lightning, crowd effects, scenery, imagery and objects – that better facilitate persuasion (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, locs. 309 and 569), it makes an impact (if successful, of course) and lives on through transcending iterability, thus contributing to developing future discourse: "It will be an event for the history books", one might say. It lives its own life (in the Derridean sense).

The relationship between the past and present, therefore, is not preordained. Which version of the past that becomes apparent in which circumstance is unpredictable. Historical analogies are used in various rhetorical contexts "to understand new realities and metaphors", to meet and control unexpected situations, familiarising the unfamiliar through the lense of old experiences (Liakos & Bilalis, 2017, p. 208). This makes continued discourse on what HIP is and can be particularly interesting,

ensuring its place and relevance in the future too. As Butt similarly argues for the work ontology: "Only by recognising the contingency of the work concept, only by recognising its historical boundedness, do we have a chance of planning for its survival and revival in a rapidly changing world" (Butt, 2015, p. 7). As such, a performative musicology, like that suggested here, cannot, in its efforts to shed light on present mechanisms, perhaps escape the personal agenda of the one performing it (if, in fact, *any* analytical approach can). A musicology dedicated to the doing of something by uttering it also constructs a rhetorical scaffold, drawing on historical fragments to promote and perform something specific. It is active rather than passive, and recognises scholars not only as observers and analysts, but participating performers in the same phenomenon they seek to unveil. As Butt reminds us, the function of historical discourse could be conceived as activities aimed at enhancing our sense of belonging to a greater context, and learning certain lessons, "[b]ut this should not be confused with a sense of the past seeking resonances in the future" (Butt, 2015, pp. 6 and 10). The past itself does not necessarily "beg" to be reimagined or reinstated in whatever format, but it may certainly have had the future in mind (Butt, 2015, p. 6).

Acknowledging this perspective, I propose that to unmask the ecological rhetorical agency of past actions is also to construct a transferrable design that can move back and forth in the temporal domain, not to recreate the same significance and action, but to offer comparable ones to create new content. These comparable rhetorical practices can then be used to: 1) reproduce, reestablish or re-present the past in the present; or 2) they can be appropriated to signify new meaning and action detached from the original setting. This is both where Liakos' and Bilalis' *Jurassic Park* (see below) and performativities$_{1–3}$ come into play within the pedagogical view. To make this claim, I will take a position where: 1) rhetoric arguably serves us better, by providing a transferrable, relatable and reiterative space for early music to keep unfolding, than aesthetic perspectives; 2) as historically informed performers, we appropriate historical fragments in rhetorical settings both to construct ourselves and to persuade others and, as such, reinforce normativity with controlled and censored developments; and 3) such transferable rhetorical design alongside

various concepts of performativities can also be used to approach the future of early music performance. I will use the remaineder of this chapter to pursue this position, particularly from a pedagogical perspective.

Rhetoric as pre-aesthetics

It is perhaps a question of separating *how* history is written from how it *should* be written, and how normativity overcomes what really happened (Liakos & Bilalis, 2017, p. 211). The reason why I suggest that rhetorical approaches serve early music performances (at least that leading up to the 1730s) better than aesthetics has to do with the fact that aesthetics is a more modern concern. When researching or, even more as laymen speaking of music, we often assume a position of speaking of aesthetics in the sense of "pleasure of the imagination" (Rueger, 2011, p. 201), and so we keep the canon intact as a framework (Bergeron, 1992), through which we regard the musical "work" to be an object, and the basis for our discourse. We speak of the "work" itself and its creator. We speak of how to perform the "work" in a historically informed manner, preferably assigning "right" and "wrong" to its execution. We gladly discuss how we perceive the work, and how our perception correlates to what the author of the work originally intended (see, e.g., Butt, 2015). To me, this is to embrace aesthetics, particularly from a romanticised worldview in which the audience buy their entry to a concert venue in order to sit obediently as subjects for the reenactment of the objectified, aural, "early modern work". But if such a focus, I think, is to provide the framework for discussing pre-aesthetic music, that is music before the 1735 recognition of the term "aesthetics," and before the *je ne sais quoi*, we are off on the wrong foot. We are somehow judging the book by its cover. As philosopher Alexander Rueger comments: "One has to resist the temptation to impose on the early modern debates reconstructions of problems in terms that achieved their meaning only much later" (Rueger, 2011, pp. 201–202, 213–214). From this perspective, rhetoric should be a more natural analytical approach to the early modern "artefact", especially to unlock its potentially agential and active features within a certain context. In the seventeenth century, for instance, one was concerned with how the arts could stimulate and

manage the passions of the audience effectively. The fine arts were not distinct from the rest of traditional arts (e.g., optics, mechanics or astronomy), and as such, there was no room for dedicated aesthetic philosophical debate before the mid-eighteenth century. As Rueger points out:

> This rhetorical framework is visible as the background of debates in art theory throughout the seventeenth century. […] All parties, philosophers, artists, and art theorists, drew on the same resources for this topic, the treatises on rhetoric. […] Only in the eighteenth century did the Baroque cabinets of curiosities, the collections of specimens of *all* the arts and of nature, dissolve into separate museums for the "fine arts" and scientific collections. (Rueger, 2011, pp. 202–203)

A rhetorical approach offers the possibility of not only appreciating a communicative, persuasive design, but also unveiling the means by which it was generated (Toye, 2013, loc. 227). A work of art was intended to amaze and invoke wonder, but it also had to be believable (Rueger, 2011, pp. 206–207). Some means of rhetorical design could, for instance, be used to establish rapport between two people by invoking the same sort of language, thus building beneficial social relations through positive assimilation and expressed admiration (Butt, 2015, p. 14; Rolfhamre, 2018). Rhetoric, then, was a balancing act between "the requirements of believability and the stimulation of emotions", to secure decorum (Rueger, 2011, p. 212). Thus, when analysing rhetorical design, we must ask why it was put together in a specific way and for what purpose (Toye, 2013, loc. 734). We must consider whether what the rhetorical design was invoked to realise had illocutionary or perlocutionary force (or both?), and how its separate fragments were deliberately aimed at a certain discourse. Furthermore, how do we again, today, put these fragments together in new arrangements to promote a certain HIP-guise? While arguing that the "linear relationship between the accumulation of 'positive' knowledge of the past, and our moral and political preoccupations of the present, is a big delusion", Liakos and Bilalis inform us that the historian's sense of moral responsibility to enlighten the public by telling the truth about the past is misconstrued. By identifying our present, massive history consumption that produces "mass perceptions of history

and what feelings and passions it creates", they ask us to place this history telling phenomenon centre stage, as a social and cultural (even mimetic) practice (Liakos & Bilalis, 2017, pp. 210–211 and 220). This perspective further emphasises the role of rhetoric in telling, reimagining and representing the distant past. This shows how we actively use the past in terms of convincing and persuading, as well as establishing and doing history (Metzger, 2010, pp. 131–132). Through the analogy of the well-known 1993 science fiction film *Jurassic Park* (director Stephen Spielberg), Liakos and Bilalis ask us to:

> Imagine a theme park, full of history and memory creatures, made and controlled by historians, archivists and memory guardians. Suddenly these creatures acquire life, become autonomous, uncontrollable, start to fight each other, and scare the humans. Yet, the humans are not innocent victims. They recruit the past phantoms for their power games, give them roles and often borrow their voices. The past acquires life, a second hybrid life. This second life of the past contaminates its first life. It is difficult, if not impossible, for humans to imagine these creatures in their original setting, outside their role in the park. Modern imagination contaminates the past and its images […]. (Liakos & Bilalis, 2017, p. 209)

Rhetorical ecology

Clearly, rhetorical texts and acts are not self-sufficient, self-maintained entities. They exist within a certain context in which multiple rhetorical texts together provide space for others in an everlasting space-time continuum (evoking performativities$_{2-3}$, in particular). In their pursuit of an ecological pedagogy of rhetoric, Nathaniel A. Rivers and Ryan P. Weber criticise how often, in rhetoric, atomistic models focus on isolated rhetorical acts. "Rhetorics move and evolve, and too often theories of the rhetorical situation and the classrooms they inhabit act as if rhetoric sits still." Consider, in composition textbooks, how Martin Luther King's speeches and letters, and how Rosa Parks' actions leading to the bus boycott in Montgomery in 1955–56, are all treated in isolation (Rivers & Weber, 2011, pp. 194 and 196). (Personally, I find Peter Burke's *The Fabrication of Louis*

XIV (1992) to be one interesting exception to this rule where he analyses the multifaceted rhetoric and propaganda of Louis XIV's image or brand, so to speak). Rivers and Weber's rhetorical ecology focuses not on the one document, but on the many authors, receivers, texts, institutions, artefacts and histories targeted at different audiences for different purposes to highlight "rhetorical action as emergent and enacted through a complex ecology […]" which we can navigate for cumulative insight. "The concept of rhetorical ecology emphasizes the symbiotic nature of texts, including the way texts, events, and feelings influence or 'contaminate' one another" (Rivers & Weber, 2011, pp. 188–190 and 193).

So, in maintaining a performative musicological perspective related to rhetoric and pedagogy, we are able to construe a multifaceted ecology in which we can identify the doing, the intent of doing, and the self-assuring iterable practices enabling and sustaining the possibility of doing. Through this ecology, we can see how HIP suddenly invites us not only to do more than re-present a musical practice so that it is not entirely forgotten, but rather to get to know our present in relation to a rhetorical concept of the past so as to do things differently in the future. For what is the pursuit of the past, the purchase of a gittern, orpharion or ancient harp if not a yearning for the different, the other? The effectiveness of the context, then, is not only interesting and important, but vital. The pedagogical perspective of this very complex phenomenon (and yet so simple in principle) is further emphasised when Rivers and Weber ask "what rhetoric is compounded by the choices we have to make as educators: what rhetoric, how rhetoric and why rhetoric?". Moreover, they add that "ecology as framework suggests modes of engagement, we find both possible in and desirable for a rhetorical *paideia*" (Rivers & Weber, 2011, pp. 202, 207). We start to see a possibility of the, somewhat narrowly framed, *Jurassic Park* of HIP for the sake of society (which returns us to the opening section of this chapter once more). How can HIP be agential and "do" the present and future by providing both a canonic normativity, and what Rivers and Weber call a "protopublic space" where we learn how the more general public is formed and operates (Rivers & Weber, 2011, pp. 209–210 and 212–213)? So, my opening questions (Does historical music performance make sense today, particularly in an educational

setting? In what way can learning to play early music contribute to our society? Could historical music knowledge make us better citizens?) seem somehow less figurative and farfetched. They seem more plausible and relevant, and even possible. The configuration of an HIP "that does" is then, also ethical and pedagogical.

Clearly, we must not only ask how to do HIP but also how we do musicology. What constitutes the way in which we understand the musical world, and what genealogy informs our perspective? Without getting lost in this distant but relevant perspective, this "parecbasis", the issue of musicology can be regarded as rooted in two different world views, at least in how they are portrayed through their related discourses. In *Introducing Critical Theory: A Graphical Guide*, to exemplify what I aim at here, we are introduced to a sort of genetic coding of critical theory through a family tree. It starts from the Enlightenment and divides into various branches including economics, philosophy (leading to empiricism, idealism (Kant, Hegel, etc.)), science (physics, biology, human sciences, etc.), and romanticism (leading to modernism and postmodernism, etc.) (Sim & Loon, 2012, pp. 24–25). Without repeating the full tree here, my point is that these kinds of genetic studies of thought say something about who we are and how we describe, judge and perceive the world in terms of scientific enquiry. Just as the academisation process of vocational music education (i.e., main instrument conservatory education merging with academic universities) does not automatically alter the previously tenured teaching staff's heritage, and perceived "classical music performer" mandate. It instead provokes friction, and conflicting ideas of what a university music degree is and should be, and how its economic and knowledge creating performance are to be judged (in a neo-liberalistic sense) (Angelo et al., 2019, pp. 79–80). It is a matter of formation, of upbringing and coming into being within a certain setting.

Musicology itself is a relatively young discipline, compared to other sciences, stemming from the likes of Guido Adler's 1885 *Umfang, Methode und Ziel der Musikwissenschaft* dividing the discipline in an encyclopaedic fashion into two main tenets: historical musicology (treating Western art music) and systematic musicology (dedicated to acoustics, psychology, sociology, aesthetics and what came to be known later as

ethnomusicology). This Austro-German tradition of studying historical European music positioned itself at the centre of musicology, Western art music or not, for generations to come. With the following developments promoted by scholars such as Joseph Kerman (1924–2014), whose book *Musicology* (1985, Britain; published as *Contemplating Music: Challenges to Musicology* in the USA) according to some, marks the divide between old and new musicologies. He introduces a distinction between scholarship and criticism, suggesting that the former should become more like the latter, preferring the experience, value and importance of music before its objectification. Yet scholars were still reluctant to accept anything other than factual detail and interpretative schemes (Williams, 2001, pp. 1–3). Focusing on central figures (including Joseph Kerman, Theodor Adorno and Carl Dahlhaus) in European musicology, Alastair Williams identifies three main concerns: 1) "Demonstrating how knowledge is dependent on often unstated assumptions that can be analysed, contested and possibly modified"; 2) "The historical and sociological forces that construct the values of musical autonomy […], leaving as a residue the question of how the specific actuality of music can be understood alongside the social forms it embodies"; and 3) "A shared sense of crisis in the values enshrined in classical music is also central" (p. 20). Still, the hierarchical, Marxist flavoured divide between high and low, classical and popular music (where the first was a more preferable object of study than the latter) remained. As a reaction to the American new musicologists who focused more or less solely on the classical music canon, critical musicology arose in the UK doing similar projects, but they also embraced popular music and other genres. It joined a post-modernist movement in the 1990s alongside the rise of feminist musicology, critical musicology, and gay and lesbian musicology (Scott, 2003, pp. 4–5).

Roberta Montemorra Marvin suggests that the source studies, which used to be at the very centre of musicology were pushed to the side by the developments in the 1980s, to be "viewed as a "positivistic," empirical component of a loftier process […]" (Marvin, 2004, pp. 2–3). During this phase, source studies became *passé,* giving rise to a scholarly divide between the culturally infused "new musicology" and the "old" ways. Now it seems that the pendulum is resting in the centre where we see

an increase in scholarly work drawing on the positive contributions of both:

> Now, traditional and contemporary approaches have recently come into balance: source studies have been enhanced by new theoretical applications and modes of inquiry have been enhanced by new theoretical applications and modes of inquiry and newer ideologies have incorporated documentary evidence. (Marvin, 2004, p. 2; see also Fabian, 2016; Butt, 2015)

In the present context, I do not intend to distance myself from that worldview. In fact, I doubt whether I am able to do so because of my upbringing both as a musician and a scholar, and the theoretical foundation upon which the present argument rests. I also doubt whether it should be an aim at all in early music, and historical music discourse, because if we distance ourselves too much from the discipline we claim, we do not contribute to broadening its perspectives effectively enough, but become "the other" who is distant and part of something else that is not "us". That is, criticism, change and new perspectives should preferably come from within to be accepted by its own members. Outsider perspectives have more difficulty in doing so (Sutton & Douglas, 2013, p. 414). Furthermore, in studying historical music, we accept its premises as historical music and the re-creation and fantasising of past texts, because that is why we study it. In the words of Rueger:

> We seem to desire to know those things most intensely of which we can in principle not acquire much knowledge because they are too 'distant' from us and which we therefore admire most […]. Thus the pleasure we feel about the marvellous seemed to be connected with our lack of knowledge rather than with the beginning of an actual investigation into the causes of wonder. (Rueger, 2011, p. 209)

There is not only need, therefore, to reconstruct it for the sake of merely reconstructing it, but also to see it from new perspectives aimed at broadening our co-presence within its realm. This is, of course, no novel perception, but it is a perspective worth repeating whenever there is a search for the "new", or the "other". This could perhaps be a contributing factor as to why some newer artistic disciplines, such as artistic research, seem

to struggle at times to be fully accepted as research by traditional science communities. But this question belongs in a different context than the present one.

Pedagogy, rhetorical ecology and performativities: Past, present and future

For a deeper insight into the pedagogical aspects and potential of historical music performance then, we could turn to Alan Metzger. Focusing on one element of the massive history consumption that Liakos and Bilalis spoke of, namely the historical film, he asks: "Are historical feature films – commercial movies set entirely or mostly in previous time periods – the most powerful force shaping how people think about the past?" (Metzger, 2007, p. 67). If we connect this perspective to David Huron's (2006) ITPRA theory, proposing that our expectations of what is to come are founded on our compound, past experiences and that our central nervous system (CNS) rewards us in relation to the accuracy of our predictions of what is to come, then mass history prepares our initial meeting with HIP. As commercial products constructed to convey a particular message, these films affect how we think of the past and relate it to our present. They provide public references for communicating conceptions of the world around us in a way that do not necessarily promote *historical* literacy: "Filmmakers often use a historical event as a metaphor for current concerns, attitudes, and values that are easier to sell to contemporary audiences". As rhetorical complexities they evoke emotions in a memorable and persuasive way, and the millions of viewers – many of them school-age students lacking sufficient knowledge to critique the films' possibly manipulative and trivialising efficacy, undistracted by counter-narratives – establish the historical film as an important educational issue. "When students watch history movies without the support of sufficient content knowledge and nuanced understandings of history, a possible (or probable) outcome is for the filmic account to "colonize" their thinking about the past – taking up residence in the mind as a kind of literal truth" (Metzger, 2007, pp. 67–71). In a later publication Metzger evokes the term "cultural curriculum", which is to

be found at "intersections between school, home, and the collective memory of society at large". Through this manner of perceiving our historical presence, we can become historical empaths (through the lense of the present collective historical consciousness), who "recognize and respect potentially foreign perspectives" (Metzger, 2010, pp. 128–129; 2007, p. 71).

Perhaps one of contemporary audio-visual historical-rhetorical work's most powerful features, in addition to its visual force – one can soon think of Peter Sloterdijk's connection between concepts of truth and "seeing is believing" (e.g., Sloterdijk, 2017, pp. 27 and 50) – has to do with its *presence*, its being experienced by us here and now, and not then by others. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, "Presence acts directly on our sensibility. […] The thing that is present to the consciousness assumes thus an importance that the [rhetor] must take into consideration" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, loc. 2677, original italics removed). The concept of aesthetics, or art-informed learning, plays an important role in international education studies, since it presents an educational potential for transformational critique and learning (Illeris, 2012, p. 10; McGregor, 2012, p. 310). When, on the one hand, educational systems are utilised to reinforce societal norms and identity formation in new generations (Kohli, 1999, p. 321), the arts have the particular ability to encourage multiple readings thus providing more open spaces for learning (McGregor, 2012, p. 313).

Illeris focuses on three concepts: subjectivation (per Thomas Ziehe's definition), positioning and performance, in order to assert that today's young audience presents a new reality for arts education. Through Ziehe, she delineates a new psychological state in Western cultures where differences between people are more a matter of personality than of structurally determined social differences. Young people now wish to be true to themselves rather than be governed by "social factors that can be changed through political means" (Illeris, 2012, p. 15), thus taking control of, or willingly ignoring the performative$_3$ reality offered by Butler. (Whether they succeed in doing so is a different matter). If things do not feel right, they do not wish to participate. Where the inner world is the only real world and everything else is in various degrees forced on them (the *sentio ergo recta* appears). Subjectivation offers a way of pinpointing young

people's preference for allowing their own "interpretation and sensation to dominate their interaction forms in all spheres of life […]" (Illeris, 2012, p. 15). A link between an HIP that "does" and the present subject's personal motivation not only emerges, but also reinforces the importance of acknowledging rhetorical ecologies alongside illocutionary and perlocutionary efficacies. That is, the parallel operation of performativities$_{1-3}$ and *Jurassic Park* from society to HIP, and from HIP to society: "The question "Does this appeal to *me*?" overshadows the feeling of being in open contact with reality so to speak, challenging the essentialist didactic claim about unmediated sense based interaction as the basis for picture production" (Illeris, 2012, p. 15). This would perhaps explain why Rivers and Weber, in presenting their rhetorical ecological pedagogy, observe that rhetorical portfolios work best when focused on the student's own ecology (Rivers & Weber, 2011, p. 205).

Staying with the student, we can also add several issues: a competitive school environment that benefits those who succeed and make it (Guha, 2013, p. 36; Mukherjee, 2017, p. 538); compartmentalising students based on their academic achievements into A, B and C students (Marshall, 1999, p. 314); and, following a Foucaultian line of reasoning, initialising "special" needs education for those unable to be "normative" enough (which again enforces the social norm they do not fit into in a Butlerian sense). Furthermore, there exists the possibility of our being too occupied with storing knowledge according to a norm (Guha, 2013, p. 36), which in the Norwegian school system is also annually tested through national competence tests throughout the primary school system measuring all students' compliance with the state officiated competence norm. Those who do not meet the norms get special support to enable them to meet the required standards (Utdanningsdirektoratet, 2020). So, what do we do with the prevailing concept of standard knowledge? Do we focus on including and nurturing disadvantaged social areas in our trying to meet the challenges of the global world (Guha, 2013, p. 38), or is this a responsibility reserved for the privileged? Should the responsibility of equality and inclusion, and of making oneself understood, rest with the oppressed or the oppressor (Srinivasan, n.d., p. 9)? Should we foster love and compassion (Guha, 2013, p. 40), or entrepreneurship and value creation?

Should we impose academic excellence on all or attempt to get students to "choose" academic excellence (Ladson-Billings, 1995, p. 160)? And how do we use the curriculum both to maintain norms and/or foster change (whatever is identified to be in need of change) (Howard, 2003, p. 195; Mukherjee, 2017, p. 541)? Does the teacher possess a required intellectual and pedagogical commitment to making change (Howard, 2003, p. 199)?

As Gloria Ladson-Billings argues, it becomes a question of whether we insert culture into education or education into culture (Ladson-Billings, 1995, p. 159). The perspectives presented by the scholars above relate primarily to race, gender, oppression and economic segregation—particularly issues of normativity and policies in relation to individual versus community, and one community versus another community. But their contributions have a transferrable significance that is useful also in understanding a core mechanism of HIP as a rhetorical, pedagogical, performativities contingent, and social psychological project: inclusion versus exclusion; compliance to the norm or misconduct; safekeeping canons or going rogue; creating a piece of art or a piece of history (or both). Madhumita Guha reminds us that "[e]ducation is in continuation of the past to the present and will be carried over to the future. What we receive in the present is the result of the efforts put in by our ancestors. Every period of history leaves a mark in the system of education" (Guha, 2013, p. 41). As Tyrone C. Howard reminds us (alongside the numerous publications drawing on Butler's performativity$_3$), we must "[r]ecognize that teaching is not a neutral act" (Howard, 2003, p. 200), and as Nina S. Edsheim argues in different circumstances: "[…] if we reduce and limit the world we inhabit, we reduce and limit ourselves" (Eidsheim, 2015, loc. 325). Those having been given some sort of pedagogical mandate (teacher, concert presenter, musician, historian, etc.) must remember that the sort of normalising framework portrayed by those above and especially Butler is still very much at work, and also that those who violate the norms bring cultural capital to the community, which can widen the perspectives of mainstream norms and worldviews (Howard, 2003, p. 197–198). The ability to truly make an impact on others depends on being in a position to do so, and one also often sees a relationship between one's personal interests, external attitudes, and where one makes

an impact (Berry, 1982, p. 288 and 299). Furthermore there is the question of whether we, in effect, make an impact on ourselves, on others or both. Mary Frances Berry reminds us of impact inconsistencies when she turns to post World War II negotiations between US officials and representatives from Japan and Germany in relation to the two countries' post-war constitutions: The US delegates insisted on guaranteeing equal rights for women in Japan and Germany, yet at the same time opposed this for American women (Berry, 1988, pp. 31–32).

In light of this recent parecbasis, the relationship between individual and community is interesting, not only in terms of achieving verified or falsified compliance with social, cultural and political norms, but also in terms of early music's (or classical music in general) future recruitment. The "What's in it for me?" does not necessarily correspond to the interest in and motivation behind historic preservation, that is, the balancing act between presentism and historicism. In my own experience, I have seen numerous films, re-enactment festival reports, and other manifestations of the historical where much effort and attention to detail was given to the visual, yet the music could be anything, without any historical connection. The historical *music* performance, at least based on my personal observations here, is then at risk of being the first to perish in the mass historical consciousness, at least in the traditional sense (historically themed computer games, in general, are particularly good references for such problems, where the lute can be anything and sound like anything, but I must postpone this perspective for future work).

So, what can an HIP pedagogically do for the past in the present and future? Eidsheim in particular reminds us, "Most of the live music we hear in a Western context is presented within an acoustic frame so naturalized that any other acoustic setting is understood as wrong rather than different" (Eidsheim, 2015, loc. 782). Perhaps, by merely recognising the mechanics of normativity and musical canons and reacting to the past "thinking about significance, long-term causation, and interpretation of events and meaning […,] between what happened in the past and what that means to our world today", we can identify multiplicity and diversity in historical framing in order to foster more ethically contingent debate (Metzger, 2010, p. 133). For instance: What identities does HIP

promote and perform? How do non-typical communities relate to what HIP offers? How does HIP perform gender? The questions are manifold, and I hope that the performative musicology perspective promoted here can contribute to these issues in the future by highlighting HIP's contextual relations as an activity strongly related to and relying on the historical artefact. However the possibilities introduced by deliberate use of cumulative rhetorical fragments of historical essence, are by no means automatic, nor easily implemented. In fact, given the recent upswing in exclusive nationalistic rhetoric in Western politics and media, we may ask whether the numerous World War II films produced in recent times do in fact contribute on a mass scale to learning from history and nurturing compassion and tolerance, or if they pass us by as uncritical, entertaining narratives. Where do we identify our thresholds for tolerance (e.g., "They can do or be whatever they want, as long as it is not here with me", which is indeed an example for ethical discussion)?

Through Julia Annas' use of music performance analogies to understand the formation and development of virtue, we see how learning to act depends on an initial trust in the educator. In order for what we learn to promote virtue rather than mere habit, there must be an inherent drive in us to aspire; to understand and act deliberately before replicating what should be done; to habituate before becoming mere routine (Annas, 2011, pp. 15, 52 and 87). A rhetorical and performativities centred focus on HIP as an activity, with different degrees of efficacy in a pedagogical setting, may well provide such a space, functioning as an ongoing activity rather than a final end, or at least a state of truth we can relate to normatively. Many didactical approaches could easily be made interesting and fruitful here (e.g., Guha, 2013; Howard, 2003; Metzger 2001, 2010, and many others not discussed here, such as Lynn Fels' performative inquiry (2015) and Irit Rogoff's criticality (2003, 2006)). However let us return to Helene Illeris (2012) as she is already included in the present text through her emphasis on art pedagogy in relation to subjectivation, in particular. To meet the subjectivising self-centredness of the young generation, she argues, one must seek to position the students in a concrete situation and in relation to other positions (which can also change within the same situation). Positioning, as a pedagogical concept, "is about getting and giving

possibilities of experiencing the possibility to act that can challenge the sides of subjectivation that lock the learners into a limiting self-centredness". This means that, in meeting the artwork, one transcends the cognition and analysis of representation to:

> work with an active construction of identity and action forms as a presentation of possible realities […, replacing artefact analysis with] strategic experiments where the question "What is the meaning expressed by this work?" is replaced by the questions "How can I act in relation to this? Which positioning possibilities does this construct?" (Illeris, 2012, p. 16)

Exchanging passive empathy to the artwork for the exposure and creation of relations to the artwork, Illeris also emphasises that "positions are social products to be played with, without constantly wondering whether what one does or says is in harmony with "oneself". […] One must do something, one must choose" (p. 16). While Illeris' research bases itself in visual arts education and the aesthetic experience, a shift from aesthetically contingent readings of early music to rhetoric, and performativities centred approaches may provide HIP with new sorts of agencies. This may activate a new set of functions within early music discourse, as a way to appreciate by not only reflecting on the past and seeking to understand it from our present, but also by extending the invitation to use it as a pedagogical means to relate to the past in the present. That is how we can choose to create and re-create ourselves through connections between our own subjectivity, historical empathy, operative performative and rhetorical mechanics, and some sort of consciousness of how we are subject to societal norms and expectations. Without leading to presentism where the historical artefact is made obsolete, we assert that it is the very historical artefact that, through contextualisation, makes other futures possible through active and conscious past-present relations.

Concluding discussion: Performative musicology and foreseeing the future of HIP

The first attempt to enter a different perspective, such as the one outlined here, can certainly provoke a feeling of opening Pandora's box.

Every perspective demands additional ones that have to be postponed for future efforts, thus leaving much of the "story" untold. But what this exercise has shown is, hopefully, that different concepts of the performative, rhetoric, pedagogy and habit, collectively and cumulatively provide important elements for a reconfiguration of our understanding of what it means to be an HIP performer, what responsibility that entails, and how HIP can "do ethics". Performative musicology thus acknowledges its creative and productive agency. Rather than representing, re-establishing and re-enacting past musical practices, it offers something else. It is not merely historical deciphering and reconstruction; it is not merely the performance of historical artefacts; it is neither performance as theatricality, classical music craftspersonship nor re-enactment in a singular sense. It is a cumulative construction aimed at establishing something through its activity. Therefore, the performativities focused perspective drawing on pedagogy and rhetoric presented here – without excluding other possible approaches to the practice, but contributing to them – offers a historically informed music performance practice highlighting it's rhetorical agency. In so doing, we regard historical music performance practice as neither an "artefact" alone, nor as only constituted by social practice, nor only existing in the theoretical, philosophical domain. What we pursue here is the cumulative relationship between the individual contributions emphasising dynamic readings from more than one perspective, rather than determining and safekeeping one preferred ontology. We look beyond the separate spaces and agencies provided by the score, sound, reception, meaning making, aestheticism, historicity, embodiment, etc., to gain a richer understanding of cause and effect in broader temporal, situational, practical and social contexts, focusing directly on agency. Such persuasive agency, naturally, will not only affect present audiences and participants, but will also set a course for future activities to unfold. This, obviously, not only allows HIP to be read as a pedagogical and rhetorical practice, but will also forge the way to its ethical agency. As Liakos and Bilalis assert: "[…] new events illuminate the past in a different way, shed light on different events or allow new interpretations of past events. The past has power and provides images and emotions that escape from the intentionality of its re-evocation" (Liakos & Bilalis, 2017, p. 208).

Simply put: I seek to contribute to HIP by moving beyond the traditional text-performance-reception approach, without moving into historically detached, here and now focused branches of performance studies, in order to examine what early music performance, in this case, does and how it is used to move forward.

This supports the chapter's hypothesis that the historically informed music performance, when re-situated and re-contextualised, can indeed offer to do more than provide an opportunity to re-experience or even fantasise a re-living of the past. If I am right in my compartmentalisation of these theories, particularly when considering performativities$_{1–3}$, then we are at the same time presented with three different opportunities for rhetorical ecologies and decorum, pedagogy and ethical discourse, particularly in terms of virtue, *paideia* and *phronesis*, that is education for the ideal member of a state. Of course, the latter perspectives represent huge, complicated questions, deserving much more attention and thought than the present context can provide. However I will nonetheless introduce certain perspectives that I hope to pursue later in other, more fitting, publications.

Nodding to Austin's (1962) work while asking "how to do things with HIP", a theoretical utopia for this operation could possibly look something like this:

P: If HIP persuades the audience, and the performers theselves believe they portray a truthful representation of past musical practice, then HIP can establish itself (performativities$_{1–x}$) as a juxtaposed *true representation of the past* (performativity$_1$).

$\Gamma_1(x)$: If some *P* is reiterated by multiple actors, a cumulative understanding of the past is established (performativities$_{2, 3}$).

Γ_2: Through reiterating selected fragments of our perceived, construed past we discover our present: We both see the past through our present understanding and current worldviews, and understand our present by identifying and (citationally) recognising features of the past that we translate into knowledge of the present (performativity$_2$).

$\alpha(x)$: Current politicians define a model citizen, which educational institutions should realise (performativity$_1$) mimetically, but knowledge

of the past can produce alternative, competing models. Cumulative knowledge of the past and the present enables us to judge the state model in comparison to possible alternatives. Persuasive reasoning (utilising our *Jurassic Park*) may lead to the conviction of which model citizen (state or alternative) is desirable and what effect it would have on society if collectively implemented.

β(x): The conception and implementation of *α(x)* produce moral wisdom accordingly. The acceptance of and agency effectuated through the lense of said moral wisdom (*phronesis*) lead to new policies, new blueprints and norms, new scaffolds to be realised through education (from the individual teacher to state white papers; *paideia*).

W(x): If all above are successful, we can continue the reiteration (performativity$_2$) to produce a scaffold enabling us to imagine a *possible* future. By acknowledging, accepting and aspiring to the proposed future, we could formalise a norm that serves as a blueprint that we, in the end, realise by acting it out (performativity$_3$), if enforced persuasively through the educational system.

Now, this is obviously not a realistic real-life scenario because it depends on far too many variables to be successful and harmonious. It can only serve as an in vitro assimilation of some sort of operationality. Moreover, the model above would demand an HIP that is not conceived as a normative end, but one that acts; one that calls for action; one that ultimately does something. Although an alternative worldview may be easily designed and appeal to the masses, current managerial practices within the educational system may make it hard to implement practically (see e.g., Rolfhamre, 2020). What this logic suggests, however, is that a linkage between HIP and societal impact, sustainability and imagining the future is not entirely inconceivable. But it relies on successful rhetoric and conviction throughout its entire process. Although the present context does not sufficiently provide enough foundation to satisfy this logic, it possibly provides enough incentive to give the idea further consideration in future research work. (And have we not learned from recent development that anything goes, anything is possible in our post-truth (McIntyre, 2018), *sentio/puto ergo recta* society, as long as you find yourself in the right time and place to make it happen (performativities$_{1,3}$ in particular)?)

Martha C. Nussbaum argues that aesthetic activity creates a safe and protected "potential space" in which we "investigate and try out some of life's possibilities […]. Because we are in a context of safety, we are also encouraged to have a range of reactive emotions" (Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 243–244, 246). Through the additional perspectives above – primarily those of Illeris (2012), Liakos and Bilalis (2017), Rivers and Weber (2011) and Rueger (2011) – I conclude that performative musicology, as a distinct, dedicated focus, has something to offer, because it goes beyond the idea of understanding musical practice from an artefact-performance-reception view, to pronouncing its agential advocacy for change (or sometimes for resisting change). It is both a performative perspective for historical musicology, and a musicology that seeks to be performative, and as such, it is also inevitably ethically charged precisely because of its aspiring efficacy.

This is my first publication on, and the first attempt to outline, the topic of what could be identified as performative musicology. It will be interesting to see how it may develop in the future. Suffice it to say, for the moment, that there is a growing tendency to address performativities more fully in music research (see e.g., Chung, 2019; Kartomi, 2014; Madrid, 2009), in addition to the established Butlerian approaches affiliated with, for instance, identity, gender and ethnicity studies. In one sense, we seek to join forces with Chung's P_1-Performativity and P_2-Performativity, as well as Miller's Performativities sub 1 and sub 2 (Chung, 2019; Miller, 2009), while at the same time acknowledging the individual contributions and genealogical steps of performativity's development (e.g., Loxley, 2006; Loxley & Robson, 2013) in close relation to pedagogy and rhetoric. I offer here a possible starting point, not a complete methodology, but rather a contributory incentive towards creating a course for future research: What will HIP do for us in the future? And what will we do for HIP? Well, we will simply have to see.

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